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by Panatius; because every investigation which is rationally undertaken, concerning any subject, ought to set out with a definition, that it may be understood what is the subject of discussion.

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III. All questions concerning duty are of two sorts. The first relates to the final good; the second consists of those rules which are to regulate the practice of life in all its relations. Examples of the former are as follows:-Whether all duties are perfect in themselves? Whether one duty is of more importance than another? together with other questions of the same nature. Now the rules for moral duties relate, indeed, to the final good; but it is not so perceptible that they do, because they seem chiefly to refer to the regulation of ordinary life, and of them we are to treat in this book. But there is another division of duty for one is called a mean duty, the other a perfect duty. If I mistake not, the complete or perfect duty is the same with what we call a direct one, and by the Greeks is called zarówμa. As to that duty which is mean they call it xa0yxor, and they thus define those terms. Whatever duty is absolute, that they call a perfect duty; and they call that duty, for the perappeared to bear most distinctly the stamp of truth, but not submitting to the authority of any. Horace makes a similar profession respecting himself

"Nullias addictus jurare in verbi magistri,

Quo me cumque rapit tempestas deferor hospes."

First. Epist.-First Book, lines 14, 15. "The Roman orator," says Sir. J. Mackintosh, "though in speculativo questions he embraced that mitigated doubt which allowed most ease and freedom to his genius, yet in those moral wrirings where his heart was most deeely interested, followed the severest sect of philosophy, and became almost a Stoic."-"Progress of Ethical Philosophy."

Cicero, in his work on Moral Ends (De Finibus), briefly defines ethics, or morality, as the ars vivendi, or doctrina bene vivendi; that is, the art of living wisely. The terms ethics is derived from the Greek ɩký, which, in signification, is equivalent with the Latin mos, mores, whence the adjective moralis, and the English word morals. Aristotle, in the second book of his "Ethics," addressed to his son, Nichomachus, says that moral science received the name of ethics from the word vos, “habit, use, or custom," since it is from habitual experience, and the routine of customary conduct, that moral dispositions and principles are gradually formed and changed. Perhaps the definition of Dr. Thomas Brown can not be improved: "Ethics is the science which relates to our mutual affections, not simply as phenomena, but as they are virtuous cr vicious, right or wrong."

formance of which a probable reason can be assigned, a mean duty.'

In the opinion, therefore, of Panatius, there is a threefold consideration for determining our resolution; for men doubt whether the thing which falls under their consideration be of itself virtuous or disgraceful, and in this deliberation minds are often distracted into opposite sentiments. They then examine and deliberate whether or not the subject of their consideration conduces to the convenience or enjoyment of life, to the improvement of their estate and wealth, to their interest and power, by which they may profit themselves or their relations; all which deliberation falls under the category of utility. The third kind of doubtful deliberation is, when an apparent utility seems to clash with moral rectitude; for when utility hurries us to itself, and virtue, on the other hand, seems to call us back, it happens that the mind is distracted in the choice, and these occasion a double anxiety in deliberation. In this division (although an omission is of the worst consequence in divisions of this kind), two things are omitted; for we are accustomed to deliberate not only whether a thing be virtuous or shameful in itself, but, of two things that are virtuous, which is the more excellent? And, in like manner, of two things which are profitable, which is the more profitable? Thus, it is found that the deliberation, which he considered to be threefold, ought to be distributed into five divisions. We must, therefore, first treat of what is virtuous in itself, and that under two heads; in like manner, of what i3 profitable; and we shall next treat of them comparatively.

IV. In the first place, a disposition has been planted by nature in every species of living creatures to cherish themselves, their life, and body; to avoid those things that appear hurtful to them; and to look out for and procure whatever

1 "It was thus that they (the Stoics) were obliged to invent a double morality; one for mankind at large, from whom was expected no moro than the Kalnkov, which seems principally to have denoted acts of duty, done from inferior or mixed motives; and the other, which they appear to have hoped from their ideal wise men, is кaтóρ@wua, or perfect observance of rectitude, which consisted only in moral acts, done for mere reverence for morality, unaided by any feelings; all which (without the exception of pity) they classed among the enemies of reason and the disturbers of the human soul."-Sir. J. Mackintosh's "Progress of Ethical Philosophy."

is necessary for their living, such as food, shelter, and the like. Now the desire of union for the purpose of procreating their own species is common to all animals, as well as a certain degree of concern about what is procreated. But the greatest distinction between a man and a brute lies in this, that the latter is impelled only by instinct, and applies itself solely to that object which is present and before it, with very little sensibility to what is past or to come;' but

1 "It seems evident that animals, as well as men, learn many things from experience, and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, etc., and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned by long observation to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gave ease or pleasure. This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action, the most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain when you menace him, of lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not even experience which makes him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and intend to call him when you pronounco it in a certain manner, and with a certain tone and accent?

