Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being

James Frederick Ferrier

W. Blackwood and sons, 1875 - First philosophy - 586 pages

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The counterproposition is equally contradictory whether accepted without or with a restriction 261	5

The counterproposition is the foundation of sensualismchar	6

It embodies an inadvertency of natural thinking 113	11

by their prescription	13

PROPOSITION II	21

How ill the necessary truths have fared in Germany and in our	24

Why philosophy undertakes this object	46

This system contrasts distinctly the true and the false	52

Kants doctrine impotent against sensualism	283

The statement in par 4 and the charge in par 7 are borne out by the foregoing remarks	286

Kant sometimes nearly right He errs through a neglect of neces sary truth	287

The true compromise between sense and intellect	288

PROPOSITION XI	290

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	291

Distinction between knowing and thinking	292

This proposition the foundation of a true philosophy of experience	293

Because Absolute Existence may be that which we are ignorant	58

Their laws of thought always turn out at best to be mere laws	65

That philosophy has a startingpoint is proved by the fact that	71

PROPOSITION I	79

PROPOSITION II	97

It expresses the ordinary notion and also generally the psycho	103

Inseparability in cognition not to be confounded with insepara	109

natural inadvertency	114

The psychological error accounted for	115

Invalidity of Counterproposition III Its origin 14 15 16 17	116

Many things are distinguishable which are not separable in cogni tion	117

Illustrations applied to subject and object	118

Short statement of what this proposition contends for	119

No opinion offered as to existence	120

PROPOSITION IV	121

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	122

Oversight of self only apparentnot real and total	123

Psychological materialism as founded on the four counterproposi tions	124

Fallacy of materialism Possibility of idealism as founded on the four propositions	125

A preliminary question prejudged by materialist and by idealist	126

Cause of this precipitate judgment Its evil consequences	127

How Prop IV decides this preliminary question How Counter proposition IV decides it	128

The same symbols as illustrative of the psychological position	129

Different conclusions from the two positions	130

Difference farther explained	131

Another point of difference between this system and psychology	132

Matter per se reduced to the contradictory	134

This contradiction attaches not only to our knowledge of matter per se	136

But to matter per se itself	137

Advantage of this reduction New light on the problem of philo sophy	139

Importance of finding the contradictory	140

In what sense the contradictory is conceivable	141

Matter per se is not a nonentity	142

PROPOSITION V	144

Fifth Counterproposition	145

Distinction between the primary and the secondary qualities of matter	146

Character of the secondary qualities	147

Character of the primary qualities	149

It runs into a contradiction	151

Psychological conception of idealism	152

This refutation if logically conclusive is founded on a contradic tion and therefore cannot be accepted	154

The distinction of the primary and secondary qualities should be abandoned as useless or worse	155

PROPOSITION VI	156

DEMONSTRATION	157

Explanation of words	158

In what sense the contingent element is necessary and in what sense it is contingent	160

Question concerning the particular and the universal instead of being made a question of Knowing	161

Was made a question of Being by the early philosophers Thales	163

It still related to Beingnot to Knowing	164

Indecision of Greek speculation The three crises of philosophy	165

Plato appeared during the second crisis His aim	167

The coincidence of the known and the existent must be proved not guessed at	168

His merits The question respecting the particular and the univer sal demands an entire reconsideration	169

A preliminary ambiguity	170

Further statement of ambiguity	171

Is the Platonic analysis of cognition and existence a division into elements or into kinds?	174

It has been generally mistaken for a division into kinds	176

Explanation of this charge	177

Sixth Counterproposition	179

This counterproposition is itself a proof of the charge here made against philosophers	180

Review of our position	181

Misinterpretation of the Platonic analysis traced into its conse quences	182

Perplexity as to general existences	183

Realism is superseded by Conceptualism	184

PROPOSITION VII	196

We study the strange rather than the familiar hence truth escapes	202

Perhaps the ego is the summum genus of existence as well as of cog	212

A hint as to its fluctuation in existence	218

PROPOSITION VIII	224

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	226

Materiality and immateriality Eighth Counterproposition	227

Eighth counterproposition the common property of materialist and spiritualist	228

