consideration, inasmuch as this discussion is proceeding on lines of implication incompatible with its formal introduction at this point. As to his objection, it is well, however, to note here, in passing, that it doubly begs the question of existence, by implying existence as material.

To sum up what Balmez seems to us to say: He begins by asserting that, according to his view, the expression by Descartes of his principle was probably at variance with his conception of it; that, whereas, he evidently intended to enunciate his principle as the expression of a fact, he had given to it the form of an argument. Taking this as his point of departure, Balmez then defines what he thinks Descartes intended to enunciate. But, in so doing, he gives nothing, as the idea of Descartes, beyond what is the common conception and expression of the commonly accepted cognition as derived from intuition; and besides, in attempting to state it as a fact, to the avoidance of its appearance as an argument, he has presented, as to form, an argument exactly like that of Descartes, only couched in different words; for it ought to be evident that the expression of Balmez, "this thought is my soul, I am," is equivalent to the expression of Descartes, "I think, therefore I am." Both have the form of arguments. Both, if to be interpreted as statement of fact, not argument, do not go beyond the general expression of the general cognition through intuition.

It is a strange thing to say, and we wish to say it without the slightest intention of disparaging Balmez, for whom we have the sincerest admiration, that in this particular case he has, while elaborately attempting to elucidate the view of Descartes, as formulated in his celebrated proposition, failed in a measure to relieve it from its original obscurity. And this is all the more strange because, in a mere note which he appends to his “Fundamental Philosophy" he gives, from Descartes himself, the only explanation, of all that he made of which we know, that is satisfactory. In support of this statement we quote from the notes to book first of "Fundamental Philosophy," as translated by Mr. Henry F. Brownson, the following passage.

'We have, we think, faithfully interpreted the thought of Descartes, but lest there should be some doubt as to this, we subjoin a notable passage from his answer to the objections collected by Père Mersenne from various philosophers and theologians, against the second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth meditations.

"When we know that we are something that thinks, this first notion is taken from no syllogisms; and when any one says: I think, therefore I am, or exist, he does not infer his existence from thought, as by the force of a syllogism, but as a thing known by itself; he sees it by a simple inspection of the mind; for if he deduced it from a syl

logism, he would have to know beforehand this major: whatever thinks is, or exists. On the contrary, this proposition is manifested to him by his own sentiment that he cannot think without existing. It is a property characteristic of our mind to form general propositions from the knowledge of particular propositions.' Descartes does not always explain himself with this clearness; the objections of his adversaries made him examine his doctrine more thoroughly, and this contributed to clear up his ideas."

But then, this comes to what we have from the first asserted, that no proposition can be framed which shall prove the fact of existence. Here Descartes impliedly admits it, for he shows that what bears the form of an argument-the very framework of his celebrated proposition-is no argument at all, that it was not by him intended, and cannot properly be understood, as such. Here, as Descartes admits it, we rest our case with this conclusion, in which we have the honor to agree with both him and Balmez, that it is impossible to make an argument for, without begging the question of, existence; which is what was to be demonstrated.

It is not intended as disparagement of the judgment of mankind as to the principle attempted to be enunciated by Descartes and Balmez, to say that the principle does not, through their enunciation, rise above the common conception and expression of the principle by mankind generally. It is safe to say, what has all along been here implied, what it would be madness to doubt, that the understanding, through perception or imperception, of the intelligent of mankind generally, must be the final test of the truth of any principle whatsoever, and that equally (as inseparably bound up with their perception or imperception) to that test must be the final appeal as to the correctness or incorrectness of the formulation of the principle with respect to its representation in words. Philosophers cannot in any wise go beyond the perception of the intelligent of mankind generally, in the comprehension of a principle that relates to mankind, or in the perception of the truth or falsity of the principle as formulated in words. It is only in the sphere of the first conception and formulation of principles that philosophers can excel the intelligent of mankind generally. The final test of the truth of the principles, and of their correct expression, must reside with mankind. Assuming this position as incontrovertible, then we repeat that neither Descartes nor Balmez has formulated the principle evidently intended to be formulated, in a manner essentially different from each other, or from that in which it is formulated by the intelligent of mankind generally.

Yet, withal, there is a something indefinable in the expression of Balmez, not contained in the expression of Descartes, which, as an attempted statement of what it is obvious that each attempts to

state, approaches much more nearly to the truth of statement, as such, without regard to whether the thing attempted to be stated be or be not true, than the expression of Descartes comes. But more, far more, than from the expression into which Balmez finally resolves the conception (which, formally, is as faulty as that of Descartes) does light break upon us from the exposition of both in the expansion of their theme; which both have marred by their attempted condensation of it in a single phrase.

