pedient which is not virtuous, than by those according to whom that may be virtuous which is not expedient, and that expedient which is not virtuous. But to us, our Academic sect gives this great license, that we, whatever may seem most probable, by our privilege are at liberty to maintain. But I return to my rule.

V. To take away wrongfully, then, from another, and for one man to advance his own interests by the disadvantage of another man, is more contrary to nature than death, than poverty, than pain, than any other evils which can befall either our bodies or external circumstances. For, in the first place, it destroys human intercourse and society; for if we will be so disposed that each for his own gain shall despoil or offer violence to another, the inevitable conscquence is, that the society of the human race, which is most consistent with nature, will be broken asunder. As, supposing each member of the body was so disposed as to think it could be well if it should draw to itself the health of the adjacent member, it is inevitable that the whole body would be debilitated and would perish; so if each of us should seize for himself the interests of another, and wrest whatever he could from each for the sake of his own emolument, the necessary consequence is, that human society and community would be overturned. It is indeed allowed, nature not opposing, that each should rather acquire for himself than for another, whatever pertains to the enjoyment of life; but nature does not allow this, that by the spoliation of others we should increase our own means, resources, and opulence. Nor indeed is this forbidden by nature alone-that is, by the law of nations—but it is also in the same manner enacted by the municipal laws of countries, by which government is supported in individual states, that it should not be lawful to injure another man for the sake of one's own advantage. For this the laws look to, this they require, that the union of the citizens should be unimpaired; those who are for severing it they coerce by death, by banishment, by imprisonment, by fine. But what declares this much more is our natural reason, which is a law divine and human, which he who is willing to obey

"La plus sublime vertu est negative; clle nous instruit de ne jamais faire du mal a personne."-Rousseau.

(and all will obey it who are willing to live according to nature) never will suffer himself to covet what is another person's, and to assume to himself that which he shall have wrongfully taken from another.' For loftiness and greatness of mind, and likewise community of feeling, justice and liberality, are much more in accordance with nature, than pleasure, than life, than riches-which things, even to contemn and count as nothing in comparison with the common good, is the part of a great and lofty soul. Therefore, to take away wrongfully from another for the sake of one's own advantage, is more contrary to nature than death, than pain, than other considerations of the same kind. And likewise, to undergo the greatest labors and inquietudes for the sake, if it were possible, of preserving or assisting all nationsimitating that Hercules whom the report of men, mindful of his benefits, has placed in the council of the gods-is moro in accordance with nature than to live in solitude, not only without any inquietudes, but even amid the greatest pleasures, abounding in all manner of wealth, though you should also excel in beauty and strength. Wherefore, every man of the best and most noble disposition much prefers that lifo to this. From whence it is evinced that man, obeying nature, can not injure men. In the next place, he who injures another that he may himself attain some advantage, either thinks that he is doing nothing contrary to nature, or

1 "The word natural is commonly taken in so many senses, and is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence, be natural to man-if reason and forethought be also natural-then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. Men's inclination, their necessities, lead them to combine; their understanding and experience tell them that this combination is impossible, where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of others: and from these passions and reflections conjoined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in others, the sentiment of justice, throughout all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place in some degree or other, in every individual of the human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of his intellectual faculties, may justly be esteemed natural."-Hume's "Principles of Morals.' Appendix III. 2 Horace adopts the same illustration in the following passage. "Dignum laude virum Musa vetat mori:

Colo Musa beat. Sic Jovis interest

Optatis epulis impiger Hercules."

Lib. iv. Carm. 8, vcr. 23-30.

thinks that death, poverty, pain, the loss cf children, of kindred, and of friends, are more to be avoided than doing injury to another. If he thinks that nothing is done contrary to nature by injuring men, what use is there in disputing with him who would altogether take away from man what is human? But if he thinks that indeed is to be shunned, but that those things, death, poverty, pain, are much worse, he errs in this, that he thinks any defect, either of body or fortune, more grievous than the defects of the mind.

VI. One thing, therefore, ought to be aimed at by all men ; that the interest of each individually, and of all collectively, should be the same; for if each should grasp at his individual interest, all human society will be dissolved. And also, if nature enjoins this, that a man should desire to consult the interest of a man, whoever he is, for the very reason that he is man, it necessarily follows that, as the nature, so the interest, of all mankind, is a common one. If that be so, we are all included under one and the same law of nature; and if this too be true, we are certainly prohibited by the law of nature from injuring another. But the first is true; therefore, the last is true. For that which some say, that they would take nothing wrongfully, for the sake of their own advantage, from a parent or brother, but that the case is different with other citizens, is indeed absurd. These establish the principle that they have nothing in the way of right, no society with their fellow-citizens, for the sake of the common interestan opinion which tears asunder the whole social compact. They, again, who say that a regard ought to be had to fellowcitizens, but deny that it ought to foreigners, break up the common society of the human race, which, being withdrawn, beneficence, liberality, goodness, justice, are utterly abolished. But they who tear up these things should be judged impious, even toward the immortal gods; for they overturn the society established by them among men, the closest bond of which society is, the consideration that it is more contrary to nature that man, for the sake of his own gain, should wrongfully take from man, than that he should endure all such disadvantages, either external or in the person, or even in the mind itself, as are not the effects of injustice. For that cne virtue, justice, is the mistress and queen of all virtucs.'

