Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public FinanceCompetitive Governments systematically explores the hypothesis that governments are internally competitive, that they are competitive in their relations with each other and in their relations with other institutions in society which, like them, supply consuming households with goods and services. Breton contends that competition not only serves to bring the political system to an equilibrium, but it also leads to a revelation of the households' true demand functions for publicly provided goods and services and to the molding of a link between the quantities and the qualities demanded and supplied and the tax prices paid for these goods and services. |
Contents
The conceptual framework | 3 |
11 Goods and services defined | 5 |
12 Models of government | 9 |
13 Concepts of efficiency | 17 |
14 Requisites of democracy | 24 |
15 Competition | 30 |
16 Assembling the building blocks | 34 |
Demand and its revelation | 37 |
i Technology | 204 |
ii Coordination costs | 209 |
b Nature | 210 |
c Effects | 212 |
iii Contractual enforcement costs | 213 |
iv Caveats | 222 |
b Collusion | 223 |
84 The Wicksellian Connection remembered | 226 |
21 Utility maximization | 42 |
i Taxprices | 43 |
ii Freeriding | 44 |
iii Substitution | 46 |
22 Demand revelation | 48 |
i Motivation | 49 |
ii Mechanism | 52 |
23 Demand lobbies | 57 |
i Aggregation and the interaction of demand lobbies with centers of power | 59 |
ii Shirking by lobby members | 61 |
iii Reverse shirking by lobby managers | 64 |
iv Collusion and rentseeking | 65 |
24 The Wicksellian Connection | 66 |
25 Conclusion | 69 |
Checks and balances | 70 |
31 Compound governments | 71 |
32 Definitions and assumptions | 74 |
i Checking and balancing | 75 |
ii Checking instruments illustrated | 76 |
33 A formal model and some implications | 79 |
34 The Wicksellian Connection anew | 87 |
35 A digression on American exceptionalism | 90 |
36 Balanced governments | 93 |
37 Conclusion | 95 |
Budgetary processes | 96 |
41 The budgetary process of parliamentary governments | 98 |
ii The model | 101 |
42 The budgetary process of congressional governments | 111 |
i Stylized structure | 112 |
ii The model | 114 |
43 The Wicksellian Connection once again | 118 |
44 Conclusion | 121 |
Consent suffrage and support | 122 |
51 A model of political consent | 123 |
i A Vox Dei dispensation model | 125 |
ii A Vox Populi dispensation model | 129 |
52 Introducing suffrage and support | 134 |
53 Collusion and breakdown | 141 |
54 The Wicksellian Connection once more | 146 |
Hierarchy and bureaucracy | 148 |
61 The problem defined | 149 |
62 Models of inefficient bureaus | 155 |
ii The discretionary power model | 162 |
63 Models of efficient bureaus and bureaucracies | 167 |
ii Bureaucracies | 176 |
64 Conclusion | 178 |
A retrospective overview | 181 |
71 More definitions | 183 |
72 Vertical competition | 184 |
73 Horizontal competition | 190 |
74 Conclusion | 194 |
The organization of governmental systems | 196 |
81 The standard explanation | 197 |
82 An alternative explanation | 203 |
85 Conclusion | 227 |
Competition stability and central governments | 228 |
91 The inducements to compete | 229 |
i Tiebouts potential entry and exit mechanism | 230 |
ii Salmons external benchmark mechanism | 233 |
92 Some empirical evidence on intergovernmental competition | 235 |
ii Estimates of political mobility | 238 |
iii Analysis of price rivalry | 239 |
93 Horizontal competition and stability | 240 |
i Policy and program diffusion | 241 |
ii Political mobility | 243 |
iii Price rivalry | 245 |
95 Securing stability | 248 |
i Why use monitors? | 249 |
ii Monitoring horizontal competition | 250 |
b Regional policies | 251 |
c Intergovernmental grants | 254 |
iii Monitoring vertical competition | 258 |
a Bicameralism | 259 |
b Intrastate federalism | 260 |
c Constitutional entrenchment | 261 |
96 The Wicksellian Connection reconsidered | 262 |
The world order | 264 |
101 International competition | 267 |
102 International regimes | 271 |
103 The European Union | 275 |
104 Conclusion | 276 |
Sociopolitical structures | 277 |
The size of the nonmarket sector | 279 |
111 Nonprofit organizations | 280 |
112 An alternative perspective | 282 |
113 Goods are goods | 284 |
114 Conclusion | 285 |
The growth of governments | 286 |
121 The determinants of supply | 288 |
i Some preliminaries | 289 |
ii Differential productivity growth of conventional inputs | 293 |
iii Differential growth in the capacity to control freeriding | 295 |
iv Differential growth in the ability to acquire information | 302 |
122 Equilibrium and growth | 304 |
123 Conclusion | 308 |
Conclusion | 311 |
Longterm budget deficits | 315 |
The power of small groups | 318 |
The independence of judiciaries | 321 |
Information and pressure | 326 |
An empirical Wicksellian Connection? | 328 |
Overlap and duplication | 331 |
The structure and stability of federal states | 334 |
| 337 | |
| 363 | |
| 369 | |
Other editions - View all
Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance Albert Breton No preview available - 1996 |
Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance Albert Breton No preview available - 1996 |
Common terms and phrases
agents analysis argued assume assumption bargaining behavior Breton budget budgetary process bureaucracy cabinet Canada centers of power central governments ceteris paribus Chapter checking instruments checks and balances citizens collusion compete compound governments congressional systems consequence constitutional control free-riding coordination costs demand curve demand functions demand lobbies discussion division of functions division of powers Economics effect efficiency elected electoral enforcement equilibrium example exist exogenous expected consent expenditure federal fiscal formal governmental systems grants groups income redistribution increase informal structures instability institutions intergovernmental competition junior governments legislation line ministers literature logrolling marginal mechanism ments monitoring Nash equilibrium organizations outcomes output parliamentary parliamentary systems parties political preferences principals problem production provincial quasi-rents relations rent-seeking role Section sector senior stability Subsection supply tax harmonization taxprices theory tion utility losses vertical competition vertical fiscal imbalance vertical networks voting Welfare Economics Wicksellian Connection