Thus Nature gives us (let it check our pride) 195 The virtue nearest to our vice ally'd: Reason the bias turns from good to ill, And Nero reigns a Titus, if he will. The VARIATIONS. Peleus' great Son, or Brutus, who had known, NOTES. VER. 197. Reafon the bias, &c.] But left it should be objected that this account favours the doctrine of Neceffity, and would infinuate that men are only acted upon, in the production of good out of evil; the Poet teacheth (from Ver. 196 to 203.) that Man is a free agent, and hath it in his power to turn the natural paffions into virtues or into vices, properly fo called: "Reason the bias turns to good from ill, And Nero reigns a Titus, if he will." Secondly, If it should be objected, that though he doth, indeed, tell us fome actions are beneficial and fome hurtful, yet he could not call thofe virtuous, nor thefe vicious, because, as he hath defcribed things, the motive appears to be only the gratification of fome paffion; give me leave to answer for him, that this would be mistaking the argument, which (to Ver. 249. of this epiftle) confiders the paffions only with regard to Society, that is, with regard to their effects rather than their motives: That, however, it is his defign to teach that actions are properly virtuous and vicious; and though 74 The fiery foul abhorr❜d in Catiline, In Decius charms, in Curtius is divine: 200 205 This light and darkness in our chaos join'd, What fhall divide? The God within the mind. Extremes in Nature equal ends produce, In Man they join to fome mysterious` use; Tho' each by turns the other's bound invade, As, in fome well-wrought picture, light and fhade, NOTES. And though it be difficult to diftinguish genuine virtue from fpurious, they having both the fame appearance, and both the fame public effects, yet that they may be difentangled. If it be asked, by what means? He replies (from Ver. 202 to 205.) by conscience ;— the God within the mind;—and this is to the purpose; for it is a Man's own concern, and no one's elfe, to know whether his virtue be pure and folid; for what is it to others, whether this virtue (while, as to them, the effect of it is the fame) be real or imaginary? W. VER. 205. Extremes in Nature equal ends produce, &c.] But ftill it will be faid, Why all this difficulty to distinguish true virtue from falfe? The Poet fhews why, (from Ver. 204 to 211.) That though indeed vice and virtue fo invade each other's bounds, that sometimes we can scarce tell where one ends and the other begins, yet great purposes are served thereby, no less than the perfecting the constitution of the Whole, as lights and shades, which run into one another infenfibly in a well-wrought picture, make the harmony and spirit of the compofition. But on this account to fay there is neither vice nor virtue, the Poet fhews (from Ver. 210 to 217.) would be just as wife as to say, there is neither black nor white; because the shade of that, and the light of this, often run into one another, and are mutually lost : "Afk your own heart, and nothing is fo plain; 'Tis to mistake them, cofts the time and pain." This is an error of speculation, which leads men so foolishly to conclude, that there is neither vice nor virtuę. W. And oft fo mix, the diff'rence is too nice Fools! who from hence into the notion fall, We first endure, then pity, then embrace. 210 215 220 But where th' Extreme of Vice, was ne'er agreed: Afk where's the North? at York, 'tis on the Tweed; In Scotland, at the Orcades; and there, At Greenland, Zembla, or the Lord knows where. VARIATIONS. After Ver. 220. in the 1ft Edition, followed thefe, NOTES. No VER. 217. Vice is a monfter, &c.] There is another Error, an error of practice, which hath more general and hurtful effects; and is next confidered (from Ver. 216 to 221.) It is this, that though, at the first afpect, Vice be fo horrible as to fright the beholder, yet, when by habit we are once grown familiar with her, we first fuffer, and in time begin to lose the memory of her nature; which neceffarily implies an equal ignorance in the nature of virtue. Hence men conclude, that there is neither one nor the other. W. "Hence we find," fays that amiable moralift Hutchefon," that the basest actions are dreft in fome tolerable mafk:" "What others call avarice, appears to the agent a prudent care of a family or friends; fraud, artful conduct; malice and revenge, a just sense of honour; fire, and fword, and defolation among enemies, a juft thorough No creature owns it in the first degree, But thinks his neighbour farther gone than he; 225 230 'Tis VARIATIONS. After Ver. 226. in the MS. The Col'nel fwears the Agent is a dog, NOTES. thorough defence of our country; perfecution, a zeal for truth, and for the eternal happiness of men, which heretics oppose." VER. 231. Virtuous and vicious] A fine and juft reflection, and well calculated to subdue and extinguish that petulant contempt and unmerited averfion which men too generally entertain of each other, and which gradually diminish and deftroy the focial and kind affections. “Our emulation," fays the amiable and sagacious Hutchefon, "our jealoufy or envy, should be reftrained in a great measure by a constant resolution of bearing always in our minds the lovely fide of every character." And Plato obferves, in the Phædon, that there is something amiable in almost every man living. This charitable doctrine of putting candid constructions on actions that appear blameable, nay, deteftable and deformed, is illustrated and enforced, with great strength of argument and of benevolence, by King, in the 5th ch. of the Origin of Evil, when he endeavours to evince the prevalence of moral good in the world. VER. 234. By fits, what they despise.] Xan π»v è-Onòv Èppe an, was a faying of Pittacus, quoted and commented upon by Plato, in the Protagoras. 'Tis but by parts we follow good or ill; 235 For, Vice or Virtue, Self directs it ftill; Each individual seeks a fev'ral goal; But HEAV'N's great view is One, and that the Whole. That disappoints th' effect of ev'ry vice; That, happy frailties to all ranks apply'd; Heav'n forming each on other to depend, 240 245 250 Bids 1 NOTES. VER. 239. That counter-works each folly and caprice ;] The mention of this principle, that Self directs vice and virtue, and its confequence, which is, that "Each individual feeks a fev'ral goal," leads the Author to observe, "That HEAV'N's great View is One, and that the Whole.” And this brings him naturally round again to his main subject, namely, God's producing good out of ill, which he profecutes from Ver. 238 to 249. W. VER. 249. Heav'n forming each on other to depend,] I. Hitherto the Poet hath been employed in difcourfing of the use of the Pasfions, with regard to Society at large; and in freeing his doctrine from objections: This is the firft general divifion of the subject of this epiftle. II. He comes now to fhew (from Ver. 248 to 261.) the use of these Paffions, with regard to the more confined circle of our friends, |