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by Petrus Hispanus.
CHAP. 11. Latin version that he found ready to his hand'. But, how
ever this may have been, it is certain that the prestige which necessarily invested the labours of the head of the Church soon cast into the shade those of the English ecclesiastic, and though the name of William Shyreswood was long remembered at Oxford, his reputation in Europe could not compare with
that of Petrus Hispanus. For two centuries and a half the of the treatise Summulæ Logicales of the latter writer reigned supreme in
the schools, and during the hundred and thirty years that followed upon the invention of printing, no less than fortyeight editions are enumerated by Prantl as issuing from the presses of Cologne, Leipsic, Leyden, Venice, and Vienna; while already, with the commencement of the fourteenth century, the importance of this new element had become so generally recognized, that to reconcile the same with the previously accepted dicta of authority had become a task which no one who aspired to be regarded as a teacher of the age found it possible to decline. Just therefore as it had devolved upon Albertus and Aquinas to decide how far the Arabian commentators could be reconciled with the orthodox interpretation of Aristotle, so did it devolve upon Duns Scotus
to incorporate or to shew reasons for rejecting the new Influence of thought presented in the Byzantine logic. The element, Logic sobre accordingly, which in Albertus, Aquinas, and Grosseteste, is than nerely but an exceptional phenomenon (vereinzelten Erscheinungen),
now becomes in the great schoolman of Oxford a predominant feature; a feature which Prantl in his almost exhaustive treatment of the subject has fully investigated; and though it is neither practicable nor desirable for us to attempt to follow him into those technical details which belong to the special province of his work, it is, on the other hand, essential to our main
purpose to make some attempt at explaining the con1 Jedenfalls ist unter den ähnli. den Psellus zu übersetzen, oder ob chen Erzeugnissen jener Zeit das er nur als Abschreiber einer bereits Compendium des Petrus Hispanus vorhandenen getreuen Uebersetzung das geistloseste, insoferne es ohne sich seinen „, weltgeschichtlichen irgend einen einzigen eigenen Einfluss errungen habe, lässt sich Gedanken nur den Grundtext der nicht entscheiden; der Schweiss
eingeführten byzantinischen des Angesichtes" kann in keinem der Logik wiederholt. Ob der Verfasser beiden Fälle gross gewesen sein.' des Griechischen mächtig war, um
struction placed upon the Byzantine logic and the direction CHAP. II. in which it operated. One might easily be inclined to suppose,' observes our authority, that its influence belonged purely to the literature of the schools, and had nothing at all to do with the Arabian Aristotelianism and the controversies springing from thence, but the sequel shews that this Byzantine weed-growth sent its offshoots deep into the logical party contentions, and hence into the so-called philosophy of that time, and that (since Occam and his followers) a knowledge of the Byzantine material is the only key to the solution of the oft-lamented unintelligibility of many entire writings as well as of isolated passages.
It will here be necessary, in order to gain a correct impres- The legitision of the precise position of Duns Scotus in relation to the Muence of philosophy of the time, briefly to recall those important partiaing modifications of theory that had already resulted from the events of the preceding century. The first effects of the new logic. Aristotle upon the schools would seem, as may be naturally supposed, to have tended towards some diminution of that excessive estimation in which logic had hitherto been held. So long as the Isagoge, the Categories, and the De Interpretatione represented the sum of the known thought of the Stagirite, the importance of logical science had been unduly exalted and the study had commanded exclusive attention. But as soon as it was discovered that Aristotle himself had recognised such branches of philosophy as physics, metaphysics, ethics, and that it was difficult to say how far it could be proved that he had regarded logic as anything more than an instrument of enquiry, while the Aristotelian tradition had uvdoubtedly been that it was an art and not a science,—that is, that it had for its subject-matter no fundamental laws of thought, but was merely an arbitrary process constructed for the better investigation of real knowledge ',—the prestige of
neutralised by the Byzantine
1 The distinction between a Science and an Art, that the former has for its object-matter that which is necessary or invariab the latter that which is contingent and variable, dates back as far as Aristotle. See Ars Poet. I, ii. Topica, vi, viii. 1.
Sir William Hamilton (see Article
CHAP. 11. the dialectic art became correspondingly lessened. Aquinas
and Roger Bacon, little as they agreed in other respects, seemed in some sense at unison on this point. The subjectmatter of logic,' said the former, 'is not an object of investigation on its own account, but rather as a kind of scaffolding to other sciences; and hence logic is not included in speculative philosophy as a leading division, but rather in subserviency thereto, inasmuch as it supplies the method of enquiry, whence it is not so much a science as an instrument?.' The view of Bacon, according to which he regarded the logica utens as a natural inborn faculty, and the logica docens as merely ancillary to other sciences, has already come under our notice. That such views failed to find expression in a corresponding modification of practice, and that, notwithstanding the more intelligent estimate of science that now undoubtedly began to prevail, logic continued for more than two centuries to occupy the same 'bad eminence' both at Oxford and at Cambridge, must be attributed to the Byzantine logic, to Petrus Hispanus, and to Duns Scotus.
