The Strategy Of Conflict
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory—the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one’s own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.-Print ed.
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A REORIENTATION OF GAME THEORY 59
STRATEGY WITH A RANDOMINGREDIENT 118
A STUDY IN MUTUAL
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 201
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action advantage adversary agreement allout balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly chance choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision deliberately depends deterrence enemy enemy’s enforcement evidence example expected value explicit bargaining game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa maneuvers mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixedmotive game move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation noattack nonzerosum game nuclear weapons offer one’s other’s outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational expectations rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row’s Russians side side’s situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten value system zerosum game