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attempts to pave the way for that object. Upon this occasion ministers moved an amendment, in which it was said that we were determined to persevere in the contest till such a government was established in France as might be able to maintain the accustomed relations of peace and amity. Not a word was added to explain when such a government was to be expected, or in what it would be al lowed to consist. It was affirmed by the friends of peace, that it was necessary to abandon that system which led to extermination, and to treat at a period when, if unsuccessful, we should be able to continue the war with vigour. To this it was answered, Would we throw our country at the feet of France, and recognise their superiority? No-it was replied; but we had reason to distrust the capacity of hose who had involved us in our present difficulties. Ministers, however, continued to exclaim, Would we treat with the republic? would we acknowledge that our king and parliament were unfit to govern us? would we surrender our West-India islands and our commercial advantages? They told us also, that the finances of the enemy were exhausted, and he was incapable of maintaining the contest. Amidst all these topics, however, their lofty tone was softened; they no longer said they were fighting to restore the ancient government of France their spirit sunk as their difficulties increased, their concessions advanced in proportion as their embarrassments thickened; but it was no advantage to their country, it only produced disgrace, with out promoting conciliation.

In the next speech from the throne, France was declared to have come to a crisis which might lead

to peace. Many doubted the pro priety of the steps taken to effect it; many suspected they were not sincere; some advances to negotia tion, however, were made by Mr. Wickham to Barthelemi, the French envoy at Basle. The success of that application was well known, and its object was strongly suspect ed to have been merely to satisfy the prevailing inclination of the people. The conduct of lord Malmesbury, in the first instance, proved also, that if ministers were sincere, they must have been the most incapable administration that ever existed. A minister was sent with power to conclude, and not to treat, except for the emperor and that was without his authority! Vain attempts had been made to obtain those documents and papers, without which it was impossible to develope the true state of some very important points in the negotia tion; and his grace confessed, that he was not able to form a correct opinion upon the subject. But as those documents were refused, he concluded that they contained nothing which could justify ministers in the demands of Belgium as a sine qua non. Notwithstanding the pretences upon which the war was said to be undertaken (as-to give protection to the oppressed, to check the career of ambition, and to defend property), what were the terms on which we proposed to conclude a peace? All the greater powers were to be benefited at the expence of the smaller. Whilst Poland was allowed to be divided without a remonstrance, schemes of partition were devised by those who pretended to interfere for the advantage of the weak, and the interest of all parties. France was to have retained some of her conquests, the emperor to have re

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ceived compensation for his losses, and Great Britain to have taken the Dutch settlements in the east. Upon this occasion (as a sine qua Ron) Belgium was not to have remained with France. Lord Malmesbury's first negotiation was broken off upon this point, though it was the opinion of many (well calculated to judge of it) that it ought to have been ceded as the means of obtain ing peace.

This surrender would have been yet more necessary had it been known that the bank was in danger of stopping payment; and what must have been the capacity of those ministers, who being warned of the consequences, persisted in the measures!

The duke proceeded to point out the difference of our situation now, and five years ago: the country was obliged to pay interest for a debt of 160 millions, the most enor mous that ever was incurred in any war. This was the sum which it was thought necessary to expend for the destruction of jacobins! And, after all, the jacobin rulers still existed in France, and possessed more honour than ever they did! Notwithstanding this debt, another was to be contracted: and an additional charge of nine millions and a half annually was to be laid on this country. A greater burden than what the whole interest of the loan amounted to at the end of the American war! Could no blame attach to the men who had squandered so profusely the resources of the nation without fruit or advantage?