• The logic of Duns Scotus,' says Prantl, which gave tine logic ins birth to an abundant crop of Scotistic literature, does not
indeed proceed in entirely new paths which he had opened up for himself,—he is, on the contrary, as regards the traditional material, just as dependent and confined (abhängig und bedingt) as all the other authors of the Middle Ages. But he is distinguished, in the first place, by a peculiarly copious infusion of Byzantine logic, and secondly, by the comprehensive precision and consistency with which he incorporates the Aristotelian, Arabian, and Byzantine material, so that by this means many new views are, in fact, drawn from the old sources, and, in spite of all opposition, the transition to Occam effected?' The treatise of Psellus, as translated by Petrus Hispanus, thus enunciates the theory which Duns Scotus developed ;-Dyalectica est ars artium, scientia scien
Presence of the Byzan
an opinion adopted, almost to a man, by the Jesuit, Dominican, and Fran. ciscan Cursualists.' More accurate enquiry has shewn this to be by far too sweeping an assertion,
1 Ad Boeth. de Trinitate, (Vol. XVII 2) p. 134. quoted by Prantl, i 108.
2 Geschichte der Logik, 11. 203,
tiarum, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. Sola CHAP. II. enim dyalectica probabiliter disputat de principiis omnium aliarum scientiarum. Et ideo in acquisitione scientiarum dyalectica debet esse prior?' Physics, mathematics, metaphysics,' said Albertus Magnus, are the three speculative sciences, and there are no more, logic is not concerned with being or any part of being, but with second intentions? It Theory of the was in connexion with this doctrine of the intentio secunda Secunda. that Duns Scotus sought to find that consistency' of which Prantl speaks, and to retain or even to augment the old supremacy of logic.
It may be desirable briefly to restate the question as State of the it presented itself before the enunciation of this theory. Bruns Scotus. Logic, said the Thomist, is an art and not a science; a science is concerned with real facts, with veritable entities, not with artificial processes or arbitrary laws. Metaphysics are a science, astronomy is a science, but logic, as concerned only with those secondary processes of the mind which it seeks to define and regulate, has no pretentions to rank as such. While therefore they accepted, as Albertus has done, the Thearable Arabian theory of the intentio secunda, by far the most important contribution to metaphysics since the time of Aristotles, they stopped short precisely at the point where that theory touched upon the question of the right of logic to be included among the sciences. That theory admits of being stated in a few words. The intellect as it directs itself (intendens se) towards external objects, discerns, for example,
i Prantl remarks, dieser Satz secundas.' Metoph. i 1, 1. The only fehlt in unserem Texte des Psellus; sense in which Albertus appears to er ist wohl aus der gewöhnlichen bo- have been able to recognize logic as ethianischen Tradition aufgenom- a science was as Logica Utens : see men.' III 41. In the edition of the quotations in Prantl, 92. Synopsis by Axinger we have, how- 3 • The principal material added by ever, the original Greek: Alalektikń the Arabians to the text of Aristotle έστι τέχνη τεχνών και επιστήμη επι- is the celebrated distinction between στημών προς τας απασών των μεθόδων first and second intentions. This is αρχάς οδόν έχουσα, και διά τούτο εν τη found in the epitome of the Categoκτήσει των επιστημών πρώτης είναι την ries by Averroes. It has also been διαλεκτικής χρή. 1 1, p. 1, quoted by traced to Avicenna. To the Arabians Prantl.
also are probably owing some of the Istæ igitur sunt tres scientiæ distinguishing features, though cerspeculativæ, et non sunt plures. Sci. tainly not the origin, of the Scholastic entiæ logicæ non considerant ens et Realism.' Dean Mansel, Introd. to partem entis aliquam, sed intentiones Arlis Log. Rud. p. xxix.
Counter theory of
CHAP. II. Socrates in his pure individuality, and the impression thus
received is to be distinguished as the intentio prima. But
were not. It was in respect of this theory of the non-reality Duns Scotus. of the intentiones secundæ, that Duns Scotus joined issue
with the Thomists. It is true, he replied, that existence
more than creations of the intellect, and have consequently Logic a only a subjective existence. They are equally real, and
though the recognition of their existence is posterior to that
science as well as an art.
1. Auch den Unterschied, welcher zwischen Logik und Metaphysik neben manchen Berührungspunkten doch als ein wesentlicher besteht, erblickt Scotus ebenso wie all seine älteren und jüngeren Zeitgenossen in jener intentio secunda, welcher wir nun seit den Arabern stets schon be. gegneten, und er spricht in mannigfaltigen Wendungen wiederholt es aus, dass die Logik jene Momente, welche von ratio oder von intellectus oder von conceptus ausgehen, kurz also dersubjectiven Werkstätte angehören, auf das objective Wesen der Dinge wende," applicare. Eben hiedurch entscheidet er auch jene Frage, ob die Logik als modus sciendi selbst eine Wis
senschaft sei, im Ausschlusse an Alfarabi dabin, dass die Logik einerseits als docens wirklich eine Wissenschaft ist und andrerseits als utens den modus für alle übrigen enthält, so dass wir hier...den Begriff einer“ angewandten Logik” treffen.' Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, III 204–5. According, therefore, to this view we have, Logica Docens = Pure Logic=& Science; Logica Utens=Applied Logic
Art. This appears almost identical with the view subsequently espoused by Wolf, and by Kant, who, in defining the Logica Docens as • The Science of the Necessary Laws of Thought,' arrived, though by a very different process, at the same