Early conception of mind as material Ghosts clairvoyance spirit rapping	229

Conception of mind as material substance dismissed	231

The spiritualists conception of mind is as null as the materialists	232

Both parties hold mind to be particular	233

It is known only as the universal	234

The materialists error consists in his holding mind to be particular	235

The spiritualists error consists in his holding mind to be particular	236

The two errors summed up	238

PROPOSITION IX	241

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	242

Objection obviated	244

David Hume outgoes this proposition	245

What this proposition contends for	246

Ninth Counterproposition	248

History of word essence Its meaning reversed by moderns	249

Consequences of this reversalinjustice to the old philosophers	250

Confusion and error to which the reversal has led	251

This proposition reduces the ego per se to a contradiction	252

Why the word ego is used in these discussions	253

The individual or monad	254

Another objection obviated	255

PROPOSITION X	257

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	258

Tenth Counterproposition	259

Comment on the translation here given of the counterproposition	260

acter of sensualism	261

The antisensual psychology merely restricts the counterproposition leaves the contradiction uncorrected	263

The root of the mischief History of distinction between sense and intellect	264

A rule for the historian of philosophy	266

Return to history of distinction between sense and intellect	267

Illustration of early Greek doctrine	269

The old philosophers were right in their problemin their way of working it and in fixing sense as the faculty of nonsense	270

A reason why the truth of this doctrine is not obvious	271

Difficulty and difference of opinion as to intellectual element	272

Ambiguities of the old philosophers	273

Comment on first misconception	275

Comment on second misconception	276

Comment on third misconception	277

Key to the Greek philosophy	279

Return to counterproposition It is founded on a confusion of the distinction between sense and intellect	281

The Lockian and the Kantian psychology in limiting the counter proposition effect no subversion of sensualism	282

First restriction by way of addition Second by way of subtraction	294

The latter restriction unrecognised by philosophers Eleventh Coun terproposition	295

Its invalidity shown	296

Dr Reids mistake in his assault on representationism	297

The truth and the error of representationism	299

PROPOSITION XII	300

PROPOSITION XIII	310

PROPOSITION XIV	321

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	325

Fifteenth Counterproposition	326

PROPOSITION XVI	327

THE SUBSTANTIAL IN COGNITION	328

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	329

Reasons for introducing this proposition	330

The position of natural thinking in regard to this proposition	331

Sixteenth Counterproposition	332

Its downfall	333

This definition is due to Spinoza	334

PROPOSITION XVII	335

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	336

It must be made to revolve away from us in order to bring round	337

Its contradictory character exposed in so far as it is psychological	339

The counterproposition considered in so far as it is the product of natural thinking	340

The exact point in the counterproposition which natural thinking opposes to the proposition	341

Psychological opinion as to existing substance	342

Secondly It places before us the mere phenomenal	343

The institutional conception of known substance	344

History of distinction between substance and phenomenonits terms have been reversed	345

Errors caused by this reversal	346

Substance and phenomenon originally bore the signification assigned to them here	347

The known phenomenal according to the older systems	348

A word upon existing substance and phenomenon	349

Two main ambiguities in the old systems	350

These ambiguities accounted for	351

And cleared up by a reference to the Institutional doctrine	352

Coincidence of the old speculations with the Institutes	353

An objection obviated	354

PROPOSITION XVIII	363

PROPOSITION XX	370

All men are equally cognisant of the absolute	378

A reminder	379

The difficulty is not to know it but to know that we know it	380

Refutation of the relationist doctrine	381

The relation of noncontradictories and the relation of contradictories	383

PROPOSITION XXII	384

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	385

It is introduced in order that the necessary may be separated from the contingent laws	386

What is required in setting about this analysis	388

The analysis illustrated	390

It is unnecessary to carry the analysis into greater detail	391

How these remarks qualify the doctrine of the absolute given in Pro position XXI	392

