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CHAP. II. schools, that from his time nominalism obtained the suf

frages of the learned, while realism, in some instances, was A scendancy even regarded as a heterodox doctrine. The triumph of noistic doctrines minalism as opposed to the realism of this period, was but Schools. the victory of more sober sense over the verbal subtleties and

subjective phantasies that had hitherto dazzled the otherwise acute vision of the schoolmen; and the brief sentences in which William of Occam sweeps away the elaborate webspinning of his predecessors have their brevity as well as their logic reflected in the pages of Hobbes, of Locke, and of Mill. Le caractère propre du nominalisme c'est la simplicité, says Hauréau, in apology for his own brevity in expounding the doctrines of Occam; and though the application of the method is modified with each separate thesis of realism, the point of departure is the same, and the result is easily

anticipated. Criticism of The nominalistic philosophy, therefore, as representing

not an obsolete system but conclusions which have won the suffrages of succeeding thinkers, requires no exposition at our hands, but it will be necessary, having followed Prantl

thus far, to explain in what manner, according to his view, Influence of the Byzantine logic exercised such important influence on so tine logic on fundamental a controversy,—an influence in the absence of troversy which he even ventures to assert Nominalism would not have respecting

made its appearance at this era'. As the chief contribution of the Arabian philosophy to the metaphysics of the age had

been the theory of the intentio secunda, so that of the ByzanTheory of the tine logic was the theory of the suppositio, a conception of

which no trace appears in Duns Scotus, notwithstanding the very appreciable influence of the Byzantine element on his writings. According to this theory neither the intentio prima nor the intentio secunda is a real entity; the intentio prima is but the name designating the external object, while the intentio secunda is a generalisation from the intentiones primæ. Both are but types of the reality, the former a sign of the



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objective entity, the latter the collective sign of signs. And, CHAP. IL so far was Occam from claiming for the intentio secunda a real and distinct existence, as Duns Scotus had done, and inferring therefrom the high prerogative of logic, that he appears to have regarded this as a question in which logic had no concern'. But while Occam struck thus boldly at the The true foundation of realism, he clearly discerned that individuals, Universals as such, could afford no real knowledge, and hence Universals outline assumed for him their true value as the aim of all scientific induction. This, then, was the chief service which Occam rendered to philosophy. He brought again to light, from the darkness to which preceding logicians had consigned it, the true value of the inductive method, as auxiliary to the deductive,—the great truth which Aristotle had indicated and the schoolmen had shut out. After a lapse of eighteen centuries, the proper function of syllogism, as the bridge constructed by induction for deduction to pass over, seemed likely at last to be recognised. That the position Occam thus took up was not subsequently recognised in all its importance as the equilibrium between philosophy and science, must be referred to the errors of yet greater reputations, who, in the strong reaction from scholasticism which set in with the sixteenth century, visited with indiscriminate censure its real services as well as its follies and mistakes. «In short,' says Prantl, 'we find ourselves in Occam on the basis of an Aristotelian

first pointed

William of

1.Utrum autem talia sint realiter et subjective in anima an objective tantum, non refert ad propositum nec hoc spectat determinare ad logicum, qui tamen principaliter dis. tinctionem inter nomina primæ et secundæ intentionis habet considerare, quia logicus præcise habet di. cere, quod in ista propositione“ homo est species” subjectum supponit pro uno communi et non pro aliquo sig. nificato suo;

utrum autem illud commune sit reale vel non sit reale, nihil ad eum, sed ad metaphysicum.' Sent. 1 Dist. 23. Quæst. 1. (quoted by Prant), 111 342). The two great philosophical distinctions which chiefly engaged the attention of the schoolmen,--that between matter and

form, and that involved in the theory
of the intentio secunda,—are those
on which Mr Shadworth Hodgson
has built up the theory of his essay
Time and Space. If I rightly un-
derstand his profound exposition of
first and second intentions (see pp.
33—45), his view, making due allow-
ance for the additional light thrown
upon the question by recent discus.
sion, is essentially the same as that
of the Oxford schoolman of the four-
teenth century. First intentions,'
he says, 'may be defined as objects
in relation to consciousness alone;
second intentions, as objects in re-
lation to other objects in conscious.
ness.' p. 39.

