enemies. But still let moderation be observed. For it seems to be the part of a cruel man, or rather scarcely of a man at all, to endanger the lives of many. It is both dangerous to your person, and disgraceful to your character, so to act as to get the name of an accuser, as happened in the case of Marcus Brutus, a man sprung from a most noble family, and son to the eminent adept in civil law.

Moreover, this precept of duty also must be carefully observed, that you never arraign an innocent man on trial for his life, for this can by no means be done without heinous guilt. For what can be so unnatural as to prostitute to the prosecution and the ruin of the good, that eloquence which nature has given us for the safety and preservation of mankind. Although, however, this is to be avoided, yet we are not to consider it a religious duty never to defend a guilty party, so that he be not abominable and impious. The people desire this, custom tolerates it, and humanity suffers it. The duty of a judge in all trials is to follow truth; that of a pleader, sometimes to maintain the plausible though it may not be the truth,' which I should not, especially as I am now

1 Two of the most eminent moralists of modern times have thus recorded their respective judgments on this point of casuistry. Archdeacon Paley says, "There are falsehoods which are not lies; that is, which aro not criminal: as, where no one is deceived; which is the case in parables, fables, novels, jests, tales to create mirth, ludicrous embellishments of a story, where the declared design of the speaker is not to inform, but to divert; compliments in the subscription of a letter, a servant's denying his master, a prisoner's pleading not guilty, an advocate asserting the justice, or his belief of the justice, of his client's cause. In such instances, no confidence is destroyed, because none was reposed; no promise to speak the truth is violated, because none was given, or understood to be given."-Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, book i.i. chapter xv.

In refutation of this view, Dymond suggests the following considerations:-"This defense is not very credible, even if it were valid; it do fends men from the imputation of falsehood, because their falsehoods are so habitual that no one gives them credit!

"But the defense is not valid. Of this the reader may satisfy himself by considering why, if no one ever believes what advocates say, they continue to speak. They would not, year after year, persist in uttering untruths in our courts, without attaining an object, and knowing that they would not attain it. If no one ever in fact believed them, they would cease to asseverate. They do not love falsehood for its own sake, and utter it gratuitously and for nothing. The custom itself, therefore, disproves the argument that is brought to defend it. Whenever that

treating of philosophy, venture to write, were it not likewise the opinion of a man of the greatest weight among the Stoics, Panatius. But it is by defenses that glory and favor also are acquired in the greatest degree; and so much the greater, if at any time it happens that we come to the help of one who seems to be circumvented and oppressed by the influence of some powerful man, as I myself have done both in other cases frequently, and when a youth in defense of Sextus Roscius Amerinus, against the influence of Lucius Sylla, then in power, which speech, as you know, is extant.

XV. But having explained the duties of young men, which avail to the attainment of glory, we have next to speak about beneficence and liberality, the nature of which is twofold; for a kindness is done to those who need it, by giving either our labor or our money. The latter is casier, defense becomes valid, whenever it is really true that 'no confidence is reposed' in advocates, they will cease to use falsehood, for it will have lost its motive. But the real practice is to mingle falsehood and truth together, and so to involve the one with the other that the jury can not easily separate them. The jury know that some of the pleader's statements are true, and these they believe. Now he makes other statements with the same deliberate emphasis; and how shall the jury know whether these are false or true? How shall they discover the point at which they shall begin to 'repose no confidence?' Knowing that a part is true, they can not always know that another part is not true. That it is the pleader's design to persuade them of the truth of all he affirms, is manifest. Suppose an advocate, when he rose should say, 'Gentlemen, I am now going to speak the truth;' and after narrating the facts of the case, should say, 'Gentlemen, I am now going to address you with fictions.' Why should not an advocate do this? Because then no confidence would be reposed, which is the same thing as to say that he pursues his present plan because some confidence is reposed, and this decides the question. The decision should not be concealed-that the advocate who employs untruths in his pleadings, does really and most strictly lie.

"And even if no one ever did believe an advocate, his false declara. tions would still be lies, because he always 'professes to speak the truth.' This indeed is true upon the Archdeacon's own showing; for he says, 'Whoever seriously addresses his discourse to another, tacitly promises to speak the truth.' The case is very different from others which he proposes as parallel-'parables, fables, jests.' In these, the speaker docs not profess to state facts. But the pleader does profess to state facts. Ile intends and endeavors to mislead. His untruths, therefore, are lies to him, whether they are believed or not; just as, in vulgar life, a man whose falsehoods are so notorious that no one gives him credit, is not the less a liar than if he were believed."-Dymond's Essay on the Principles of Morals, Essay ii. chapter v.