The absolute however is still object + subject The main result of the epistemology	393

The chief point to be attended to in it	394

The same subject continued	396

The cause of Berkeleys errors pointed out	397

The main result of the epistemology	399

The importance of this result	401

SECTION II	403

PROPOSITION I	405

Novelty of the agnoiology	406

The plea of our ignorance a bar to ontology	407

This obstacle can be removed only by an inquiry into the nature of ignorance	408

PROPOSITION III	412

PROPOSITION V	419

PROPOSITION VI	428

PROPOSITION VIII	432

PROPOSITION I	453

PROPOSITION VI	472

Sixth Counterproposition	473

PROPOSITION VII	475

OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS	476

PROPOSITION VIII	477

Importance of the ego as a constituent of Absolute Existence	478

PROPOSITION IX	479

Question as to the origin of knowledgehas been erroneously treated	480

First consequence of the assumption Ninth Counterproposition	481

The earliest form of representationism Physical influx	482

Correction of this doctrine by Des Cartes	483

Consequences of the Cartesian correction	484

The Cartesian salvohypothesis of Occasional Causes Its in sufficiency	486

his Vision of all things in God	487

his Preestablished Harmony	488

Lockes explanation	489

his doctrine of intuitive perception	490

His fundamental defect	491

his misunderstanding of Berkeley	492

Reid failed to establish a doctrine of intuitive perception	493

His character as a philosopher	494

He mistook the vocation of philosophy	496

Kant Innate Ideas	497

The circumstance to be particularly attended to in considering this doctrine	499

PROPOSITION X	511

Attention called to restriction in foregoing paragraph	517

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	526

character	528

The next step which the system takes in its negative or polemical character	529

The second contradiction which it corrects	530

The third contradiction which it corrects	531

The sixth contradiction which the epistemology corrects	532

The seventh contradiction which it corrects	533

The ninth contradiction which it corrects	534

The eleventh twelfth and thirteenth contradictions which it corrects	535

The leading contradiction which the agnoiology corrects	536

The derivative contradictions which it corrects	537

The opinions entertained by natural thinking and to some extent by psychology on the subject of Being	538

Exposure and refutation of these contradictions	539

The tenth contradiction which the ontology corrects	540

By the correction of these contradictions the system has redeemed its pledge	541

As a discipline of necessary and demonstrated truth	542

PAPERS SUPPLEMENTARY	545

LETTER TO MR DE QUINCEY	547

APPENDIX TO INSTITUTES OF METAPHYSIC	553

LETTER ON SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE INSTITUTES	582

Other editions - View all

INSTITUTES OF METAPHYSIC
JAMES F. FERRIER
Full view - 1854

Institutes of Metaphysic
James F. Ferrier
No preview available - 2015

Institutes of metaphysic: the theory of knowing and being
James Frederick Ferrier
No preview available

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Common terms and phrases

absolutely unknowable affirms agnoiology answer apprehended called character common conceivable conception condition constitute contingent contra contradic contradictory counter-pro counter-proposition declares demonstration dictory distinction doctrine element epistemology error essen essential existence explained express genus Hegel Hence idealism inadvertencies inseparable in cognition intellect intelligence Kant kind knowable known laid law of contradiction law of reason laws of thought ledge logy material things material universe matter per se means ment merely metaphysics mind minimum scibile natural thinking neces necessary laws necessary truth necessity never nition nonsense object of cognition object of knowledge OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS oneself ontology ordinary thinking ourselves oversights philo philoso Plato popular psychology position possible present primary qualities principles PROP proposition proved psychology qualities of matter regard remark sophy speculation starting-point subject and object suppose supposition Theatetus tion true truth of reason unintelligible unit or minimum virtually embraces whole words

Bibliographic information

Title	Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing and Being, James Frederick Ferrier Volume 3 of Philosophical works of the late James Frederick Ferrier
Author	James Frederick Ferrier
Edition	3
Publisher	W. Blackwood and sons, 1875
Original from	University of Chicago
Digitized	23 Nov 2015
Length	586 pages

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