concentrated force of the vast Northern Empire could not then be available in that direction.

Another possibility is a territorial extension of Austria down to the Ægæan Sea, and the union of the Balkan states with Austria by stronger ties than those of a mere confederacy. In this case a cession of the German speaking provinces to Germany, and a transfer of the seat of the new Empire from Vienna to Pesth lie within the reach of not improbable conjectures. England's consent could be bought by allowing her to take Egypt, a price that no doubt would be willingly paid and gladly accepted. France and Italy could not raise any protest except they were supported by Russia. And in this probability, namely, that they will be supported by Russia, exists the key to the whole situation.

England's interests run, ipsissima natura, so much counter to those of the Empire of the North that her position in the coming conflict cannot be considered doubtful at all. Germany and Austria, as we have seen, may endeavor to resort to every subterfuge of diplomacy to gain time within which to reinforce their own strength and stave off an approach of France and Russia; to gain that object they will be ready to make sacrifices. But we think that ultimately an alliance between France and Russia must take place.

It does not require any sagacity to perceive the immense advantages accruing to both powers from it. The German army would be divided so that neither France nor Russia would have to confront the whole strength of the splendidly trained soldiers of Emperor William. Russia, whose fleet is locked up in the Baltic and the Black Sea, would gain the assistance of the powerful French navy, which is now in numbers as well as in armament a match even for England. France, on the other hand, with Russia as an ally, can then attempt to realize her fond dream of revenge, for since Sedan the one preeminent thought of that nation has been to wipe out the disasters of 1870–71; and while she justly hesitates to measure strength with Germany single-handed, the popular feeling will drive her to break a lance with Germany the moment Germany is engaged otherwise. That point can hardly offer any doubt. If France can, she will retrieve her misfortunes, as soon as she may, at least, hope for success.

Italy, the least interested of all the great powers, may avail herself of the opportunity of Austria's engagements in the Balkans against Russia to obtain the long-coveted Italian-speaking provinces of the House of Hapsburg and the port of Trieste. Turkey, finally, remains an uncertain factor. Doomed under all circumstances to quit Europe and lose her dominions on this side of the Bosphorus, it is but natural that the Porte will try to throw her

weight on that side to which victory may seem to lean. Yet her attitude remains perhaps the most uncertain factor.

If we consider, in conclusion, the size of the armies each of the powers mentioned has at command, an approximate idea of the immensity of the impending conflict may be formed. Russia, the Colossus of the North, possesses on a war footing over 2,500,000 well trained, well equipped soldiers, with a possibility of raising that number to nearly ten millions. France can mobilize two millions within thirty days, Germany likewise two millions, Austro-Hungary a million and a half, with a possibility of more than duplicating that number; Italy has an army of one million at her disposal. To this mass of soldiery must be added England's forces and those of the Turkish Empire and of all the Balkan states, swelling the total aggregate to ten million men. War would be waged on the Rhine and on the Bosphorus, in Italy and in Poland and in the East. If we bear in mind that these modern armies have been brought to the highest perfection of discipline and training, that they are equipped with armaments which render the prospective loss of life frightful to contemplate; if we remember the enormous sums required to support this vast armed camp and the terrible drain upon the revenues these sums entail; if we also reflect upon the unavoidable amount of misery, desolation, wretchedness and poverty following in the wake, we may, then, begin to understand why those who stand at the helm of the governments pause and hesitate to assume the awful responsibility of uttering the word that will set in motion this vast machinery of destruction.

Whether it be possible even by the most powerful combination to check permanently the onward march of a nation which is still in the ascendency, only the future can answer. To foretell the probable result would be to indulge in idle speculations of a most uncertain character. It is certain, however, that ere long the struggle will take place, and that it will be a struggle of unparalleled magnitude ending in a redistribution of power and territory. And it is also certain that, when Providence decrees, the columns will advance.

WILL THE TORIES GIVE IRELAND HOME RULE?

W

HEN the British Parliament met on the 18th of August, everything looked extremely favorable for the advocates of the Legislative Union. The Tories overflowed their benches, the Liberal Unionists were in a state of violent self-satisfaction, and Liberals could not conceal the mortification, depression, and demoralization which the unexpected result of the elections had produced amongst them. Some of the events which immediately followed the opening day were highly calculated to increase the self-satisfaction of the enemies of Ireland. People had hoped against hope that the Liberal Unionists would return to their allegiance to the Liberal leader and to the Liberal party, and that the sight of a Tory ministry in power would be enough to shake their resolution and to drive them back to the arms of Mr. Gladstone. The Liberal Unionists took a very early opportunity of at once crushing these hopes. Lord Hartington made one of the most vigorous speeches of his life in denunciation of the idea that he had changed his mind, and gave it clearly to be understood that he and the Government were in opinion as one. Mr. Chamberlain went even further. In a speech full of vehemence and vigor he committed himself to the statement that he would never give a vote to put out the present Government if its successor were to be what he called a "separatist ministry." There were some obstinate optimists who were foolish enough to be very much disappointed by these speeches.

