belong to him; fo that this Claufe either takes from his Majefty what we have no Right to take, or it gives him what, as we conceive, he has no Right to claim; as we cannot then confider this Sum to be given either for a real Deficiency, founded on the Civil-Lift Act, or that it can be warranted by the faid Act, as a fuppofed Arrear, we conceive it to be a new Grant to his Majefty, and a new Burthen on the People, which does not appear to us to have been demanded by the Crown, and confequently not to have paffed according to the Forms hitherto practifed and requifite in all fuch Cafes.

2dly, This Clause appears to us unreasonable on many Accounts; as there was no real Deficiency at Midfummer 1728, to which Time the Account is ftated, fo neither is there any Arrear at the Time when this new Supply is granted, but the whole Sum of Eight Hundred Thousand Pounds, and confiderably more, was come into his Majefty's Coffers, and he was, confequently, in Poffeffion of the very Money, the fuppofed Arrear of which is made good to him by this Claufe: Thus it seems to us, that the Nation is loaded not to complete, but to augment the Sum defigned for his Majesty's Civil-Lift, and this at a Time when the publick Debts are increased, when the Taxes are heavily felt in all Parts of the Country, when our Foreign Trade is incumber'd and diminished, when our < Manufactures decay, when our Poor daily multiply, and when many other national Calamities furround us: Thefe Confiderations are in themfelvés very moving, and we apprehend that they must appear stronger, when it fhall be further confidered, that his Majefty would be fo far from wanting any of these extraordinary Supplies, that eyen without the Provifion in the Civil-Lift Act, for making good Deficiencies, he would be pofVOL. II. feffed

E

feffed of a far greater Revenue than King William, Queen Anne, or even his late Majesty enjoyed; and yet his prefent Majefty, then Prince of Wales, received out of the Civil-Lift Revenues, during the Reign of the late King, One Hundred Thoufand Pounds per Annum, befides the entire Revenues of the Principality of Wales and Duchy of Cornwal; whereas it does not appear to us, that a liké Sum of One Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum, or even the Revenues of the Principality of Wales, have been yet fettled on his prefent Royal Highness.

3dly, We cannot but be extremely apprehenfive of the many ill Confequences which may follow from a Grant of Money to the Crown, fo ill grounded and fo unreafonable as we conceive this to be: The Advantage in Favour of his Majefty, established by the Civil-Lift Act, is very great, fince, if the Produce of the Revenues granted and appropriated to the Ufe of the Civil-Lift does not answer the yearly Sum of Eight Hundred Thoufand Pounds, the Deficiency is to be made goodto his Majefty by the Publick; whereas no Provifion is made by which, if the Produce of thofe Revenues exceeds the Sum of Eight Hundred Thousand Pounds, the Surplus fhall accrue to the Benefit of the Publick; by this Precedent, not only real Deficiencies are to be made good, but Supplies are to be given for Arrears ftanding out at the End of every Year which fhall come in be fore Supplies can be granted, though the Supply given to make good Arrears in one Year will certainly increase the Surpluffages in another: When we confider the Method which has obtained of anticipating the Revenues, before they come to the Exchequer, contrary to the ancient and legal Practice, when we reflect in what Manner thefe Accounts have been made up, and in what Manner

they

they have been brought in, we cannot but apprehend that the Door is opened by this Precedent for laying new and exceffive Charges on the Nation: The Revenues appropriated to the Ufes of his Majefty's Civil-Lift are fubject in their own Nature to vary, and even when there is no Deficiency in the Produce, there may be Arrears in the Receipt; thefe Arrears may easily be increased by the Management of defigning Minifters, by private Directions to Receivers, and by artful Methods of ftating Accounts; from all which we cannot but apprehend, that now this Precedent is made, we may have frequent Accounts of Arrears, and a grievous and even intolerable Load may be brought on the Nation in a fhort Time; and we are perfuaded that his Majefty can have no Satiffaction in finding his Court abound in Wealth, whilft he may undergo the Mortification of feeing his People reduced to Poverty; neither can we conceive that the latter Part of the Claufe is in any Degree an adequate Provifion against the Evil we complain of, or the Apprehenfions we entertain; for an Account to be made up at his Majefty's Demise will not prevent the Confequences of this Precedent during his Life; and as we hope that his Reign will be long, fo we may be allowed to fear that even during the Continuance of it, this extraordinary Method of increasing his Majesty's private Revenue (already very ample) may prove a Source of general Discontent, which is but too apt to produce general Difaffection.

