Supreme Government, not satisfied with depriving the Agra Government of all superintendence over every other branch of administration, had determined to manage all that is left to that government, the Revenue and Judicial departments, through a secretary nominated by itself. We trust that we are not guilty of any disrespect in offering these remarks. We are speaking of the sure tendency of such an arrangement, not of your Lordship's actual intentions, which we are convinced are directed solely towards the public good. Of all the appointments under a subordinate government, we conceive it to be most essential that the governors should have the nomination of their secretaries, and we hope that your Lordship will, on reconsideration, perceive the double injury inflicted by an opposite course; the injury to the personal respectability of the governor, and what is of more importance, the injury to the efficiency of his government, which can never be promoted by a detraction from the respectability of his office. In the present instance, there is apparently something besides degradation to the office, there is a palpable indignity put on the individual appointed to that office; for while it is admitted (paragraph 20) that the question as to appointments to the secretariat is doubtful, and is therefore reserved for further consideration, there seems to be no hesitation in deciding that question with regard to the feelings of the governor, in a way that cannot be supposed to be according to his wishes. The Legislature assigns to the subordinate governments even the nomination of councillors, on vacancies unprovided for, and it cannot be supposed to have intended that they should not have the nomination of their own secretaries. With respect to Mr. Macsween, we conclude, that if he be allowed an option, he will not choose to be put down from being chief secretary to the Supreme Government, to be secretary to a government with such restricted powers, stationed at Allahabad.

10. Adverting to the proposed junction of the Revenue and Judicial departments with the Political under the Supreme Government, we apprehend that such an arrangement, as a permanent one, is impracticable. The experience required for the Political department is so different from that necessary for the other, that no person is likely to possess sufficient experience for both. The arrangement might succeed in Mr. Macsween's hands; but it cannot hardly ever again occur, that a gentleman eminently qualified by experience as well as abilities for the Judicial department of the secretariat, should, from his distinguished talents and rare character, be deemed the fittest secretary for the Political department also, notwithstanding his want of practical experience in that branch of the service. A principal motive, therefore, for the double degradation of Mr. Macsween and the Governor of Agra, is a proposed union of incongruous offices, such as has never yet happened since secretaries were appointed to departments, and such as cannot be expected ever to happen again.

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11. If patronage were a possession solely for the gratification of the individual distributing it, we should think that the portion assigned to the Agra Government, with respect to the Revenue and Judicial department, in which only any portion_is signed, sufficiently liberal as to those departments, considering that the Supreme Government, in every thing that it gives away, makes some sacrifice; but if the distribution of patronage be, as undoubtedly it is, for the good of the public service, we are bound to say, that the reservation of appointments to the Revenue Board and highest court of justice in the hands of the Supreme Government, besides being contrary to the practice at the other presidencies, must tend to impair the efficiency of the subordinate government, by leading those under its authority to look elsewere for promotion. It would, we conceive, be a better arrangement, if it be deemed impossible to follow the practice established at the other presidencies, that the Agra Government should recommend, and the Supreme Government confirm, appointments to these high offices. The power of recommendation vested in the Agra Government would ensure the due attention to their duties of those looking to such appointments, while the control of the Supreme Government would secure great care on the part of the subordinate government in the selection.

12. We see no objection to the arrangement by which the correspondence of the Agra Government is to be carried on with the Supreme Government, and not immediately with the Court of Directors. Combined with so many other arrangements which reduce the Agra Government to a nonentity, it will tend to lower that Government; but we regard it in itself as entirely unobjectionable. It is a token of subordination to the Supreme Government which is perfectly consistent with the spirit of the new constitution for the government of India, and which we have no wish that the Agra Government should in any degree be relieved from, even to the extent implied by direct correspondence with the Court of Directors.

13. The arrangement by which it is proposed to exclude the Governments of Madras and Bombay from their former share in political affairs, will eventually, although it may not for some time, have the same effect on those powers that the same thing must at once have on the Agra Government. The question seems to be, whether the Supreme Govern

ment can most effectually conduct our foreign relations with or without the local agency of the subordinate governments. Your Lordship has decided this question against the subordinate presidencies; and if this judgment be correct, the effect on the respectability of these presidencies is of minor importance.

