sprung into being, such as he is, instantaneously, or quasi-instantaneously; he must have been created.

Now the creation of man, and the condition in which he came from the hand of the Creator, may be conceived in diverse ways. Let us first consider the mode presented in the text of the Mosaic record, as understood by Catholic interpreters.

Creation, in the strict sense of the word, is the bringing into existence of any substance, whether material or spiritual. In this sense the soul only of Adam was created; his body was formed from preexisting matter. And so was that of the first woman; though in her case not merely a new combination, but also a miraculous growth of matter, would seem to have taken place. But let this be as it may, the shaping of both protoparents' bodies was not entrusted to natural agencies or second causes; and hence it is customary to apply the term "created" to their whole being, including the bodily organism and the "informing" soul. The first of our race, then, sprang into being in a state of maturity which, in the case of their descendants, is but the outcome of a slow process of development and exercise. They were not merely endowed, physically and intellectually, as we are, but from the first moment of their lives exercised their faculties of body and mind in a degree corresponding to the end of their existence in the state of probation, which was "to know, to love, and to serve God."

What, then, under this view, must have been the condition of primitive man in regard to language? He spoke at once. Even before a helpmate was given to Adam, he exercised the linguistic faculty -mentally, if not orally,-in his familiar converse with God, and certainly by actual utterance in his giving names to the living beings that surrounded him. And he spoke as never man has spoken since. His language, being in harmony with all other gifts showered upon him by his Maker, and befitting his exalted position, was one of unsurpassed fitness for the expression of thought. As his body was that of an adult, who would have passed in a perfect manner through the ordinary stages of development, including the exercise of the organs of sense and locomotion, so his mind was not a tabula rasa, but developed like that of an individual that would have been subject from infancy to a faultless training by master minds. For every idea, then, that existed in Adam's soul there was also given the corresponding linguistic expression. In what form of language he may have spoken, the monosyllabic, the agglutinative, the inflective, or some form different from all those now in existence, it would be idle, indeed, to investigate; nor will it ever be known to what extent his speech was affected by his fall. For our purpose it is enough to know

that Adam spoke, both before and after that fatal event. The doctrine of creation, then, as understood by orthodox ecclesiastical teachers, positively excludes a state of speechlessness in the life of primitive man.'

There is, however, a view of creation that assumes-with what consistency we shall presently see-the absolute rudeness of the first human beings. The crude and hybrid theory we refer to was broached by some of the rationalistic theologians, chiefly Germans, of the last century, and may still be favored by a few, who, though averse to evolutionism in any of its forms, are yet unwilling to accept the biblical narrative as an exact record of the fact and the circumstances of creation. They admit the formation of the first human organisms by immediate divine action, but conceive the minds of the beings thus produced to have been tabula rasa in the strictest sense of the word. Endowed with all the innate faculties that belong to the intellectual nature of man, the first pair-or pairs, as some would have it—were still destitute of any of the results of their exercise-the very children of nature of Professor Whitney's anthropology. Let us, then, see how far that view of creation may agree with his fundamental supposition.

We may safely leave aside the possibility of the first men having been created in the shape of new-born infants or young children. The idea appears preposterous even to the school in question. They were, then, full-grown men and women. If so, they entered at once upon the task of forming a language. For "any human beings," our professor assures us, "that should be cut off from all instruction by their fellows, would at once proceed to recreate language;" that is, we presume, as soon as they reached the proper

1 The above view, as to the state of Adam's mind, is set forth with great lucidity by Suarez (De Op. VI. Dierum et An. L. iii., c. 6, 9). "Certum est, Adam, statim ac fuit creatus, habuisse naturalem scientiam a Deo sibi inditam." "Scientia rerum naturalium Adamo indita in sua essentia fuit ejusdem speciei cum illa, quae inventione et ratiocinio humano potest acquiri, i. e., fuit per accidens infusa, seu quoad modum supranaturalis, non per se et in sua entitate; adeoque Adam in ejus usu habebat, ut nos, dependentiam a phantasia, speculando ejus phantasmata; haec tamen erant in phantasia seu in sensu interno aut cogitatione a Deo infusa, uti et species intelligibiles, quae, licet non essent per sensus acceptae nec a phantasmatibus acquisitis abstractae, erant tamen tales, quales per sensus et phantasmata acquiruntur, i. e., infusae per accidens et in substantia naturales, sicut habitus scientiae Adami, atque ejusdem rationis cum illis, quae a phantasmatibus abstrahi potuissent.”

Applying the same principle to Adam's speech, we would say: Any specimen of that language-supposing one having come down to us--would probably disclose to the practised eye of the philologist the same marks of growth which he discovers in all recorded speech, with none of its irregularities and blemishes, just as a chemical analysis of the wine served at Cana upon the intercession of the Blessed Virgin, would probably have shown all the ingredients and combinations of wine, grown and prepared by the usual slow process, with none of its impurities and defects. There was nothing supernatural in that language, though its mode of acquisition was different from all modes now observable. But more about this on another occasion.

age for the efficient use of those organs and faculties upon which the language-making power depends. Consequently, the parentsof our race, being adults, began to speak on the first day of their existence. And imperfect though the first stumbling beginnings in the art of giving utterance to their thoughts may have been, their language, being human, was immensely in advance of all the means of expression in the power of the dog. The only period of speechlessness, then, in the life of primitive man, was the probably very short term between the moment of creation and the utterance of the first sound with conscious intent to signify. Still, even a minute, or a fraction of a minute, is "time;" and hence we are compelled to confess that one theory at least of the origin of man is not incompatible with Mr. Whitney's assumption.

