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during one whole year," then he shall gain a settlement therein. The words in 9 & 10 Wm. 3, c. 11, which relate to a certificate-man, are different; and as the first statute is what the appellants rely on, it should have been followed up. Rer v. Corfe Mullen (1B. & Ad. 211) was referred to. [ERLE,J.-If he was a certificate-man, he would here have proved a settlement, and à fortiori, therefore, if not.) It is not stated it was an annual office, or that he served it for himself. In Reg. v. St. Olaves (5 Q. B. 912; 1 New Mag. Cas. 24), a settlement was held to be insufficiently stated because it was not shewn that the pauper was charged with the rates, as well as that he paid them. [LORD DENMAN, C. J.—The distinction between the cases cited and the present is, that this is an annual office by statute, and we know it judicially.] It is not, however, stated that he filled it for himself. [Erle, J.-Surely if he is legally appointed, and served the offices, that excludes his being a deputy ?] The residence in the parish is also not shewn. The word “during” does not necessarily mean the whole time, but would be satisfied by a residence of thirty-nine days spread over the whole period. (LORD DENMAN, C. J.-In strict language, during does mean the whole period.] There should be no room left for a doubtful intepretation of the statement of the settlement. Great strictness has prevented many appeals. [Lord DENMAN, C. J.-And produced more. I should be sorry to see the balance struck.) The evidence that was taken shewed what was necessary to be proved, and such facts ought always to be stated.
Stock, contrà, was not called upon.
LORD DENMAN, C.J.-In a great many cases very minute objections are taken, which can only be discovered by a microscope; but as they are taken, we must decide them. We do not swerve from the rule that we will not draw inferences, and that the grounds of appeal, as well as the examinations, must state distinctly and clearly the requisites of the settlement claimed. The question here is, does it sufficiently appear that the settlement is stated ? I am of opinion that it does. By statute, the office of assessor and collector of these taxes is an annual office; the statement is, in the eye of the law, equivalent to stating in terms that it was an annual office. It is stated that he was legally and duly appointed, and that he served it. I do not see why we should infer that he was a deputy or certificate-man. The residence is also stated. All the ingredients of the settlement, therefore, are stated. The Sessions were right in hearing the evidence, and all the facts were established, subject to the opinion of this Court. If they had thought, however, that the party was clearly misled by the statement of the ground of appeal, they should have refused to hear it, and not reserved the case. (a)
COLERIDGE, J.-—This is a settlement under 3 W. & M. c. 11, and in order to make the evidence receivable, it must appear that the person served an annual office on his own account a whole year, and during that time resided forty days in the parish. It is not expressly stated that this was an annual office; but that is unnecessary, as we know that it is so by statute. It is true that there may be an appointment and service for less than a year; but there is no ambiguity of that kind here, as it is stated he served several years. It is clear also that he served it for himself, and that he resided during the period in the parish.
WIGHTMAN, J.— The question is, does it expressly appear, or by necessary intendment, that the settlement was gained ?-and looking at the statute and the words used here, I think it does. ERLÉ, J.-When I say, that it must appear by necessary intendment, I
(a) Sce Reg. v. Kesteven, 3 Q. B.810 ; 1 New Mag. Cas. 8. .
do not mean that all possibility of misinterpretation is to be excluded, for the infirmity of human language will hardly permit this. Here, the settlement is sufficiently shewn.
Order of Sessions and order of removal quashed. E. W.
COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
TENNANT v. BELL.
17 Geo. 2, c. 3, s. 2. “ Forthwith," in the 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, which requires the overseers to furnish copies of rates forthwith,
after demand, means within a reasonable time, and what is in reasonable time is in each case a
question for the jury. DE EBT, for a penalty under 17 Geo. 2, c. 3, against the defendant, as one
of the overseers of Kirby Lonsdale, for having neglected to furnish to the plaintiff, being a rate-payer of the parish, a copy of a poor-rate “ forthwith,” as required by that statute. Plea-Nil debet. The plaintiff went to the overseer on the Friday after the rate was published, and asked for the copy. The defendant told him he could not have it then, but might have it after his (the defendant's) people had done collecting the rate. The plaintiff went away, and applied at the defendant's house on the following Wednesday, when he was not at home. On Thursday the writ was issued. At the trial, Mr. Justice Wightman left it to the jury to say whether it was a reasonable time or not, and they found for the defendant.