Even Mr. Gladstone himself was rather cast down. His nature is essentially sanguine. He felt the profound conviction that reason and justice were both on his side, and he would not entertain the idea that those who had served formerly with him would long resist the cause of good sense and of political comradeship. For this reason he had discouraged attacks upon his opponents by his own party. Everybody execrated the ill taste of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington in pushing themselves on to the front opposition bench in order to thwart the Liberal leader and to support the Tory ministry. Representations were made to Mr. Gladstone that he should take some steps to prevent this outrage upon decency; but he refused to listen to this advice, and Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain were allowed to take their seats beside him and Mr. John Morley. At last, however, he recognized the truth and has made up his mind that by the end of this struggle Lord Hartington and Mr. Chamberlain will be against him.

Indeed, many of the men who were in immediate political contact with him make no attempt at concealing the fact that they are irreconcilable. They state most clearly that they intend to support the Tories as long as Mr. Gladstone remains the leader of the Liberal party. His death or his resignation is the one possible termination they admit to the alliance of the Tory party; and the question now is whether they will be able to crush Mr. Gladstone or Mr. Gladstone will be able to crush them.

The session, however, soon developed a very different state of affairs. The Ministry had adopted a method of preventing any of those discussions of their plans or policy in which lie gravest danger. The language put into the mouth of the Queen was brief to boldness. The solitary reference to Ireland was a statement that the election had confirmed the adverse verdict against Home Rule, and it was almost impossible to find within the limits of this brief document any point that could be controverted or even seriously debated. Mr. Gladstone felt this so much that his first speech in reply to the Address from the Throne was terse and almost free from anything like disputatious matter. This was the result not merely of boldness of the Queen's Speech, but also of his own view of the situation.

Public opinion, too, was dead against the revival for the moment of the Home Rule controversy. The inevitable ebb of fatigue and apathy had succeeded to the full tide of enthusiasm in which the election had been fought. Then Mr. Gladstone had done many things during the election which enabled his enemies to scoff. He had gone on the stump through the country, had delivered a series. of remarkable speeches which had led to enormous demonstrations, and in this way had been forced to keep himself largely before the public. His eagerness for the success of his policy had also induced him to take every possible step to assure the victory, and he had written innumerable letters and telegrams in favor of Home Rule candidates. These things had spread the idea that Mr. Gladstone was losing his temper; and the loss of temper is one of the unforgivable sins with the political public of England. His watchful and venomous enemies were preparing, under these circumstances, for an explosion of wild and childish wrath against all his opponents when Parliament met. It was for this reason that the late Premier felt the necessity of adopting an attitude of tranquillity and reserve, and that he abstained from as vigorous criticism of the Queen's Speech as might have been expected. But the great reason for the attitude of Mr. Gladstone was the character of the Queen's Speech itself. Saying nothing, it saved itself from criticism. To attack it was to fight with a phantom, and accordingly Mr. Gladstone contented himself with a brief recapitulation of his

opinions on the Irish question, and an expression of his unalterable resolve to work for Irish self-government.

The speech of Lord Randolph Churchill made a revolutionary change in this situation. The new Tory leader delivered an address which ranged far beyond the narrow limits of the Queen's Speech, and elaborated a large and ambitious programme for the future. The Ministry did not intend to be as idle and as uncommitted as their Queen's Speech. They had a paragraph, partly consisting of vague promises as to the future, and also definite statements as to the immediate present. The future would be provided for by a series of commissions, who would inquire into nearly every subject of Irish complaint. A commission would investigate the question of judicial rents; another commission would inquire as to the industrial probabilities of Ireland, and a general officer would be sent to Kerry for the purpose of restoring order in that district. But while a commission was thus to inquire into the judicial rents, the Chancellor of the Exchequer was careful to explain that these judicial rents would not be interfered with. "If there are any persons in this House," he said, "who are of opinion that there will be, by the Government, any interference with, or suspension of, legislation, or the neglect of executive action, of the right of landlords to recover their land, in the event of the non-payment of rent, they fall into great and serious error." And again: "A serious mistake," he said, "will be made by any who think that the Government contemplate any further dealing with the land question in Ireland, in the direction of any revision of the rent, by the interposition of the State. This is altogether apart from the policy of the present Government." And then he went on to utter a strong denunciation of the system of dual ownership, established by the Land Act of 1881, and to declare that the policy of the Government would be to transform dual into single ownerships; in other words, to establish a peasant proprietary. Before turning from this part of the policy of the Government, we may make a passing observation, that the criticisms of Lord Randolph Churchill upon the dual ownership under the Land Act of 1881 might have been stolen from hundreds of speeches of the same character, delivered by the Irish members, and by the speakers of the Land League, in 1881.

Here was an annunciation of a policy with a vengeance. That night little was said by the English members, who were not yet in full possession of their spirits and wills. Besides, the Liberal Party were entirely ignorant of the very important speech that was being delivered elsewhere while they were listening to the address of Lord Randolph Churchill. In the House of Lords, at that very moment, the other Tory leader had been describing the same