especially to a wealthy person; but the former is the more noble and splendid, and more worthy of a brave and illustrious man; for although there exists in both a liberal inclination to oblige, yet the one is a draft on our purse, the other on our virtue, and bounty which is given out of our income exhausts the very source of the munificence. Thus benignity is done away by benignity, and the greater the number you have exercised it upon, so much the less able are you to exercise it upon many. But they who will be beneficent and liberal of their labor, that is, of their virtue and industry, in the first place, will have by how much greater the number of persons they shall have served, so much the more coadjutors in their beneficence. And in the next place, by the habit of beneficence they will be the better prepared, and, as it were, better exercised to deserve well of many. Philip, in a certain letter, admirably reproves his son Alexander, because he sought to gain the goodwill of the Macedonians by largesses-"Pest!" he says, "what consideration led you into the hope that you could imagine that they whom you have corrupted with money would be faithful to you? Are you aiming at this, that the Macedonians should expect you will be, not their king, but their agent and purveyor." He says well, "agent and purveyor," because that is undignified in a king; and still better, because he designates a largess a corrupt bribe; for he who receives becomes the worse for it, and more ready always to expect the same. He enjoined this on his son, but we may consider it a precept for all men. Wherefore, this indeed is not doubtful, that such beneficence as consists of labor and industry is both the more honorable, and extends more widely, and can serve a greater number. Sometimes, however, we must make presents-nor is this sort of beneficence to be altogether repudiated; and oftentimes we ought to communicate from our fortune to suitable persons, who are in need, but carefully and moderately. For many persons have squandered their patrimonies by unadvised generosity. Now, what is more absurd than to bring it to pass that you can no longer do that which you would willingly do? And moreover, rapine follows profuseness. For when, by giving, they begin to be in want, they are forced to lay their hands upon other men's property. Thus, when, for the sake

of procuring good-will, they mean to be beneficent, they acquire not so much the affection of those to whom they give as the hatred of those from whom they take. Wherefore, our purse should neither be so closed up that our generosity can not open it, nor co unfastened that it lies open to all—a bound should be set, and it should bear reference to our means. We ought altogether to remember that saying which, from being very often used by our countrymen, has come into the usage of a proverb, that "bounty has no bottom." For what bounds can there be, when both they who have been accustomed to receive, and other persons, are desiring the same thing? XVI. There are two kinds of men who give largely, of whom one kind is prodigal, the other liberal. The prodigal are those who with entertainments, and distributions of meat to the populace, and gladiatorial exhibitions, and the apparatus of the stage and the chase, lavish their money upon those things of which they will leave behind either a transient memory, or none all. But the liberal are they who, with their fortunes, either redeem those captured by robbers, or take up the debts of their friends, or aid in the establishing of their daughters, or assist them either in seeking or increasing their fortunes. Therefore, I am astonished what could come into the mind of Theophrastus, in that book which he wrote about riches, in which he has said many things well, but this most absurdly. For he is lavish in praise of magnificence, and of the furnishing of popular exhibitions, and he considers the means of supplying such expenses to be the grand advantage of wealth. Now, to me that enjoyment of liberality of which I have given a few cxamples, seems much greater and surer.

With how much more weight and truth does Aristotle censure such of us as feel no astonishment at that profusion of wealth which is wasted in courting the people; "if," says he, "they who are besieged by an enemy should be compelled to purchase a pint of water at a mina,' this, on first hearing, would seem to us incredible, and all would be astonished, but when we reflect upon it, we excuse it for its necessity; while in these pieces of immense extravagance and unbounded expense, we do not feel greatly astonished." And he censures us, especially, "because we are neither relieving necessity, nor is our dignity increased, and

1 About three pounds sterling.

the very delight of the multitude is for a brief and little space, and only felt by the most giddy, even in whom, however, at the same time with the satiety, the memory of the pleasure likewise dies." He sums up well, too, that "these things are agreeable to boys and silly women, and slaves, and freemen very like slaves; but that by a man of sense, and one who ponders with sound judgment on such exhibitions, they can in no way be approved." Though I know that in our state it is established by ancient usage, and even now in the good times, that the splendor of ædileships' is expected even from the most excellent men. Therefore, both Publius Crassus, wealthy as well in name as in fortune, discharged the office of ædile with the most magnificent entertainment; and, a little while after, Lucius Crassus, with Quintus Mucius, the most moderate of all men, served a most magnificent ædileship; and next, Caius Claudius, son of Appius; many subsequently-the Luculli, Hortensius, Silanus; but Publius Lentulus, in my consulship, surpassed all his predecessors. Scaurus imitated him; but the shows of my friend Pompey, in his second consulship, were the most magnificent of all-concerning all of whom, you see what is my opinion.

XVII. Nevertheless, the suspicion of avarice should be avoided. The omitting of the ædileship caused the rejection. of Mamercus, a very wealthy man, from the consulship. Wherefore it must be done if it be required by the people, and good men, if not desiring, at least approve it, but in proportion to our means, as I myself did it; and again, if some object of greater magnitude and utility is acquired by popular largess, as lately the dinners in the streets, under pretext of a Vow of a tenth, brought great honor to Orestes. Nor was ever any fault found with Marcus Seius, because in the scarcity he gave corn to the people at an as the bushel. For he delivered himself from a great and inveterate dislike by an expense neither disgraceful, since he was ædile at the time, nor excessive. But it lately brought the greatest honor to our friend Milo, that with gladiators,

1 The Ædiles, among other duties, had the care of the public shows, to which they were expected to contribute largely out of their private fortunes.

2 To one of the gods.