14. We have not thought it necessary to offer any remarks with respect to the powers proposed to be conferred on the Governor of Bengal, in common with the Governor of Agra. The Governor-General being ex-officio Governor of Bengal, it is obvious that whatever he takes from the Governor of Bengal, he assumes to himself as Governor-General or Governor-General in Council, and that whatever he relinquishes as Governor of Bengal, and that consequently there is no resemblance between the Governor of Bengal and the Governor of Agra, and that the latter alone is injuriously affected by restrictions and privations which may nominally be common to both.

15. If we have argued the question of the restrictions to be put upon the Government of Agra with any undue anxiety, we trust that your Lordship will make allowances for the Governor elect and the provisional Governor, who may not perhaps be able to divest themselves entirely of a personal interest in the respectability of that Presidency. We have not, however, dwelt on the insignificance to which it will be reduced merely for the purpose of giving expression to our sentiments, but more with a view to suggest what appears to us to be a most desirable arrangement for the good of the public service.

16. Your Lordship's plan deprives the Government of Agra of all power except in the Revenue and Judicial departments. We are not disposed to undervalue the importance of those departments, on the right superintendence of which, the happiness of millions depends; but it is not merely for the control of these departments that a separate government has been deemed necessary. The duty may be performed with equal efficiency and with greater economy by a single officer, under an arrangement similar in design to that which existed during a period of the administration of the Marquis Wellesley. Such an office would be highly respectable on account of its duties, and free from ridicule, because its duties would correspond with its character. By your Lordship's arrangement nothing is left to the Government of Agra but the expense; and this, which was formerly considered a just and great, but the only objection to the formation of a new government, however efficient that government might be, is now in an immeasurable degree more objectionable, since the government is made useless, and will probably become an object of derision, from the ill accordance of its powers with its designation.

17. If therefore the honourable Court should adopt your Lordship's arrangement; if the formation of an efficient and respectable government for all the purposes of government be deemed impracticable; if the separation of power and patronage from the Supreme Government be held to constitute an insurmountable difficulty, we would earnestly recommend that the Government of Agra be abolished, that the Presidencies of Bengal and Agra be re-united, and that an officer of the Bengal Civil Service be appointed by the honourable Court, with any designation and salary deemed most proper, to relieve the Supreme Government from these details of revenue and judicial administration which are assigned by your Lordship's arrangement to the proposed Government at Allahabad. This proposition we respectfully submit for your Lordship's consideration, and that of the honourable Court of Directors.

18. Sir Charles Metcalfe, on his own part, begs leave to entreat, that if the abolition of the Government of Agra be contemplated by your honourable Court, there may not be any hesitation or scruple on his account in the instantaneous adoption of that measure. It would be presumptuous to suppose that there could be, but he nevertheless thinks it right to state, that he does not consider himself as possessing any elaim that ought for a moment to retard an arrangement which in the case supposed would be so desirable, and to declare explicitly that he shall not consider himself as injured by the abolition of his office, nor in the slightest degree entitled to compensation or consideration of any kind. He feels that he has already been rewarded beyond his deserts. He has been induced during late years, not by any wish to inincrease his pecuniary means, nor any expectation of personal advantage, but by attachment to the service in which his life has been passed from the earliest age; pride in the approbation bestowed on his humble exertions, and a desire to perform the duties entrusted to him so as to promote the welfare of his country, and the happiness of the people subject to its dominion. He will be as willing to retire when his removal may be deemed beneficial to the state as he has been to embrace the opportunities graciously granted to him of continuing to devote himself to the public service.

19. With reference to the 2d paragraph of the letter from your Lordship in Council to our address, we are not aware that any legislative enactments will be necessary in the first

instance to give effect to the provisions of the system which you design to establish. The powers of the subordinate governments are in some measure determined by Act of Parliament, and no legislative enactments in this country can alter the provisions of that Act. But the Supreme Government has complete controul over the presidencies, and your orders will be implicitly obeyed by all. We conceive, therefore, that your Lordship's instructions to the parties concerned will ensure attention to your commands, and that for whatever may require general publicity, notification in the Gazette will suffice.

