overestimate the significance of this passage. It contains a recognition of the weak spot in the Athenian empire, and proposes a remedy of the broadest statesmanship. It came too late, but to have formulated such a proposal is, in itself, a proof of deep political wisdom. Hellenic This feeling for Hellenic unity found expression Feeling for in other ways. Aristophanes, who is here at one unity. with the rest of the middle party, was constant in his advocacy of peace1 and alliance with Sparta. Nicias and Laches were, in this respect, reviving the traditions of Cimon's policy3, which was to maintain the friendship of Athens and Sparta, with mutual regard for each other's dominion. In 421 they seemed to have attained their goal; but the jealousy of the rival powers was too great for the settlement to last, the national party both in Athens and Sparta asserted itself, and the selfishness and bad faith of Sparta soon broke up the agreement. Persia. The policy of union revived another principle of Greece and Cimon's policy, the principle of peace among the Greeks and war with Persia. It was obvious that the struggle between Athens and Sparta, which in χωρὶς ἕκαστον· κατ ̓ ἀπὸ τούτων πάντων τὸ κάταγμα λαβόντας δεῦρο ξυνάγειν καὶ συναθροίζειν εἰς ἕν, κἄπειτα ποιῆσαι τολύπην μεγάλην, κατ ̓ ἐκ ταύτης τῷ Δήμῳ χλαῖναν ὑφῆναι. The δεῦρο ξυνάγειν καὶ συναθροίζειν εἰς ἕν can only refer to a common council of the alliance at Athens. 1 Aristophanes wrote seven plays with the express purpose of advocating peace. (See Kock, ib. p. 119.) 2 Cf. Pax 1080. 3 See Beloch, Att. Pol. p. 48, Duncker, Griech. Gesch., Neue Folge, i. p. 91. Warning of Aristophanes. time brought all the Grecian states into conflict, could only result in weakening Greece to the advantage of Persia. That the war was for the benefit of Persia alone is abundantly evident from the effects of the peace of 404. Not only were the Ionian states surrendered to the enemy of Greece, but for a time all the states of Greece were simply vassals to the great king, and the supremacy of Persia only made way for that of Macedon. From the beginning of the war this prospect was manifest. Sparta was constantly sending embassies to Susa, Athens was not guiltless, and the degrading submission of both states to Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and Cyrus in the latter part of the war was ominous enough. The danger must have been recognized by the more far-seeing Athenians, and operated as a powerful motive for peace. Peace, however, on terms which left the old state of rivalry and suspicion was not enough; there must be a real Panhellenic union, in which all the Greeks should give over their animosities and through mutual concession be united "by the elixir of friendship." Here too Aristophanes represents the best policy of his party, in constantly insisting on the folly of the civil war, on the danger of calling in Persia, and the glorious prospects which Panhellenism offered'. 1 He attacks embassies to the great king Ach. 62-130, 613, 647. Cf. Thuc. ii. 67, iv. 50. The danger from Persia is alluded to in Pax 108, where Trygaeus proposes to indict Zeus for betraying Greece to the Medes, cf. 408. He appeals to Panhellenic feeling in Pax 302, ὦ Πανέλληνες βοηθήσωμεν εἴπερ πώποτε, ideas not There is, therefore, much to praise in the policy These advocated by Aristophanes, and inasmuch as he can- realized by not have stood alone, and his views are in logical the middle connection with the views of the middle party, we may credit that party with a leaven of the most exalted political ideas. But here their claim to admiration is exhausted. The exalted views of individuals did not obtain sufficient support to affect practical politics, and the party having no definite objects to pursue lacked solidarity. It is not enough to say that their actions fell short of their aspirations; so far as we can see, the practical statesmen of the party made no effort to realize their political ideas or to initiate a policy, except in the one particular of persistently advocating peace. They were fatally disposed to opportunism and compromise, they were content to wait upon events without energy to anticipate them. The position of a party between two extremes is always difficult, and usually compels them to criticize and oppose, not to initiate and produce. The enthusiasm of carrying a consistent policy into effect belongs to the wings, the centre is cursed with barrenness. where the Scholiast says μιᾷ προσηγορίᾳ αὐτοὺς περιέλαβε δηλῶν Tò σvyyevés. Ib. 996 he advocates a union of the Greeks, μίξον δ ̓ ἡμᾶς τοὺς Ἕλληνας πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς φιλίας χυλῷ, κ.τ.λ. When the danger had been realized in 411, he blames the Greeks. Lys. 433, ἐχθρῶν παρόντων βαρβάρων στρατεύματι Ελληνας ἄνδρας καὶ πόλεις απόλλυτε. party. The war the test question of politics. The in terests of the war. CHAPTER IV. PARTIES IN RELATION TO THE WAR. PARTY I HAVE reserved to the last the discussion of the war, so far as it divided parties at Athens. This is a subject which requires special consideration; for no other event possessed half the political importance of the war, which served for this period as the test question of politics. During the earlier years parties were almost equally divided on the subject, so that, although there was a constant state of warfare, there was usually a party advocating peace, now and again with success. The relation of the different parties to the war classes in depended on the interests of the classes composing those parties; this subject must accordingly be considered first. It is necessary for this purpose to look at the matter from two aspects. The interest of classes in the ultimate issue of the war and in the questions at stake is an entirely different question from the immediate profit or loss, which fell to their lot from the actual continuance of the war. With respect to the first point I have argued that it was in the interests of the democracy to continue the war, until a balance of advantage had been attained, that the Some historians dismiss this question by a sweep- Theory ing generalization. They assume that demagogues war beneand democrats alike found in the war a source of fited the lower profit, and that both in beginning and continuing it classes. they were actuated solely by self-interest. In the case of the demagogues the charges of Aristophanes1 are quoted and accepted' as conclusive proof, although there is no other evidence against them. It is more important to discuss the interests of the democratic party in general; and the case against them is stated in an extravagant form by Freese3. "The rich men," he says, "desired peace in order Freese's to be relieved of the trierarchy, the country people theory. to leave their quarters in the town and return to their fields: the industrial class desired peace, for slaves were harder to manage and deserted: all 1 Pericles Ach. 535, Pax 605. Pisander Babyl. fr. 81 (Kock), Lys. 491. Cleon Eq. 801, 864, &c. 2 E.g. by Hermann, Staatsalt. § 164. 3 Der Parteikampf der Reichen und der Armen, p. 70, referring to the second part of the war. |