CHAP. II. empiricism, which, along with the admission that all human

knowledge begins with the perception of sense and of the individual object, combines the claim that every science, as such, can treat only of Universals: a fundamental conception which appears clothed in Byzantine terminology, when he says that the component parts of judgements in every case occupy the place of singular individuals by means of suppositio, but for science only termini universales are of much worth?' According to this view the universal, it is hardly necessary to point out, is represented in Occam by the intentio secunda", and in this amount of consent between the paradox of the master and the true discernment of the pupil, we CHAP. II. have a striking illustration of the relevancy to true philosophy, which, notwithstanding their many vagaries, the controversies of scholasticism in relation to this vexata quæstio may undoubtedly claim?!

1 Kurz, wir befinden uns bei Occam auf der Basis eines aristotelischen Empirismus, welcher mit dem Zugeständnisse, dass alles menschliche Wissen von der Sinneswahrnehmung und von den EinzelnObjecten anhebt, zugleich die Forderung verknüpft, dass jede Wis. senchaft als solche nur von Universellem handle, eine grundsätzliche Auffassung, welche in byzantinische Terminologie eingekleidet ist, wenn Occam sagt, dass allerdings die Bestandtheile der Urtheile mittelst suppositio an Stelle singulärer Individuen stehen, aber für die Wissenschaft doch nur die termini univers sales werthvoll sind.' 111 332.

2 The following quotations from the Quodlibeta and the Summa Totius Logice, indicate with such remarkable clearness the views of Occam in conformity with the By. zantine element, that I have thought it worth while to give them in full as printed by Prantl in illustration of hisown criticism :-Large dicitur intentio prima esse signum intensibile existens in anima, quod non significat intentionem vel conceptus in ani. ma vel alia signa præcise ; (præcise in scholastic terminology = omnino, prorsus. See Ducange, s.v.) isto modo non solum categoreumata mentalia,quæ significant res, quænon sunt significativæ, sed etiam syncategoreumata mentalia et verba et conjunctiones et hujusmodi dicuntur prima intentiones......... Sed stricte dicitur prima intentio nomen mentale præcise natum esse extremum propositionis et supponere pro re,

quæ non est signum...... Similiter large accipiendo dicitur intentio secunda animæ conceptus, qui sunt naturalia signa rerum, cujusmodi sunt intentiones primæ stricte acceptæ, sed etiam prout signa mentalia ad placitum significantia signa syncategoreumatica mentalia ; et isto modo forte non habemus nisi vocale correspondens intentioni secundæ. Stricte autem accipiendo dicitur intentio secunda conceptus, qui præcise significat intentiones naturaliter significativas, cujusmodi sunt genus, species, differentia et alia hujusmodi ...... Ita de intentionibus primis, quæ supponunt pro rebus, prædicatur unus conceptus communis, qui est intentio secunda. In the Summa we have the following equally explicit exposition :-'sufficiat, quod intentio est quoddam in anima, quod est sig. num naturaliter significans aliquid, pro quo potest supponere, vel quod potest esse pars propositionis mentalis. Tale autem duplex est. U. num, quod est signum alicujus rei, quæ non est tale signum...... et illud vocatur intentio prima ......... Large dicitur intentio prima omne siguum intentionale existens in anima, quod non significat intentiones vel signa præcise, ......... et illo modo verba mentalia et syncategoreumata mentalia, adverbia, conjunctiones, et hujusmodi possunt dici intentiones primæ. Stricte autem vocatur in. tentio prima nomen mentale natum pro suo

supponere. Intentio autem secunda est illa, quæ est signum talium intentionum primarum, cujusmodi sunt tales in.