20. If in the course of argument into which we have been led, in obeying your Lordship's call for our opinions, any unguarded expression may have escaped us which may seem more free than is becoming in an address from an inferior to a superior Board, we solicit your Lordship's indulgence to errors which can only have proceeded from oversight; we need not, we trust, assure you that we have had no intention of conveying our sentiments otherwise than with the perfect respect and deference which are due to your Lordship and the Supreme Government of India.

Copy of a Letter from P. Auber, Esq., Secretary to the Court of Directors, to Winthrop M. Praed, Esq., Secretary to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India.

East India-house, 12th March, 1835.

SIR,-I am commanded by the Court of Directors to submit through you to the Board of Commissioners for the affairs of India, the reflections which have been suggested by the perusal of the letter addressed by the Vice-President in Council to the Governor-General under date the 4th September last, respecting the proposed arrangements for the Government of Agra.

The letter of the Vice-President has led the Court of Directors to consider very carefully, the difficulties which are likely to be experienced in endeavouring to carry on the government of Bengal in its two divisions, according to the plan prescrided by the Act 3 and 4 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 38.

The expense of constituting the Government of Agra on the same scale as the Governments of Madras and Bombay, with a Council and the requisite establishments, especially in the present state of the finances of India, has strongly attracted the attention of the Court, and ought not, in their opinion, to be incurred unless it clearly appears to be necessary for the attainment of some very important end.

The Court are also forcibly impressed with the consideration so strenuously urged by Sir Charles Metcalfe, that if the superintendence of the political relation with the neighbouring states be retained in the hands of the Supreme Government, the Government of Agra will not only be deprived of some of its most important functions, but will remain charged with scarcely any duties, except those which may be performed by functionaries of a secondary rank.

The matters which have already occurred to excite discussion have led the Court to a clear and strong conviction of the practical difficulties which will be experienced in providing servants for two separate governments from one undivided service, and in determining the proportion of patronage to be allotted to each. The Court regard with much apprehension the differences between the two governments, and the dissatisfaction among individuals which may arise from this source.

It appears to the Court, upon mature consideration, that there is a simple and effectual mode of obviating those difficulties without incurring the danger of any concomitant evil.

The object in constituting the Upper Provinces of Bengal a separate government was to relieve the Governor-General in Council from the management of such a mass of details as it was impossible for him to attend to without neglecting the more important concerns of the general government of India.

It appears to the Court that this inconvenience may be avoided, and the conduct of details be satisfactorily provided for if the whole of Bengal, including the Upper Provinces, were continued immediately under the Supreme Government as formerly. There would then be no question about patronage and powers; the inclinations of individuals regarding places of service would be consulted in the same satisfactory manner as heretofore. And all that would be required, in order to relieve the Supreme Government from the burthen of details, would be to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor for Agra, by whom the business of the internal government might be carried on under the general superintendence and control of the Governor-General in Council.

As the Lieutenant-Governor would discharge such functions as it might seem expedient to the Supreme Government to confide to him, such patronage and powers would be placed in his hands as might appear to be conducive to the execution of the trust with which he would be invested, and between the superior and subordinate authorities there could be no contention.

This plan appears to the Court so fully to meet the exigencies of the case, that they anxiously recommend it in the strongest manner to the consideration of the Board of Commissioners, and should the Board concur with them in the view which they have taken of the subject, the Court would solicit the attention of the President to the best mode of obtaining the powers which are necessary to carry the plan into execution, whether by direct enactment or by authorizing the Court to suspend the execution of that part of the present law which relates to the establishment of two local governments for Bengal and Agra: leaving the whole country as heretofore under the Governor-General in Council, with power to the Court to relieve him of part of the details, by the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor in Agra.

Copy of a letter from the Honorable Sidney Herbert, Secretary to the Commissioners for the affairs of India, to P. Auber, Esq.

India Board, 16th March, 1835.

