pedition, and during his exile and the absence of Nicias Androcles and the extreme democrats brought about a renewal of the war.

struggles

the war.

After the disaster in Sicily there was no longer Party an even division of parties, and, except for the in- till the terval of the oligarchic revolution, the war was end of always vigorously supported by the government'. The preponderance of the war party was due to two causes, which I have discussed above. On the one hand the social changes brought about by a long-continued war had altered the composition and relative strength of the different parties, and on the other the Athenians realized the importance of the war to Athens and to Greece, and were obstinately determined not to give way. During the oligarchy of 411 three embassies were sent to Sparta, but with this exception the policy of resistance to the last was invariably maintained. The Spartan proposals were rejected whenever they were offered*, and even after the crushing and hopeless defeat of Aegospotami the spirit of the Athenians was not broken, they refused every suggestion of concession and only yielded to the inevitable necessities of famine.

1 The peace party, although in a minority, was not extinct. Its existence may be traced in Diod. xiii. 53, where he says that some Athenians advocated the acceptance of the Spartan proposals after Cyzicus.

2 See above, p. 94.

3 See above, p. 118.

4 In 413 (Thuc. vii. 18), 410 (Diod. xiii. 53), 408 (see Gilbert, Beiträge, pp. 361—2), 406 (Schol. to Ar. Ran. 1533), 405. The proposals of 408 and 406 do not rest on good authority and are open to doubt; see Grote viii. p. 1 for the latter.

Final conclusions.

Finally this survey of political events strengthens three important conclusions which I have already accepted on somewhat insufficient evidence. In the first place we may conclude that the conditions of political life at Athens were normal, that there was a balance of political forces which practically resulted in party government. There were regular principles of party division; parties were distinctly and not unequally divided, and they sought to obtain official power in order to carry their principles into effect. In the second place the great cause of party division was not the preference which men had for particular constitutional forms, but the one great political question which overshadowed all others. During the whole war, except for an interval of four months, the democratic constitution was maintained, almost without modification'; but the contest about war and peace was never suspended, the advocates of the rival policies were always confronting each other, and enjoyed in turn success or failure. Lastly the resolution of the Athenians to make no terms with Sparta rose, as their prospects of victory became more distant and as their losses and sufferings were

1 Reforms limiting the powers of the democracy were introduced in 413 (see above p. 96), and after the overthrow of the oligarchy full democracy was not immediately restored (see p. 97); but these modifications were due to exceptional circumstances and were merely temporary.

2 The two critical disasters in the latter part of the war were the defeats in Sicily and at Aegospotami. After the first édókel Xpĥvai μỶ évdidóvaɩ (Thuc. viii. 1); and after the second the Athenians immediately prepared for a siege, and as time went on in spite of famine οὐ διελέγοντο περὶ διαλλαγῆς (Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 4 and ii. 2. 11).

every day aggravated. We may therefore conclude that the general determination of a majority of the citizens to carry the struggle to a decisive end was founded not on a calculation of personal interest but on political convictions. It was recognized that the power of Athens and her dominion over other states, even her independent existence, depended on a successful issue of the war. It is the merit of the democratic party that from the first they realized, the tremendous interests involved in the war and never swerved in their resolve to defend those interests without concession. And they must not be condemned for the result; the duel for the supremacy between Athens and Sparta was a life and death struggle, and it was impossible for Athens, at least, to draw back.

"The Peloponnesian war was begun by Sparta under vain pretexts and with guilty conscience; but the Athenians themselves do not deny that for years before they had gathered all their forces together and braced themselves for a decisive contest. And the moral responsibility for the war, in which this glorious nation consumed itself, Athens must bear. She can bear the burden, for national unity is a treasure on which a nation may stake its existence, and for the sake of the Hellenes it was the duty of Athens to fight the Dorians to the death. It was, therefore, no vulgar ambition, no purposeless beating of the air, when Athens undertook and carried on this war with all her forces and with unexampled self-sacrifice; and he who understands this will admire the Athenians more in misfortune than prosperity.

"We do not quarrel with history. The doom of Athens was inevitable and not undeserved. But yet it was the conquered cause that pleased the gods; and we, mortals of a later day, cannot reflect without regret on the fall of this wondrous nation, which nature meant for the political ideal—but nature missed the mark 1."

1 This passage is adapted from the concluding words of Wilamowitz's Festrede "Von des attischen Reiches Herrlichkeit" (Aus Kydathen, pp. 44-5). He lays more stress on the claim of Athens to dominion over the other Greeks than I have done; but the passage seems on the whole so brilliant and true that it may fairly be quoted in support of my argument.

INDEX.

References in all cases are to Athenian politics and institutions.