The war began in conjunction with the greatest confederacy ever known in Europe, and we were now without a single ally but Portugal! we were reduced to a state of inert self defence; we had no prospect

to cheer our gloom, or compensate for our sacrifices; and our exértions under the present ministry were as hopeless as they were incalculable. Whilst this was our outward situation, there was nothing in our internal state to afford us consolation: whilst our burdens increased our privileges had been abridged; we now were living under laws which were hostile to the best principles our ancestors had laboured to establish. But there was another topic which this review suggested; this was the affairs of Ireland: did not the ministry of this country, by the system which they pursued, alienate the affections of the sister kingdom? His grace declared, that if he were to enter into the detail of the atrocities committed in Ireland, the picture would appal the stoutest hearts. What could be expected, indeed, if men, kept in strict discipline, were all at once allowed to give loose to their fury and their passions? Yet it was not to the military to whom he would impute the blame, but to those by whom their excesses had been permitted and encouraged. Certain it was that two distinct and opposite orders had been issued forth for regulating the con duct of the military: one by which they were restrained from acting without the magistracy, and the other by which they were allowed to act without them. These proceedings were sanctioned by goverament, and what would be the consequences? the loss of Ireland! A reform in parliament was abso❤ lutely necessary to check the influence of the crown, and the power of the aristocracy: to check that enormous influence which the minister had derived by, the creation of peers, when peers were sent into the house by dozens.

(The duke was here called to H 4 order

order by lord Fauconberg, who said he had never heard such language poured forth in that house upon the members of it.) His grace affirmed that he had uttered nothing injurious to the characters of those elevated to the peerage: they were men of talents, of consideration, and of property, but if all men of this description, or rather, of great landed property; were selected by the minister out of the house of commons, and sent up to that house, the independence of the commons must ultimately be affeced. If no country gentlemen of wealth and consideration remained, the minister would acquire the command of every election, especially supported as they were by all the influence which the overgrown revenue of this country must every where place in his hands.

His grace next took notice of the calumnies which were cast upon all who opposed the measures of administration. They had been accused of inflaming the minds of the people, of being hostile to the constitution; nay, he himself had been charged with rejoicing in the successes of the French against this country! He could not help cousidering it as a disadvantage to hold out to the enemy, that on landing here they would find supporters; but in case of invasion, who would be the men from whom the directory might hope assistance? from those mean sycophants of power, who readily and servilely followed every change, who had been the creatures of every one in authority, and whose loyalty depended on the times! Every Englishman well knew, that if the French succeeded, we should be the most degraded slaves that ever existed; and no reasonable person would believe that the opposers of faulty ministers

would be the abettors of the French. His grace solemnly avowed, that for his own part, though he never would contribute to keep the present ministers in their places, he would exert every effort to repel invaders from our coasts. He would wait for his sovereign's command to take arms in defence of his country, and in the foremost posts of danger prove his loyalty; suspending all difference of opinion till the attack was ended; but if he returned safe, he should return with the same abhorrence and detestation of the minister's conduct, and vow eternal enmity to his system-and if ever he contracted any alliance with any administration upon any other basis than that he had described, or joined any set of men upon public principles different from those he had professed, he wished the just indignation of his country to pursue him, and the bitterest execrations of mankind to be his portion. As the duke was much exhausted with speaking so long, and the address was copious, his grace was dispensed with reading it, and it was read by the lord chancellor.

The following is an abstract of the address:" That it be humbly represented to his majesty, that after all the advantages his ministers had received from parliament, as their support, their confidence, and the revenue of these kingdoms, Great Britain had been exposed to all those dangers which it was alleged could only be prevented by resist ing the power of the French government; and, after an unavailing expence of blood and treasure, it was now the petition of the house to compel the ministers to open a negotiation for peace, with a rotaļ dereliction of the principles on which they had hitherto acted.

"That

"That our situation was too critical to admit of further trial of councils, which had failed; or the same persons in office, who, notwithstanding the heavy charges brought against them, retained their places by their policy, to the great danger of our country, our constitution, and our liberties. Our privileges had been violated, our securities destroyed, the connexion with our sister kingdom threatened with dis solution, and all the foundations of our importance in Europe rendered precarious and uncertain. To extricate us from such difficulties required much fortitude and wisdom; and as we could not look to his majesty's present advisers for these qualities, neither could we expect a successful prosecution of the war, or a secure and equitable peace.

"The representation therefore was submitted, trusting, that his majesty would see, as his subjects did, the urgent necessity of employing other persons, and adopting other councils." Lord Boringdon said, that the proposition was of a most plain and simple nature; at the same time it was of the utmost importance; for upon their lordships' rejection or adoption of it, depended, in his opinion, the independence of the country, and the existence of the constitution.

