1858. HAIGH V. NORTH BIERLEY Union. corporation is created render it necessary that work should be done or goods supplied to carry such purposes into effect-as in the case of the guardians of a poor law Union, and orders are given, at a board regularly constituted and having general authority to make contracts, for work or goods necessary for the purposes for which the corporation was created, and the work is done or goods are supplied and accepted by the corporation, and the whole consideration for payment is executed, the corporation cannot keep the goods or the benefit, and refuse to pay on the ground that though the members of the corporation who ordered the goods or work were competent to make a contract and bind the rest, the formality of a deed or of affixing a seal is wanting, and therefore that no action lies, as they were not competent to make a parol contract, and may avail themselves of their own disability." In the present case the work and labour had been performed, and was performed at the request of the Guardians; and was, in my opinion, incidental to the purposes for which the Guardians were created. They had appointed a proper officer to manage the Union accounts: they had reason to suspect that he had been guilty of fraud and embezzlement: and, by their first resolution, they appointed the plaintiff as an accountant to give them information upon this point. Such an appointment was clearly for a purpose within the general scope of their functions as Guardians, namely, that of protecting the funds of the Union. All the subsequent employment of the plaintiff by the defendants was of a similar description, the investigation turning out more extensive than was at first believed; and the plaintiff's whole time was taken up in this employment. No valid distinction can be drawn, for the purposes of this case, between the nature of the services rendered by the plaintiff and those sued upon in the two cases which I have cited. In London Dock Company v. Sinnott (a) the Court thought that the contract not only admitted of its being under seal, but could be more conveniently made under seal than by parol. I am not aware that that point was ever taken before; but, whatever its weight, it does not arise here: the facts are quite different. CROMPTON J. I am of the same opinion. I do not think the provisions of the Consolidated Order of the Poor Law Commissioners have any bearing upon the case. The question is, was this contract one to which the Guardians easily could, and were bound to, affix a seal? I feel a difficulty in distinguishing this case from London Dock Company v. Sinnott (a). If the contract were, as has been contended, a contract from hour to hour, it might be impossible for the Guardians to affix a seal. But if, on the other hand, the work was distinct and specified work, done under three several resolutions, I should doubt very much whether the contract should not have been under seal. Upon the whole, the evidence seems to me in favour of the plaintiff: but I feel sufficient doubt upon it to induce us to reserve leave to the defendants to appeal. (u) 8 E. & B. 347. Rule discharged. 1858. HAIGH V. NORTH BIERLEY Union. 1858. Monday, June 14th. In an action on a judgment, the plaintiff may indorse the particulars on the writ of summons, under sect. 25 of The Com IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. HODSOLL against Baxter. THE record in the Court of Queen's Bench was as follows. "In the Queen's Bench. "The 13th day of May," 1857. England to wit. William Hodsoll, by Thomas Willis mon Law Pro- his attorney, sued Charles Willding Baxter, by virtue of a writ issued out of this Court indorsed according to the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, as follows. cedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76.), and, on nonappearance, sign judgment under sect. 27. "The following are the particulars of the plaintiff's claim. "The plaintiff claims of the defendant the sum of 247. 11s. 1d., being the amount of debt and costs recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant under and by virtue of a judgment recovered in Her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench on the 13th of April, 1857, and which said sum of 247. 11s. 1d. still remains wholly due and unpaid. "And the said Charles Willding Baxter has not appeared. Therefore it is considered that the said William Hodsoll do recover against the said Charles Willding Baxter the sum of 247. 11s. 1d., together with 57. 17s. for costs of suit." The defendant alleged error, which the plaintiff denied. T. Bell, for the party alleging error (defendant below). The plaintiff has signed final judgment, on the assump- The action on a Is it not a claim Watkin Williams, contrà, was not called upon. WILLIAMS J. I think the judgment must be affirmed. The claim is within the spirit of the enactment: it is out of the question to suppose that the Legislature intended to omit such a case as this. If, then, the 1858. HODSOLL V. BAXTER. 1858. HODSOLL V. BAXTER. language of sect. 25 can be construed so as to include the case, it ought to be so construed. Now it seems to me that the case is within the two parts of the section. If you take the word "debt," where it first occurs, by itself, and afterwards apply the words "liquidated demand" to "contract" and what immediately follows, the word "debt" will include the case. And, again, looking at the later words, I cannot see that the section does not include all cases where the claim is "in the nature of a debt." MARTIN B. concurred. WILLES J. concurred. BRAMWELL B. I am of the same opinion. I think the word "debt" comprehends the case: at any rate this is a "liquidated demand.” WATSON B. It is clear that the intention of the Legislature was to comprehend all cases except claims for unliquidated damages. Judgment affirmed. Monday, IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. JOHN JACKSON, administrator &c. of OLIVER This case, decided on appeal in the Court of Exchequer Chamber, is reported, 8 E. & B. 784. |