The works of the schoolmen have often been compared to the pyramids; vast, indeed, in their aggregate, but tediously minute and monotonous in detail; and even as Egyptian travellers who have venturously essayed the labyrinths of those ancient structures, have described their feelings of inexpressible relief on regaining the light of day, so, we cannot but conceive, notwithstanding the enthusiasm from time to time evoked, the men of the fourteenth century must have rejoiced as they saw some promise of escape from endless perplexity and toil. It is inspiriting to note the ease where- The limits with this English schoolman disentangles himself from the conquiry inte toils of theological dogmas by his prompt disavowal of the distinctly ambitious all-sufficiency of Aquinas, a feature in which the influence of his teacher Scotus is probably to be discerned. Did the theologian seek to be informed whether the divine intelligence were the first effective cause of all existence ? 'I know not,' replied Occam; 'experience tells me nothing of the Cause of all causes, the reason has neither the right nor the power to penetrate the sanctuary of the Divine.' Was



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tentiones genus," "species," et hujusmodi.' See Prantl, 111 312, 343.

i That such was the view of Scotus Prantl points out with considerable clearness :-*So nimmt auch Scotus vor Allem die allgemein recipirte arabische Unterscheidung einer doppelten intentio in dem Sinne auf, dass die secunda intentio, d. h. die eigentlich logische, ein nachfolgen. des Erzeugniss der Denk-Operation sei und so als Universale bezeichnet werde, während die prima intentio als ursprünglich unbedingtes Erfassen auf die objective Quiddität gehe, welche wohl gleichfalls Universale genannt werde, aber an sich gleichgültig gegen Allgemeinheit oder Einzelnheit sei und daher auch im Denken nicht mit concreter Gegen. tändlichkeit (subjective) sondern eben

nur unmittelbar vorstellungsweise
(objective) auftrete.' 111 208.

2 See Prantl, 1 361–379. Mill's
Logic, Bk. Il cc. 1, 2, and 3. Bain,
Mental and Moral Science, Appendix
B. Dean Mansel observes that Oc-
cam, like Petrus Hispanus, departs
from the ordinary arrangement of
treating, consecutively the Isagoge of
Porphyry and the several books of
the Organon. He commences with
the different divisions of terms, of
which his account is much more
complete than that of the Summula
Logicales. (Introd. to Artis Logice
Rudimenta, p. xxxvi.) Prantl shows
that Occam exercises a perfectly in.
dependent judgement in his employ-
ment of the technical method of
that treatise : Geschichte der
Logik, ii 382, 391, 392.


CHAP. II. that Cause of causes omnipotent? asked the theologian.

According to logic,' was the reply, 'the mode of existence is the same in the cause as in the effects : but the effects of the First Cause are finite, the Cause itself is infinite, and is therefore removed from the province of my logic.' Such manly sense finds an echo in our hearts. We are ready to surrender to Luke Wadding his adored Scotus as a compatriot, in our gratification at finding in this indubitable Englishman the earliest discernment of the limits which more modern thought has so distinctly recognised.

It would require very extended research in his writings to enable us to affirm that Occam in no case recognised the existence of an ultimate major premise, that is to say, a major premise which could not, in conformity with the nominalistic philosophy, be shown to be resolvable into an induction from observed facts. But it is to be remembered that the question of innate ideas was not familiar to the schoolman. The belief in their existence had been roughly rejected by the chief teachers of the early Latin Church; and it was not until Plato had again become known to western Europe, that the theory began to advance towards that position which it has since assumed in the arena of philosophic controversy. There is nothing in the peculiar direction of the prejudices which characterise the age in which Occam lived, to suggest that he might not have employed, with perfect impunity, the reasoning used by Locke against an innate belief in the divine existence; but when we consider that Locke himself undoubtedly failed to grasp the true bearings of nominalism upon the whole theory of innate ideas, we may well hold his predecessor by more than three centuries exonerated from reproach in his corresponding lack of apprehension. On more perilous ground it proved, in all probability, of eminent service to

the progress of speculation that Occam so definitely refused Efects upon to render bis method subservient to the test of theological

dogma. It might seem a bold step for a Franciscan friar controversy. thus to proclaim the severance of logic from theology; but

the impossibility of that alliance which Aquinas had en

the subsequent course of scholastic

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