It does not follow that, if the principle of Descartes and Balmez, assuming it to exist, could be enunciated without begging the question of existence, it would, while substantially in its present form, command general assent, for it must not be forgotten that a certain school tells us that consciousness may be entirely a bodily function, that is, not spirit. This implies that spirit, if it exists, may not be able to recognize its own essence, and, therefore, that spirit is perhaps non-existent. The objection we note in passing, as an insuperable barrier of negation, and should like to proceed with the heretofore continuous assumption that, if human life means any endowment, it means endowment of spirit. It comes to this, however, that if we would not attempt to formulate an expression that would be taken exception to by the materialist, as begging the question of spirit as well as of existence, we must (provisorily, at least, and under protest) substitute for spirit consciousness, which even the materialist does not deny. It will not do, then, to say with Balmez, "this thought is my soul, I am;" we are driven to say, "this self-consciousness is this self-existence," and "this consciousness of mankind is the existence of mankind;" for this, which is true of one man, is true of all men, as they have ascertained by comparison of individual consciousnesses. Therefore, broadly, for all mankind, consciousness is existence. These are irrefutable propositions. Even the materialist, as stated above, recognizes the fact of consciousness. It affirms and establishes, through individual consciousness, and through comparison with other consciousnesses, not only the fact of its existence, but the quality of its existence, in universal similar consciousness. If it does undeniably affirm the general fact of its existence, why is not what it affirms of the attributes of its existence equally undeniable? This, however, in passing. Admit that consciousness is an unknown quantity, or, rather, quality. Then this unknown quality is existence. Self-consciousness pervades even sleep. With the end of self-consciousness is generally a blank. We beg no question, then, when we say that human consciousness is human existence, whatever consciousness may be, and whatever existence may be.

The difficulty under which we all labor as to the fullest comprehension of the principle under discussion, is in the seemingly im

possible elimination of the determining ego from our knowledge. Descartes includes the ego, at least formally, when he says: "I think; therefore I am." Balmez includes it, at least formally, when he uses the expression, "this thought," in the phrase, "this thought is my soul; I am." All mankind formally include it, and must continue formally to include it, whenever they attempt to enunciate the principle of Descartes.

The question, however, arises, whether the ego may not at times be eliminated from self-consciousness, as an influence controlling to wrong conclusions. To put it concretely, the question arises whether many of mankind, knowing the ego to be at most times self-prominent, so to speak, may not incorrectly believe it to be always so present, in the form prejudicial to sound conclusion regarding itself, and may not, therefore, unjustly suspect it of rendering such conclusion at all times impossible.

Supposing that a man were able to divest himself of the idea of the ego, to eliminate the ego entirely, in the fullest sense of his not knowing of its presence in his conception, and in his deliverance in speech, its presence would still be asserted by other men, and his deliverance be contested. As he could not indicate his conception of existence by any other than some such expression as, "I think," or "my thought," he is always open to the charge of begging, both mentally and verbally, the question attempted to be enunciated in the principle of Descartes.

The question remains (and the remarks of Balmez throw a flood of light in the right direction), whether the ego, in the sense of the presence of one's own individuality, as neutralizing a conception involving the affirmation of existence, may not at times be eliminated. Still would remain, however, the impossibility of formally expressing in any present terms of speech the virtual absence of the ego.

This consideration leads, as the natural preliminary startingpoint, to the investigation and definition of that which we conceive to be the ego. Upon close scrutiny it will be found that we apprehend the term as representing two distinct phases of self-consciousWe understand the term as referring both abstractly and concretely to self-consciousness. We understand the ego in the sense opposed to the abstract non-ego. We also understand the ego in the sense of its individuality, with reference to Brown, Jones, or Robinson.1

ness.

Is it not within the bounds of experience that the abstract ego

1 Kant remarks: "The simple, in abstraction, is very different from the objectively simple; and hence the ego, which is simple in the first sense, may, in the second sense, as indicating the soul itself, be a very complex conception, with a very various content. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 476, 477. Bohn's Philosophical Library.

is capable of acts different in kind from those of which the concrete ego is capable? There is reason to believe that it is. As Brown, Jones, and Robinson, the concrete ego is not, for instance, prompted to enter upon and pursue such speculations as these; it is content to know of its identity with Brown, Jones, and Robinson, as contradistinguished from Johnson and Smith. But, from experience, the abstract ego may well be supposed to escape the thraldom of mere identity with these persons. The generally acknowledged fact of unconscious cerebration points in the same direction. Still, even granting this to be so, then would remain, as we have said, the impossibility of formally expressing in any present terms of speech the elimination of the ego from obstructive judgment as to existence; for present terms of speech not only make suspected, but affirm, its presence in the concrete form.

To the point whence we set out we return, in the conviction that the principle attempted to be formulated by Descartes and Balmez is true, but that it is inexpressible in formal terms. The general exposition of Balmez, and the final explanation of Descartes, are luminous, but their light is almost extinguished when they attempt to put it into a lantern to guide the stumbling footsteps of mankind. Two, the same questions, as from the beginning of this discussion, confront us: first, as to whether the ego, as innately incapable of sound judgment regarding existence, can be deemed ever eliminated; and second, as to whether positive formal proof of existence can be given in set ratiocinative terms of speech. The former of these questions is resolvable into the latter; for if the latter be true, the former must be, but not conversely. But the latter, as we have shown, is not possible, and therefore we must revert to the former, to endeavor to show that the ego, in the form of the abstract ego, effectively eliminates the concrete ego as an element possibly neutralizing judgment; and that although the abstract ego's idea of existence cannot be formulated in set ratiocinative terms of speech, it may be formulated by discursion. What abstract self-consciousness knows synthetically may perhaps be painfully explained by continuous approximative statement. Yet the polygon, however multiplied as to sides, never becomes the inscribed circle. All that we can hope to do is to contribute, from an exceptional experience, some additional light to the subject.

It is narrated by Sir Humphry Davy that, experimenting with nitrous oxide gas, and succumbing to its influence, he conceived the whole universe resolved into thought. It is not mentioned, that we remember, in the connection, that during the conception he lost the idea of personal identity. He may have been in a condition analogous to dreaming, where his knowledge of his personal