conceived; and nothing is more certain than that a metaphyfical or abfolute impoffibility cannot be conceived. But, fays Dr. Kirwan of an author, who appears to have thought on this fubject exactly as we do," It is strange that he did not perceive that matter was [is] entirely ufelefs, fince even admitting its exiftence, the Divine agency muft ftill be called in; and fince he allows that every thing might go juft as well, even if it did not exist, he should also allow that its existence is at leaft doubtful." P. 319. We have explicitly admitted, and fo, we believe, has the author referred to, that no man can have so absolute a conviction of the existence of matter as he has of the existence of his own mind; we likewife admit that, fuppofing the exif sence of matter, the divine agency muft ftill be called in, because though bodies are inert, and the particles of the denfeft of them not in abfolute contact, not only are their maffes kept together by fome power, but they even appear to influence each other at a distance; but we have not therefore admitted that every thing might go on just as well, even if matter did not exist, becaufe, though we perceive not its neceffity, it may be neceffary or at least useful as an inftrument to fuch minds as our's. A Carpenter could make a small boat or canoe with no other inftrument than a common clafp-knife; but it does not therefore follow that the other inftruments commonly employed on fuch occafions are ufelefs. We have faid that an abfolute impoflibility cannot be diftinctly conceived; but it does not from this follow that we can conceive all that is poffible, or even all that is real. Matter therefore might exift and be useful, even though we could form no conception of its ufes; juft as many things are found in the human body of which the most skilful anatomist is not able to affign the particular ufes, though no intelligent anatomift ever fuppofed them to be useless. To account for the general perfuafion that matter exists this author makes feveral fuppofitions, of which one is that it was fuggested by the ftructure of language. "This, fays he, requires, moft commonly at leaft, adjectives and fubftantives. Now the fame adjective is applicable to a va riety of different fubftantives; thus, we fay, a good man, a good houfe, a good horfe, &c. Frequently indeed the fubftantive with which the adjective is fuppofed [to be] conjoined, is not expreffed; thus Hudibras fays, better is the only enemy to good; but as an adjective is imperfectly intelligible without reference to fome fubftantive, the general term thing was invented, which denotes any fubftantive: then all fenfations being expreffed by adjectives, ૨૧ BRIT, CRIT. VOL. XXXV. JUNE, 1810, on 1 on account of their various applicability, as red, fragrant, fweet, loud, hot, cold, hard, foft, extended, &c., the mechanism of lan. guage neceffarily fuppofes them to have fome fubftantive to which. their aggregate is applicable. This fubftantive was called a thing or fubftance, though perfectly unknown, being unperceived by any of the fenfes, until a particular name was devised, which name was fuppofed to denote alfo that unknown thing, and to involve it in its fignification: thus an apple was at first called a red, fragrant, juicy thing, before it was named an apple, which more exprefsly denoted the peculiarities of its taste, smell, colour, fhape, hardness &c. Thus thefe fenfations were deemed to be modifications of this fictitious thing, which was called their subAratum, and the fuppofed fubftratum of all fenfational aggregates was by philofophers called matter." P. 272. Without flopping to queftion this theory of the origin and progrefs of language, we beg leave to obferve, that fuppofing it true, it would lead us to a conclufion juft the reverfe of that which Dr. Kirwan has deduced from it. Language was either invented gradually by men, or communicated to the first pair by the Author of their Being. If it be a human invention, how came it to pafs that all mankind fhould have given to all the various languages that have been fpoken on the earth, fuch a ftructure as led to the univerfal belief of the very fame abfurdity? If it was communicated from Heaven, it is ftill lefs credible, that God, who could not be himself deceived, fhould have bestowed on man a gift calculated to lead them into abfurdity and error. The ftructure of language therefore, fuppofing this to be a juft account of its progrefs, compels us to believe that matter exifts; efpecially as this Author's account of the manner, in which fenfations are communicated to the human mind is extremely improbable if not ridiculous. That account we have in one of his replies to the Author of the article, Metaphyfics, in the Encyclopædia Britannica. That Author, treating of the refiftance, made by an ivory ball of certain dimenfions, to the clofing of one's hand, adds, fays Dr. Kirwan," that it is the fame thing which communicates to our eye the fenfation of colour, and has the power of refifting the compreffion of our hand, is evident. This is true, if the word thing be taken for an aggregate of fenfations, as it should be, for colour is one of that aggregate; but it cannot be inferred, that the fenfation of refiftance or folidity, is that which caufes colour, which is, I fuppofe, what is meant by communication.” P.. 317. Without giving ourselves the trouble of turning over the work referred to, we may take it upon us to affirm, that this cannot be what is meant by communication; for no hyloift admits that folidity is a fenfation. The fame folid fubftance, however, which refifts the compreffion of the hand, reflects the light which falls on it, to the eye; the impulse on the eye is communicated through the optic nerve to the brain; and that communication excites, by fome means unknown to us, the fenfation of colour in the mind. Such is the procefs by which fenfations are excited, according to the theory of thofe, whom our Author calls Hyloifts; but according to his own theory as here stated, each fenfation communicates itself! An ivory ball is nothing else than an aggregate of fenfations; an aggregate of fenfations can exist only in a fentient mind; and yet that aggregate exifting in the human mind, communicates to that mind one of the sensations of which the aggregate itfelf confifts! We pafs over the Author's arguments against the existence of matter, deduced from the facts, that a body appears much harder, or