Pashley moved for a rule nisi for a new trial.-- The jury should have been directed by the judge to find a verdict for the plaintiff, as upon
the facts proved; the meaning of the word “ forth with” was for the judge to interpret, and not for the jury. [WIGHTMAN, J.-If I had given an opinion, it would have been against you.] That does not alter the right now to object to the omission as a misdirection. [Lord DENMAN, C.J.-Why did you not tender a bill of exceptions?] It ought now to be settled, that this was a question for the judge, like questions of malice. The construction of written documents is for the judge, and not for the jury: He referred to Morell v. Frith (3 M. & W. 402). Then, “forth with" plainly excludes delay. In Grace v. Clinch (4 Q. B. 606), where a question arose as to the meaning of the word “immediately,” the Court observes, “ In applications for mandamus which have come before us, it has been assumed that forthwith' excluded the intervention of delay.” So in Tennant v. Crastell, which was another action by this plaintiff, against another overseer, for refusing a copy of the rate, the facts were almost identical, and Patteson, J. directed the jury that the statute had not been complied with. It was afterwards before this Court upon another point, and no objection was taken to this ruling. In Reg. v. Robinson (12 A. & E. 672), it is said “forthwith” must receive a reasonable construction, and here the delay was evidently too great.
Cur. adv. vult. On a subsequent day (November 16), judgment was delivered as follows:
LORD DENMAN, C.J.-I understand from my brother Patteson that he was misapprehended, if he was understood in the sense suggested by Mr. Pashley. He did not lay down any matter of law at all, but left the matter to the jury as a question to be answered by a consideration of all the circumstances. That seems to be the doctrine laid down in Spenceley v. Robinson (3 B. & C. 658), which was an action upon this statute, and the question was similarly left in this case. There will, therefore, be no rule. We must not, however, be understood to express any opinion as to what is reasonable diligence in this matter.
Rule refused. E. W.
Lunacy-Order and certificates under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100—Right to detain a lunatic-Costs.
form annexed to the Act are not stated, where a bona fide excuse is given for the omission.
insane, that “she labours under delusions of various kinds ; that she is dirty and indecent in
the extreme :" Held, sufficient. In a similar certificate, the words “ following fact,” given in the form annexed to the Act, werk
struck out, and it was stated that the opinion was formed "from conversations which I hare had
this day with her:" Held, also, sufficient.
consequence of the order or certificates being void would be to render the keeper of a licensed house,
right to restrain a lunatic is not affected by the statute.
decided that there is no ground for the application.
HABEAS CORPUS had issued, directed to Dr. Millingen, the proprietor
of a private lunatic asylum, called York House, Battersea, to bring up the body of Mrs. Shuttleworth, and calling upon him to shew cause why she should not be discharged from his custody. Mrs. Shuttleworth was accordingly brought up, under care, as a lunatic, and the case came first before Patteson, J., in the Bail Court. It appeared from the return that she had been placed under Dr. Millingen's custody by virtue of an order signed by Mr. Rowlett, the minister of St. Peter's, Pimlico, under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 100, s. 45, and two medical certificates under s. 46. The order was in the form given by the Act, with the following exception-only the five first queries were filled up, and in answer to the query. “ special circumstances (if any) preventing the insertion of any of the above particulars," it was stated that “she was watched by a person whom she feared.”
The first certificate was as follows:
“I, Thomas Willmott, being a surgeon and apothecary duly qualified, hereby certify, that I have this day, separately from any other inedical practitioner, visited and personally examined Martha Elizabeth Rhodes, the person named in the accompanying statement and order, and that the said Martha Elizabeth Rhodes is a person of unsound mind, and a proper person to be confined, and that I have formed this opinion from the following fact, viz.:
That she labours under delusions of various kinds; that she is dirty and indecent in the extreme.
(Signed) Name, THOMAS WILLMOTT.
“ Place of abode, 17, Upper Eaton-strect. “Dated this 4th day of August, 1846." The other certificate was as follows:
“I, William Griffith, being a surgeon, hereby certify, that I have this day, separately from any other medical practitioner, visited and personally examined Martha Elizabeth Rhodes, the person named in the accompanying statement and order, and that the said Martha Elizabeth Rhodes is a person of unsound mind, and a proper person to be confined, and that I have formed this opinion from the following facto vizi, conversation I have had this day with the said Martha Elizabeth Rhodes. ' (Signed)
Name, WILLIAM GRIFFITH.
“ Place of Abode, 31, Lower Belgrave-street. “Dated this 4th day of August, 1846."