The duke, he said, in all his observations upon our present situation, had wholly abstained from speaking of it, with respect to the other powers of Europe. He had made no comparison between them and us, and had, consequently, given a very inadequate idea of our real state, estimated, as it had always been, by the consideration of its relation to others. The impression arising from such a discussion must have been contentment and exultation at our own superiority, at

the unrivalled blessings we enjoyed at the dignified station in which we were held by all who looked with horror to the dominion of foreign tyranny, and to whom religion, liberty, and law, were still objects of veneration and love. Had the situation of the Batavian republic, of the Spanish monarchy, or of the neutral maritime powers, been stated; had his grace talked of the tranquillity of Italy or Switzerland; or had he expatiated on the happiness enjoyed even in the French republic, the effect must have been the raising the opinion of the house of those ministers, who, amid such a general wreck of empire, had preserved this country in a state of prosperity and vigour which in no former period had been exceeded. If such a sum as 164 millions had been added to the public debt, with all those other calamities so eloquently, and, he must say, so.carefully, enumerated in a time of tranquillity, the ministers might be considered as weak and wicked; but the contrary was the fact that debt and those calamities had been the consequences of a war which had desolated Europe, and were light when balanced with those of other nations. The restoration of monarchy in France had been at one time regarded as a mean of peace, but he would ever deny that it had been the object of the war. In taking advantage of the royalist party, we had acted according to just and sound policy of the time, and according to the general practice of civilised nations. In all the wars in Europe, during the present century, the same conduct had been pursued. Louis the XIVth, on the one hand, and England and Austria on the other, took pains to influence the Spaniards, and secure their co-operaion in what was commonly called

:

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the succession - war. The same principle occurred with regard to the powers which supported the interests of Charles VII. and Francis the First, as emperor of Germany; now were the repeated succours afforded by France to James II. and his successors, against England, considered as contrary to the law of nations. Be this however as it might, he had authority for saying, that the restoration of monarchy was not our object in the present case. Tallien addressed a public paper to the French nation, affirming, "that it was against France, and not against their republic, that England was fighting, and that if France was to declare for a monarchy, England would support the republic." This was intelligible language, and could be supposed to mean nothing more or less than that it was not against any form of government in France, but against her gigantic and ambitious projects that England would oppose herself.

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Upon another subject his lordship said, he was sorry to perceive the duke had not observed that strict delicacy which it demanded; namely, the situation of Ireland. Could any system of conciliation produce the effect of tranquillising men who had avowed their determination to hear of nothing but what came from themselves? He was much surprised also to hear his grace descant on the numberless atrocities committed by the military in Ireland, and at the belief with which such accounts were received by this country.

Lord Moira had, a few months ago, brought forward this subject, and had been assiduous in collecting the instances he adduced: but it had been proved since, that he had been extremely mistaken in some of the principal cases which he had

laid before the house. No one, his lordship said, could be more friendly to plans of conciliation than himself; but he thought, if the Irish legislature was now to adopt the two measures which were comprehended under the term, no possible good could result from it.

In proposing to the house the address, to remove the present ministers, it was calling upon their lordships to obliterate their former services, to forget that to then we were indebted for the advantageous commercial treaty with France in 1788: to them we owed the improvements which the jurisprudence of this country had derived from juries, and from the decision of the question respecting the abatement of. impeachment; the admirable system of finance which had raised the funds to the extraordinary pitch at which they had arrived, previous to the year 1793. Nor was this all; the duke had called for their removal at a period when the suspension of the powers of government, even for a week, must be attended with the most serious consequences; at a time when a conspiracy existed against all the old governments of the earth; when the power and animosity of the enemy were increased; when common spoil would not satisfy him; when he was actually at our gates; when his language was clear and decided;

"Actum," inquit, "nihil est, ni Pœno
milite portas
Frangimus, et mediâ vexillum pono
suburrå."

This was precisely the moment when his grace had recommended to the house to address the king to change the whole executive government of the country? But what must be the effect of such a change? The British constitution would be

committed

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