"In all these cases we may observe, that the animal infers some fact beyond what immediately strikes his senses; and that this inference is altogether founded on past experience, while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects.

"But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it which they derive from the original hand of Nature, which much exceed the share of capacity they possess, on ordinary occasions, and in which they improve little or nothing by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate INSTINCTS, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding. But our wonder will perhaps cease to diminish when we consider that the experimental reasoning itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct, or mechanical power, that acts in us unknown to ourselves, and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparison of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties. Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an instinct which teaches a man to avoid the fire, as much as that which teaches a bird, with such exactness, the art of incubation, and the whole economy and order of its nursery."-Hume's "Inquiry concerning the Human Understanding," sec. 9. **

man, because endowed with reason, by which he discerns consequences, looks into the causes of things and their progress, and being acquainted, as it were, with precedents, he compares their analogies, and adapts and connects the present with what It is easy for him to foresee the future direction of all his life, and therefore he prepares what is necessary for passing through it.

is to come.

Nature, likewise, by the same force of reason, conciliates man to man, in order to a community both of language and of life: above all, it implants in them a strong love for their offspring; it impels them to desire that companies and societies should be formed, and that they should mingle in them; and that for those reasons, man should take care to provide for the supply of clothing and of food; and that not only for himself, but for his wife, his children, and for all whom he ought to hold dear and to protect. This is an affection which arouses the spirit and makes it more strenuous for action.

The distinguishing property of man is to search for and to follow after truth. Therefore, when relaxed from our necessary cares and concerns, we then covet to see, to hear, and to learn somewhat; and we esteem knowledge of things either obscure or wonderful to be the indispensable means of living happily. From this we understand that truth, simplicity, and candor, are most agreeable to the nature of mankind. To this passion for discovering truth, is added a desire to direct; for a mind, well formed by nature, is unwilling to obey any man but him who lays down rules and instructions to it, or who, for the general advantage, exercises equitable and lawful government. From this

1 "Nature has made it delightful to man to know, disquieting to him to know only imperfectly, while any thing remains in his power that can make his knowledge more accurate or comprehensive; and she has done more than all this: she has not waited till we reflect on the pleasure which we are to enjoy, or the pain which we are to suffer. It is sufficient that there is something unknown which has a relation to something that is known to us. We feel instantly the desire of knowing this We have a desire of knowledge which nothing can abate; a desire that in some greater or less degree extends itself to every thing which we are capable of knowing, and not to realities merely but to all the extravagances of fiction."-Dr. Thomas Brown's "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind."

too.

proceeds loftiness of mind, and contempt for worldly interests.1

Neither is it a mean privilege of nature and reason, that man is the only animal who is sensible of order, of decency, and of propriety, both in acting and speaking. In like manner, no other creature perceives the beauty, the gracefulness, and the harmony of parts, in those objects which are discerned by the sight. And analogous perception to which nature and reason convey from the sight to the mind; and consider that beauty, regularity, and order in counsels and actions should be still more preserved. She is cautious not to do aught that is indecent or effeminate, or to act or think wantonly in any of our deliberations or deeds. The effect and result of all this produces that honestum which we are now in search of; that virtue which is honorable even without being ennobled; and of which we may truly say, that even were it praised by none it would be commendable in itself.

V. My Son Marcus, you here perceive at least a sketch, and, as it were, the outline of virtue; which, could we perceive her with our eyes, would, as Plato says, kindle a wonderful love of wisdom. But whatever is virtuous arises from some one of those four divisions: for it consists either in sagacity and the perception of truth; or in the preservation of human society, by giving to every man his due, and by observing the faith of contracts; or in the greatness and firmness of an elevated and unsubdued mind; or in observing order and regularity in all our words and in all our actions, in which consists moderation and temperance.

1 The same sentiment, with reference to the love of knowledge, is more beautifully expressed by Virgil:

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"Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas;
Atque metus omnes et inexorabile fatum

Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari."

Georg. II. lines 490-492.

2 Our bodily eyes.] "This is a fine and a celebrated sentiment of Plato. Όψις (says he, in his Phedro), ἡμῖν ὀξυτάτη τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔρχεται αἰσθήσεων, ή φρόνη εἰς οὐκ ὁρᾶται, δεινοὺς γὰρ ἂν παρεῖχειν ἔρωτας, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἐαυτηρ ἐναργές είδωλον παρείχετο εἰς ὄψις ἱόν; ‘Our eyesight (says he), is the most exquisite of our senses, yet it does not serve us to discern wisdom; if it did, what a glow of love would she kindle within The reader may, perhaps, observe with what propriety Cicero applies to virtuo what Plato says of wisdom."-Guthrie.

us.'

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