On the motion for her discharge, Patteson, J. expressed much doubt as to the validity of the order, on account of the insufficiency of the reason for omitting the particulars specified in the form ; and as to the validity of the second certificate, that he wished it to be heard before the full Court, which was now accordingly done, upon
Parry moving for her discharge. The order is bad, as the queries are not properly answered, or any sufficient cause stated for the omission. The schedule (B) referred to by the 45th section gives various queries, which are to be answered upon the face of the order for confinement. These are—"name;" “sex and age;" “married, single, or widowed ;" "condition of life and previous occupation, if any;" “previous place of abode ;” “ religious persuasion, so far as known ; “ duration of existing attack;" “ whether first attack;" “age (if known) on first attack;” “whether subject to epilepsy ;" " whether suicidal or dangerous to others;” “ previous place of confinement, if any;” “whether found lunatic by inquisition, and date of commission." Of these, only the first five are answered. The Act contemplates that there may not be the means of answering these questions, but it requires the “special circumstances (if any) preventing the insertion of any of the above particulars” to be given. Here the only excuse given is, that the lunatic “was watched by an attendant whom she feared.” This is no reason at all. The Act gives the power to make this order to any person, which renders it the more necessary that it should be strictly pursueu. [COLERIDGE, J.-Is not the meaning merely, answer if you can; and if not, state the reason ? It may be quite true that this was the reason.] Some good reason must be given. Suppose the reason given was, “ I did not inquire." It must be such as is satisfactory to the Court as well as to the person who gives it, and it does not appear here that any inquiries were made at all. Secondly, the certificates are bad. The first states the fact upon which the opinion of the medical man is formed to be, “that she labours under delusions of various kinds ; that she is dirty and indecent in the extreme.” The first part of this is merely an inference, and cannot be called a fact at all. be only a mistake of his to consider them delusions ; some detail should have been given. The second may be a symptom of insanity, but by itself it is nothing. (COLERDIGE, J.-He forms his conclusion, and are we to judge of its correctness ? LORD DENMAN, C. J.— There are minute and careful provisions to prevent a person being improperly detained, and this is only a preliminary step for security.] This statute requires much more than 2 & 3
Wm. 4, c. 107, and must not the Court judge whether it is complied with or not ?
There might be the most trivial and absurd reasons given, and in this instance very little care seems to have been taken. The second certificate is bad, because it varies from the form, in having the words “the following fact" struck out; and then the statement as to the conversation is, as it is submitted, wholly deficient as a proof that she is lunatic. It is not a fact at all. This was the opinion of Mr. Justice Patteson, and if the contrary be held, then any thing will do. Mr. Justice Patteson, in Re Fell (3 D. & L. 373), was inclined to think that a statement that the patient “ had a general suspicion of the motives of every person” was insufficient. [Lord Denman, C. J.Supposing it be insufficient, would you say that we must discharge a raving lunatic?] It is submitted that, at any rate, upon this return such must be the result, although it may be that the Court, either as individuals or acting judicially, would restrain the person again immediately.
Sir J. Bayley, who appeared on behalf of Dr. Millingen, was not called upon to support the return.
Judgment. Lord DENMAN, C. J.— The great, and, indeed, the only difficulty in this case, arises from the fact, that my brother Patteson entertained doubts upon it. His opinion is entitled to the greatest possible weight; but being called upon to decide, those who have now heard the argument must form their own independent opinion upon it. The case seems to me to be entirely exceptional. It is clear that there could be no security for the public, and none for the unfortunate persons who are the objects of this Act of Parliament, unless there was a particular administration of the law applicable to their case, which was, in itself, entirely peculiar. In a former state of things, no doubt, oppressions were often practised on these unfortunate persons by those who had an interest in confining them.
Several Acts of Parliament were passed for their protection. The 3 & 4 Wm. 4, the last of them, prior to the 8 & 9 Vict., was found not to have a satisfactory operation. The latter Act was therefore passed, providing for many things in a spirit of the utmost care and tenderness, for the protection of these unfortunate persons, in every manner in which it was possible to provide for that protection with due regard to the safety of the public. It was now provided, that parties who should make a certain declaration as to the state of these persons, should have power to issue an order for their detention. No person in particular is required to do this; but he must be one who has had some opportunity to know the state of the person respecting whom he made the declaration. It is not dependent on the particular character of the person making the declaration, whether he can issue the order, but his right to issue it depends on his opportunity to judge, and on his use of that opportunity. "There could be nothing more proper than the conduct of the clergyman of the parish in this case, where he found a person in such a state, that with a view to the protection and advantage of that person herself, it was necessary that she should be confined. But then it was said, that the Act of Parliament was peculiar in its terms, and that these terms must be exactly observed, and that no person could have a right to send another to an asylum unless the order contained all the particulars which were set forth in the form of the order contained in the Act of Parliament. The question that first presents itself is, whether the requisite statements do sufficiently appear in the order. In my opinion they do. The statement, with respect to the religion of the unfortunate person, was made to the full extent of the know