the combat was unequal, and he dreaded the event. Peace was necessary for our deliverance; by this alone we might lessen our expences, and pave the way for the amelioration of our internal state; we might satisfy the people that their representation was substantial, not by holding out the nonsense of universal suffrage, but by gradual reforms growing out of the constitution itself. We had a prince of experience on the throne, who had friends able to give him sound advice: and the marquis concluded with a wish, that by acting upon their counsels he might yet rescue his people from the fate which seemed impending, and that we might owe the national safety to his paternal care. Lord Mulgrave admitted, that if peace could be obtained by a change of ministers, they ought to be changed immediately, whatever merits they possessed; but he did not believe this desirable consequence would follow such a change. Supposing it to take place, who was to succeed them? The noble marquis undoubtedly had abilities and experience as a statesman that well qualified him for the situation of a minister; but who would place confidence in him after his speech of that evening? In his moderate manifesto, speaking as a member of the directory, he had insinuated every thing that was degrading to the dignity of this country; in his second character of a passionate member of the directory, he had gone still further, and, with the fury of a jacobin, levelled the British character to the ground, and triumphed in its degradation. He dissented from the marquis respecting the means we yet possessed of retaining the West Indies, as well as their value, and also the Cape of Good Hope and Trinco male. But what had been the counsel recommended? a defensive alliance with all the powers of Europe. But against France the noble marquis had taken care not to be understood, Lord Mulgrave said, it was an axiom that defensive war led to offensive conduct, and consequently provoked all the dangers of offensive war without its advan tages; and by this plan all security was to be given up before we could be certain of peace. The war ought to be carried on; and there was no utility in removing the ministers, nor could he suppose we should sink under our present diffi-culties, whilst the courage, energy, and resources of the nation remained as they did at present. The duke of Norfolk, after approving of the conduct of those lords who had absented themselves from the house, observed that parliament had of late been much neglected by his majesty's ministers; and on the present occasion still less regard than usual had been shown to what was due to their lordships. His grace then referred to that part of the declaration which had stated the exorbitant demands of France, requiring that his majes ty should give up, without compen-. sation, the necessary defences of his possessions, and the future safeguard of his empire; nor was this demand brought forward as the price of peace, but of negotiation. He remarked, that this proved the enemy was in the wrong, but not that the minister was in the right. The declaration and the papers were said to have proved, "that every step had been taken on his majesty's part to accelerate peace, and that the long delay and final rupture of the negotiation was solely to be ascribed to the evasive conduct and unwarrantable pretensions of the French." His grace observed that no such papers had appeared before their fordships. The address implied that it had been satisfactory, whereas it never had been seen. This was a mode of voting approbation of the conduct of ministers before they knew what it was; and therefore he moved an amendment, of which the substance was, that after. thanking his majesty, might be added," when their lordships were satisfied with the contents of these papers, no co-operations of theirs should be wanting to carry his majesty's intentions into effect." Lord Grenville said the motion was most irregular; he had no objection to discuss the subject of it, but not in its present form. It was the custom of parliament to come to a vote on the speech from the throne, and to lay the documents to which it referred before the house afterwards; this would be done the next day, and he would predict that their lordships would be clearly satisfied that every thing had been done on the part of his majesty which had been stated in the declaration. The question was then put and carried. In the commons, Mr. W. Bootle moved the address; he professed to do it with more satisfaction, because whatever difference of opinion there might have been respecting the cause of the war, there could be but one, as to the necessity of its continuance, when our enemies had left us no alternative. The restoration of tranquillity and of uninterrupted commerce were objects of as much importance to the sovereign as to the subjects of a commercial country; and we could not doubt the pleasure with which his majesty would have come to parliament, to have inform ed them, that an honourable treaty of peace had been the fruits of his second negotiation; that he had met with an enemy equally dispos ed for conciliation, equally desirous to act up to their loud professions, and to make those mutual se cri.ices and compensations which the custom of negotiation required. Very different was the present case: his majesty indeed might tell us with truth, that, animated with the desire of conducing to the tranquillity of Europe, he had again stepped forward in a manner which would have satisfied a reasonable enemy; that he had even