But, however consistent with his views, can a theory so intrinsically inconsistent be considered admissible by a scholar of Mr. Whitney's penetration? We would do him an injustice were we to entertain the thought for a moment. If the Creator could call into being human bodies in an advanced state of development, it was certainly in His power to impart to them souls equally developed. And if there were reasons for Infinite Wisdom to dispense, in the case of the first men, with the natural laws of bodily growth, the same, if not stronger, reasons existed for an analogous dispensation in regard to their psychical development. The placing of infantine brains into the skulls of adults would presuppose a sort of retrograde course in the plan of creation, as uncalled for as would be a machinist's putting James Watt's tea kettle as a boiler into a three hundred horse-power engine. An adult human being, absolutely destitute of mental training and experience, would be a monster; and the ushering into the world of such a being, not an act of divine wisdom, but a folly, a miracle as aimless and unreasonable as the creation of an animal devoid of every instinct necessary for the preservation of its existence. And the life of man in that state would have been short indeed, especially in the case of the coexistence of any rivals in the struggle for life. A miraculous providence, of course, could have saved those miserable beings; but if the miraculous be at all admitted into our conception of the first beginnings of the human species, it is perfect folly to circumscribe the extent of that agency-to assign arbitrary limits to the Creative power, or to legislate for infinite wisdom.' The only consis

1 An almost ludicrous instance of the inconsistency into which the school in question is particularly liable to be betrayed, occurs in Jacob Grimm's (very interesting) essay on the origin of language (in Abhandlungen der Koeniglichen Academie der Wissenschaften, 1851). That eminent scholar counts among the reasons why more than one pair should have been created, the following: "The first mother might possibly have given birth to sons only, or to daughters only, thus rendering the propagation of the race impossible." The good old man graciously concedes to the

tent course is, either to reject the whole doctrine of creation, or to accept it as part and parcel of a supernatural revelation, with all its details; and, we may as well add, to understand those details as understood and proposed to our belief by the only authority in the world that claims assistance from above for the infallible interpretation of matters supernaturally revealed. Now, whatever be the final definition, by that authority (if ever to be issued), of the dogmatic truth as to the formation of the first human bodies, the Catholic doctrine concerning the protoparents' intellectual condition is definite; they never were in a state of absolute rudeness.

There is no room, then, in the doctrine of creation for the fully developed man destitute of language as the dog. There is, as we have seen, no solid foothold for that anomalous being in any of the divers constructions of the evolutionistic hypothesis. Unsustained by supernatural revelation, unsupported by science and philosophy, fully developed and still speechless man hovers before our sight, an airy phantom, a baseless vision, a puzzle infinitely more difficult of solution than the problem itself for whose disentanglement that condition of primitive man has been assumed by our author.

But perhaps our horizon is still too confined. Science has not yet said the last word on the question of our origin. The near future may solve the problem in a manner more consistent with Professor Whitney's conception of our primitive condition. In any event, in the present state of uncertainty as to the beginnings of our race, that problem must not be allowed to interfere with conclusions independently arrived at by means of sound philosophical considerations and linguistic facts properly interpreted. Are there such considerations and such facts amply sufficient to prove the invention and slow elaboration of language by fully developed man? Professor Whitney appears to think so. If we understand him rightly, the nature of language itself, all the observable modes of its acquisition and growth, and the very form of human speech in its earliest known stages, fully warrant the truth of his assumption. Our task, then, is not completed. A separate paper, however, will be required for the discussion of this and other questions connected with the inquiry into the origin of language.

Creator the power to call into being adults, and the wisdom to make them men and women, but (implicitly) denies his ability to determine the sex of their offspring.

The same scholar, to whom linguistic science owes so much, who was a child when he went "beyond his last," considers the "chimera" of an implanted language sufficiently refuted by the observation that it would have been contrary to divine justice to let the God-given speech of the first parents decline from its acme for the use of their less favored descendants. And almost in the same breath he acknowledges that whatever losses language may have suffered, they were in most cases, and almost at once, compensated by gains in other directions.

VOL. XI.-16

THE CHURCH IN CANADA UNDER THE FRENCH

IT

RÉGIME.

may seem unexpected that the subject of Establishments should have any special connection with a consideration of the Church in Canada. Such, however, will be found to be the fact, indeed, to a thorough understanding of our subject, reference must be had to what was in reality a State Establishment in England, as well as to what was believed to be a State or National Church of France. At the risk of being tedious, it may, perhaps, be desirable to examine briefly how far the term "establishment" is applicable and appropriate to churches generally. A misconception in regard to this and some cognate matters has not only engendered a considerable amount of bad feeling in this country, but has given. rise to prejudices and opinions which are positively unjust and unfounded, so far as Catholics are concerned. Mere individual opinion might go, as it has largely gone, for nothing. But it is otherwise with judicial determination. The judges of the judicial committee of the Privy Council in England, having before them every day questions bearing on their own State Church, may very naturally import corresponding impressions into the consideration of a case wherein the Catholic Church may be represented to be a State Church. They have assumed, for example, that during the French rule in Canada the Catholic Church was established by law; and that since 1763, when that country passed into the hands of the English, though it may not have been an establishment "in the full sense of the term, it nevertheless continued to be a Church recognized by the State." It was one, therefore, over which the State could exercise some control. An establishment for non-Catholics generally is an institution over which the State presides, over which there might be a minister of public worship; and it presupposes a condition of things wherein the law could put an end to the establishment or to the parliamentary religion, just as the law created it. "The Anglican theologians," says De Maistre, "often call their Church the Establishment, without perceiving that this single word annuls their religion." The word in its usual acceptation is not used by Catholic writers regarding the Catholic Church.

The popular view of a State establishment becomes the more important to correct, inasmuch as one hears a good deal of a French National Church,—the “liberties" of the Gallican Church,—the