colder, or hotter to one man than to another; as well as what he urges in behalf of Berkeley's opinion, that the primary and fecondary qualities of body are on the fame footing. In our review of Mr. Drummond's Academical Questions, we had occafion to examine thefe arguments, flated with the utmoft force of which they feem capable; and to our review of that work we refer our readers *.. In the remainder of this Effay, Dr. Kirwan treats, in a very curfory manner indeed, of a variety of important subjects, metaphyfical, phyfical, and moral; of the various kinds of fenfations, ideas, and notions; of abstraction, generalization, consciousness, and attention; of intellectual abilities and difabilities; of the origin and degrees of human knowledge; of truth and reality; of the affociation and connection of ideas; and of mere approbation and difapprobation, &c. As we have found here little that is new or objectionable, though much that is curious and interefting, we fhall barely refer the reader to the work itfelf for that information, which our limits will not permit us to give them. We cannot, however, pals on to the next Effay without remarking, that we have here met with one or two pofitions, which appear to us not favourable to the theory of Berkeley, and which the philofophers of that fchool are not, we believe, very willing to admit. The Author acknowledges that we are endowed not only with a moral fenfe implanted in us by nature, (p. 415) which Brit. Crit. Vol, xxvii. p. 1, &c. and p. 149, &c. inftinctively discovers practical moral truths, when they are fimple, but alfo with another inftinet, (p. 419) on which refts our perfuafion, that the past resembled the prefent in fimilar cafes, as well as our expectation that the future will alfo refemble the prefent. Without calling in queftion the reality of thefe inftincts, we only beg leave to afk whether it be not at leaft as probable, that the hyloifts are impelled by another inftinet to refer their fenfations of colour, tafle, smell, and found, as well as their perceptions of folidity, extenfion, figure and hardness, &c. to a material world as the inftrumental caufe by which they are excited. We feel ourselves hikewife ftrongly inclined to object to this Author's notion of vindictive justice, (p. 442) as diftinguished from what he calls corrective and preventive justice; but, as we have detailed our own notions of fuch juftice at fome length elfewhere t, we haften to the concluding Ellay, in which the Author profeffes to have given a new demonftration a priori of the exiftence of the Supreme Being, and to have expofed" fome opinions of the divine attributes peculiar to himself. This new demonftration is contained in the following propofitions. "Since many beings now exift, fome one or other of the fol lowing propofitions concerning the duration of their existence must be true, as they comprehend every poffible cafe: "Firft, all the Beings now exifting, have always existed. "Second, fome of the Beings now exifting, have always exifted. "Third, one of the Beings now exifting, has always exifted. "Fourth, none of the Beings now exifting, has [have] always exifted." P. 448. The falsehood of the firft of these propofitions is very eafily fhown by an appeal to each individual's consciousness, for proof that he has not himself always exifted. The falfehood of the fourth is proved by fhowing, as had been a thousand times fhown before Dr. Kirwan was born, that if none of the Beings now exifting, had always existed, no Being whatever could be now exifting. now exifting. It is therefore fufficiently demonftrated that either the fecond or the third propofition must be true; but there is furely nothing. new in this demonftration, unless there be novelty in demonftrating the existence of the Supreme Being, by propofitions ftated in the form of a dilemma. That the third and not the + Brit. Crit. Vol. xxx. p. 450, &c. fecond fecond propolition is true, is thus attempted to be demonftrated. "If there were more than one God, there might be an infinity of gods, which feems abfurd; for to fuppofe even two Beings ex ifting independently of each other, that is, having feparate exift ences, and yet both 'to exift neceffarily, involves a contradiction; for if the existence of each is independent of that of the other, and perfectly unconnected with it, then the existence of one of them feparately from that of the other, is perfectly conceivable and intelligible; therefore the non-existence of the other may be fuppofed; therefore it is poffible; (for what is impoffible may be admitted in argument, but cannot be fuppofed, being unintel.. ligible;) therefore its existence is not neceffary, which contradicts the fuppofition of its neceffity." P. 457. This demonftration of the unity of God has no claim whatever to originality. It is indeed nothing else then the feventh propofition of Dr. Clarke's celebrated Demonftration, which Bifhop Butler found it fo difficult to understand, and which other metaphyficians of fome name have deemed a mere fophifm*. The unity of the Supreme Being my be inferred from the harmony of the Univerfe and the unity of defign which appears to pervade the whole; but it cannot be demonftrated from any notion of neceffity, which has ever been conceived by the mind of man. Since Beings now exift it neceffarily follows that fome one Being must always have exifted to whom existence is effential, or fo ́neceffary that his existence can have had no beginning nor can poffibly have an end; but we are acquainted with no law of human thought which compels us to deny that there may be more fuch Beings than one, or to perceive in the fuppofition of a plurality any thing contradictory. According to Dr. Clarke the necef fity by which the Supreme Being exifts, is the very fame kind of neceffity which is the cause of the un Iterable relation between two and four; but, if the word caufe can be here ufed without abfurdity, the neceffity, which is the cause of the relation between two and four, is the caufe likewise of the relation between three and fix, between fix and twelve, and even between fix and eighteen. Why then may not two or more independent Beings exift, as well as one, by fuch neceffity? We cannot indeed demonftrate the existence of more than one fuch Being, because no more than one is * See Encyclopædia Britannica, 3d edition, Vol. XI, pp. 601, 602, with the works referred to in the margins of thofe pages. ૨૧૩ neceffary |