risked the dignity of these kingdoms by the renewal of his advances, and offered to make sacrifices which the relative situations of the powers at war did not warrant; but his offers had been treated with contempt, his terms unattended to and unanswered, and, after a long and fruitless attempt to bring the enemy to negotiation, his embassador had been dismissed with insult. To all this he had submitted, to prove to his subjects the sincerity of his wishes for peace. Mr. B. said, that it did not appear to have been any question of terms, any resistance of aggrandisement on our part, nor a desire of it on theirs, but an inveterate resolu tion to preclude all negotiation whatever. That an enemy should have demanded such sacrifices as no coun try had at any time yielded to another, as the price of peace, would at most periods have been a sufficient reason for a king to throw himself on the support and affections of his subjects: there might possibly be occasions which would justify the surrendering much more than the relative situation of two countries would make fair or reasonable, provided by such surren ders ders peace could be purchased; but that which would be most difficult for the sovereign of a free people to avow, that which would argue him insensible to the duty which he owed them, would be to sequaint them, that in yielding to every exorbitant demand, in sacrifeing all that had been acquired by their valour, in giving up their commercial and political interests, he had exhausted the means of ncgotiation without attaining the ends of peace. He trusted that a British king, in applying to a British parfament need not apologise for ha ving avoided unprofitable conces sions and fruitless disgrace. That all concessions would have been unprofitable, and that in sacrificing the honour of the nation he would equally have failed in securing its tranquillity, no man could entertain a doubt who looked not at the king's speech, in which he had so solemnly appealed to his subjects and to the world, but who had looked at the conduct of the French government. Since the revolution of last September, the directory had taken no pains to conceal their intention of continuing hostilities to remove all doubt upon the subject, they took the negotiation out of the hands to which it had been entrusted, and sent creatures of their own to Lisle, with pacific professions in their mouths, but charged expressly to break it off, or at least to advance propositions which had been before rejected by us, and abandon ed by them, and which they knew could never be accepted. It was evident that their object was not to treat more advantageously for themelves, that would have been excusable, but to render all treaty impossible, to retract whatever the former situation of affairs in France had induced them to concede, and to show that it was not the mode of peace, but peace itself that they dis claimed. Mr. Bootle declared it as his opi nion, that no line of conduct on our part could bring about this desired object; at the same time he hoped that we should not show an inability, or want of inclination, to carry on the war, but willingly declare our intention of supporting his majesty in the measures he might judge necessary towards the good of the kingdom, and the preservation of its constitution. Let us (said he) give our enemies to understand, that whatever divisions may have existed before, they have now united all Englishmen in one general sentiment. Let us no longer give them reason to hope that they may destroy this their Carthage, against which they have so repeatedly denounced vengeance, or carry into execution their iniquitous plan of revolutionising this country, and of forcing upon us the example of the defenceless states of Ger many and Italy. The choice was now before us; we might disband our armies, our victorious navies, and oppose no resistance to the invading foe; we might resign our lives and properties to the disposal of France, and rank ourselves in the number of her dependents; we might expect to see the throne, and the laws of the realm, overturned and trampled under foot, and prepare the con tributions which would be levied upon us to defray the expences of our own ruin; to all this we must submit, or resolve to continue the war! Mr. Bootle proceeded to consider our present situation: we were, he said, engaged in no continental war, nor did we depend on the faith of other powers; we fought upon our own element, where we had long long been used to conquer, and to regard ourselves with reason as sole and exclusive masters. Nor were our claims ill-founded: in the annals of all maritime wars, in which we had been engaged, we should find that a long and uniform habit of victory had inspired us with ideas of our own superiority. British sailors fight with a consciousness of this superiority, and with a spirit arising from it unknown to other nations. The events of the last three years supplied ample materials for triumph and exultation; we had swelled the list of prizes to a degree unheard of in former wars, we had ruined the commerce, and crippled the navies of our enemies; we had kept possession of the sea against three formidable and allied powers, blocked up their ports, whilst superior fleets lay mouldering within, inactive; and when the reproaches of their countrymen had forced them to battle, the result had invariably been what they had dreaded, and what we had expected. Mr. Bootle then moved an address of thanks, which was as usual an echo of the speech. Mr. Drummond seconded