Plimouth,

Northampton, Litchfield,
Strafford, Beaufort,

Oxford and Mortimer, Bathurst,

Die Luna 12° Maii, 1729.

Hodie 3 vice leta eft Billa, entitled, An Act to afcertain the Cuftom payable for Corn and Grain imported; for better afcertaining the Price and Quantity of Corn and Grain, for which a Bounty is payable upon Exportation; for appropriating the Supplies granted in this Seffion of Parliament; and for giving further Time to Clerks and Apprentices to pay Duties omitted to be paid for their Indentures and Contracts.

The Question was put, whether this Bill fhall

país?

It was refolved in the Affirmative.

Diffentient

1ft, Becaufe, we conceive, there will accrue lefs Detriment to the Publick, by rejecting this Bill, than agreeing to it with that Part of the Appropriation Claufe, which enacts the Sum of One Hundred and Fifteen Thoufand Pounds to be given to his Majefty for and upon Account of Arrears in his Civil-Lift, fince it would have been eafy, had this Bill been rejected, to have provided for the general Appropriation of the feveral Aids granted in this Seffion of Parliament in fome other Manner.

2dly, Because the Revenue for defraying the Ex. pences of his Majefty's Civil Government being confiderably more ample than that of any of his Predeceffors, we flattered ourselves that the Publick would not have been called upon again in so fhort a Time to make an Addition to that liberal Provifion for the Crown, though there had been force fmall Deficiency in fome of the Duties appropriated to the Service of it; but this, in our Opinion, is fo far from being the Cafe, that we are firmly perfuaded, if we had agreed to this Bill, with that Part of the Claufe, we fhould have confented to a Grant of a new Aid, and not to make

good

good the Deficiency of an old one, fince it feems evident to us, that the Produce of the Civil-Lift Funds, in the first Year of his Majefty's Reign, rather exceeded than fell fhort of Eight Hundred Thousand Pounds, even from thofe Accounts delivered into the House, which, we believe, will be univerfally allowed to be free from any Sufpicion in Favour of the People.

3dly, Because we look upon this to be not only a Grant of a new Aid, but a Grant made in fuch an irregular Manner, without being demanded by the Crown, that it cannot but give us fome Reason to think, that however it may be wanted by the Minifters, it may poffibly not be defired by his Majefty.

4thly, Becaufe the literal Interpretation of Part of the Act for fettling the Civil-Lift Revenues on his Majesty, which was contended for, in order to juftify that Part of this Claufe to which we object, feems to us liable to Confequences very dangerous to the Properties of all the Subjects, by putting it into the Power of thofe who have the Management of the Publick Money, to give the Crown a Title to the Arrears of the Civil-Lift Funds (though per haps left on purpofe in the Hands of the Receiv ers) and to a parliamentary Supply for thofe very Arrears too.

5thly, Because the Argument which was used, for paffing the Claufe, from the Smallness of the Suni, feems to us a much stronger Reason why it fhould not be asked, than why it should be granted.

6thly, Becaufe, we obferve, that whenever a Supply for the Civil-Lift has been afked in Parliament, it has caufed great Uneafinefs in the Nar tion, though demanded from the Crown itfelf, and upon Pretences, in our Opinion, more juftifiable, and at Times lefs unfeasonable than this, when, notwithstanding our most prevailing Methods of E 3

Nego.