1 There is no virtue so truly great and godlike as justice; most of th

Some person will perhaps say-should not the wise man, then, if himself famished with hunger, wrest food from another, some good-for-nothing fellow? By no means; for my life is not more useful to me than such a disposition of mind that I would do violence to no man for the sake of my own advantage. What! If a worthy man could despoil Phalaris, a cruel and outrageous tyrant, of his garments, that he might not himself perish with cold, should he not do it? These points are very easy to decide. For if you will wrongfully take away any thing from a good-fornothing man for the sake of your own interest, you will act unsociably and contrary to the law of nature. But if you be one who can bring much advantage to the state, and to human society if you remain in life, it may not deserve to be reprehended should you wrongfully take any thing upon that account from another. But if that be not the case, it is rather the duty of each to bear his own misfortune, than wrongfully to take from the comforts of another. Disease, then, or poverty, or any thing of this sort, is not more contrary to nature than is the wrongful taking or coveting what is another's. But the desertion of the common interest is

other virtues are the virtues of created beings, or accommodated to our nature, as we are men. Justice is that which is practiced by God himself, and to be practiced in its perfection by none but him. Omniscience and omnipotence are requisite for the full exertion of it: the one to discover every degree of uprightness or iniquity in thoughts, words, and actions; the other to measure out and impart suitable rewards and punishments. "As to be perfectly just is an attribute in the divine nature, to be so to the utmost of our abilities is the glory of a man. Such a one who has the public administration in his hands, acts like the representative of his Maker, in recompensing the virtuous and punishing the offender. By the extirpating of a criminal he averts the judgments of Heaven when ready to fall upon an impious people; or, as my friend Cato expresses it much better in a sentiment conformable to his character::

"When by just vengeance impious mortals perish,

The gods behold their punishment with pleasure,
And lay th' uplifted thunderbolt aside.'

When a nation loses its regard to justice; when they do not look upon it as something venerable, holy, and inviolable; when any of them dare presume to lessen affront, or verify those who have the distribution of it in their hands; when a judge is capable of being influenced by any thing but law, or a cause may be recommended by any thing that is foreign to its own merits, we may venture to pronounce that such a nation is has tening to its ruin."-Guardian, No. 99.

contrary to nature, for it is unjust. Therefore, the very law of nature which preserves and governs the interest of men, decrees undoubtedly that things necessary for living should be transferred from an inert and useless fellow to a wise, good, and brave man, who, if he should perish, would largely take away from the common good; provided he do this' in such a manner, that he do not, through thinking well of himself, and loving himself, make this an excuse for committing injustice. Thus will he always discharge his duty, advancing the interests of mankind, and that human society of which I so often make mention. Now, as to what

That is, provided he transfer to himself the necessaries of life from a worthless person.

2 "In a loose and general view," says Godwin, "I and my neighbor are both of us men; and of consequence entitled to equal attention. But, in reality, it is probable that one of us is a being of more worth and importance than the other. A man is of more worth than a beast, because, being possessed of higher faculties, he is capable of a more refined and genuine happiness. In the same manner the illustrious Archbishop of Cambray was of more worth than his valet, and there are few of us that would hesitate to pronounce, if his palace were in flames, and the life of only one of them could be preserved, which of the two ought to be preferred. But there is another ground of preference, besides the private consideration of one of them being further removed from the state of a mere animal. We are not connected with one or two percipient beings, but with a society, a nation, and in some sense with the whole family of mankind. Of consequence that life ought to be preferred which will be most conducive to the general good. In saving the life of Fénélon, suppose at that moment he conceived the project of his immortal Telemachus, I should have been promoting the benefit of thousands who have been cured by the perusal of that work of some error, vice, and consequent unhappiness. Nay, my benefit would extend further than this; for every individual thus cured, has become a better member of society, and has contributed in his turn to the happiness, information, and improvement of others. Suppose I had been myself the valet, I ought to have chosen to die rather than Fénélon should have died; the life of Fénélon was really preferable to that of the valet. But understanding is the faculty that perceives the truth of this and similar propositions, and justice is the principle that regulates my conduct accordingly. It would have been just in the valet to have preferred the archbishop to himself; to have done otherwise would have been a breach of justice. Suppose the valet had been my brother, my father, or my benefactor, this would not alter the truth of the proposition. The life of Fénélon would still be more valuable than that of the valet; and justice, pure and unadulterated justice, would still have preferred that which was most valuable. Justice would have taught me to save the life of Fénélon at the expense of the other."-Political Justice, book ii. chap. 2.