the motion: he said he was truly sorry that he had not now to congratulate the country on the cessation of the storm which had so long convulsed Europe: the evils of war were dreadful to humanity; but there were evils still greater, and those were in store for England if she did not call forth all her energy in resistance to ferocious and implacable enemy, who had unequivocally professed a determination, to her extinction, and spurned from her every proposition, however reasonable, for peace. As a proof of this, he called the attention of the house to the negotiation at Lisle; dwelt much upon the arrogance of the enemy, which increased in proportion to our solicitude to conciliate, from the first refusal at Basle, to the late dismissal of lord Malmesbury. He pointed out the extravagance of their ambition after having subjected Flanders, organised Holland, attacked Venice, Genoa, and many states of Italy and on the Rhine, pillaged Germany, adding two new principalities to their republic, and concluded with modestly desiring to destroy England!-to strip her of her commerce, her consequence, and her honour! "If (said he) the enemy obsti❤ nately and inveterately determine to refuse peace upon a fair footing, and to agree to mutual compensa❤ tion for mutual wrongs, we are under the necessity of repelling force by force; and let us meet them with one hand and one heart, and with all the energy which the love of country and of liberty can inspire." Mr. Bryan Edwards rose, and prefaced his speech by cordially assenting to that part of the address which related to the victory obtained by our fleet under admiral Duncan; but declared it as his opinion, that notwithstanding this brilliant victory, parliament had never assembled at a more perilous period; we were (he said) engaged in a war expensive and bloody beyond example; with an enemy who seemed determined to continue the contest more for our ruin, than their own advantage;-our people, galled under the weight of excessive burdens, divided among themselves, unanimous only in their disappro bation and distrust of parliament; our strongest support, Ireland, now in rebellion, or only kept down by military force.-With no better prospect in our view, how dreary and and afflicting was the scene! how feeble the consolation which a single victory could supply! Brilliant and decisive as it was (adding one to the many distinguished proofs which this war had afforded of the superiority of our navy), it was, after all, but the triumph of an hour; a triumph which may have disconcerted indeed a hostile expedition, but had certainly thinned the ranks of our gallant defenders. Amidst our public rejoicings, what heart could reflect without sorrow upon the havoc of that day!-could meditate upon its advantages, without feeling for the men who fell! This war had been attended with a waste of wealth, and prodigality of blood, not to be paralleled in the history of human depravity. Two hundred millions of money had been the waste of four years: and two hundred thousand the number of lives which had been lost. He then proceeded to inquire what prospect did the king's speech hold out to us? Was it the efectual relief of our burdens? No. Was it the hope of harmony in Ireland?-No. Was it indemnito for the past, and security for the future?-No. Was it peace?-No; but the reverse. It promised us the renewal of that devastation we lamented-or had cause to lament; it menaced us with more carnage, more tears, more sighs, and, perhaps deeper, of widows, sisters, and children! But it would probably be asked, had no efforts been made to obtain peace? None, suitable to the occasion; none, founded in sincerity, and breathing the genuine spirit of sweet concord. If we recurred to lord Malmesbury's first mission to Paris, we might without hesitation pronounce that the minister was not sincere: the terms which the French would have granted, and he refused, were 1798, such as he would now gladly accept, and which they decline to give. The French would have granted peace, on condition of holding what they then had; but the minister would be contented with nothing short of the restitution of Belgium; and the safety of England was sacrificed to the interest of the emperor. Mr. Edwards instanced, as one of the proofs of ministerial error and diplomatic absurdity, the sending the same man (lord Malmesbury) a second time to negociate, who had once (as it was asserted) been disgracefully dismissed from Paris, and thus aggravating the contumely it brought upon this country. He would, for the sake of argument, he said, suppose, that the failure of that attempt was not owing to the unreasonable demands of our minister, but to the extravagant expectations of the French. But was it not one of many instances of bad judgment, to place his lordship again in a situation to be treated with contempt? Mr. Edwards declared, for his own part, he thought it would have been a happy circumstance if that noble lord had been empowered at the outset to make the offer of restitution desired by France; and it surely ought to weigh against the professions of the minister, who did not thus empower him. But to examine the question another way: were the conquests we had made of sufficient value to justi fy the hazard and loss which we must sustain by a farther prosecu tion of the war? No! Sir Francis Baring (continued Mr. Edwards), whose acquaintance with the British interests in the East could not be doubted, had stated in the house, that the Cape of Good Hope, instead of being an advantage, would B be |