Sir, I am directed by the Commissioners for the affairs of India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 12th instant in which you state the view taken by the Court of the difficulties attending the division of the Bengal Presidency into two distinct governments, and suggest that the object of relieving the Governor General in Council from the mass of details connected with the administration of the Upper Provinces, might be effected by the appointment by the Court of a Lieutenant Governor, subject to the control of the Governor General in Council.

The letter of the Vice-President in Council, dated the 4th September last, has already engaged the serious attention of the Board.

The Legislature has provided that, notwithstanding the division of that Presidency, there shall be no division of its civil service or of its army; and this was a necessary provision, for not only would it have been impossible to apportion the civil and military establishments between the two governments with satisfaction to the persons interested, but the division would have created much practical difficulty in the distribution of the army, and have impaired the general efficiency of the administration by narrowing the selection of fit men for important trusts.

The new government, placed in immediate contact with the states of Rajpootana, will undoubtedly obtain little of their respect if interdicted from the exercise of diplomatic functions; yet it would evidently be inexpedient that the Governor-General in Council

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should divest himself of the direct control over our relations with the most important foreign states.

Without a separate army, and without a separate civil establishment, the Presidency of Agra would want what seems to be the essential attributes of a separate government, while its position within Bengal, accessible only by the river which traverse it the Lower Provinces, seems of necessity to deprive of all direct and independent communication with the home authorities.

Thus mutilated and imperfect, with nothing of a government but the name, the new Presidency of Agra will, if constituted, as it must be, like the other presidencies, with a council and a secretariat, produce further embarrassment to our finances, while, by severing from the Governor-General in Council one half of the civil appointments, it will very materially impair his means of giving a good administration to the people.

In the opinion of the Board, the chief obstacle to good government in India arises from the limited number of persons from amongst whom the selection must be made for offices of high authority; and no measure would be so injurious as one which would diminish the means the Governor-General now possesses, of placing in every situation of importance within Bengal the man he may consider best qualified to serve the State.

With these impressions as to the unavoidable consequences of dividing the Presidency of Bengal, the Board cannot receive unfavourably the suggestion offered by the Court, and they are the more disposed to desire a revision of the law, when they advert to the many circumstances which may arise tending to produce differences and collision between the Supreme Government and that of Agra, and thus to impair the authority of both.

The Board further acquiesce in the opinion of the Court, that the Governor-General in Council might be relieved from much of the oppressive detail of business by the appointment of a Lieutenant-Governor in the Upper Provinces, and that thus one of the alleged objects of the division of the Bengal Presidency might be easily and cheaply attained.

They are however, of opinion, that the desired relief of the Governor-General in Council from the oppressive weight of details would be much better effected by arrangements which he is competent to make in the distribution of business, than by allotting to a new officer all the details of the administration of that portion of the British dominions in India, which it is most important to govern well and most difficult to govern at all.

The Supreme Government cannot be well administered unless those to whom it is entrusted occasionally descend to the most minute details of expenditure and revenue, and make themselves conversant with matters apparently subordinate, which nevertheless directly influence the welfare of the people.

When the Board take into their consideration the distance of the Upper Provinces from the seat of government, their respect to foreign states, and the character of their population, they cannot but concur in the opinion which has been almost generally expressed, that there should be stationed in those provinces an officer of authority, paramount to that of commissioners, collectors and magistrates, who, enjoying the full confidence of the GovernorGeneral, might exercise whatever power it might from time to time be deemed expedient by the Governor-General to delegate to him.

That this officer should have the entire confidence of the Governor-General and be his immediate representative, seems to be essential to the useful exercise of his anthority, and with the view of obtaining this object, it appears to the Board to be necessary that he should derive his appointment from the Governor-General in Council, and not from the Court.

A Lieutenant-Governor appointed by the Court, but with powers to be from time to time limited and declared by the Governor-General in Council, would be in a position yet more disparaging than that of the Governor of Agra. Independent in his appointment, but dependent in his authority, perhaps wanting that which ennobles dependence, the entire confidence of his superior, he would be but an expensive pageant, if divested of power, and practically a governor without a council if he were entrusted with power. But to the creation of an officer exercising the authority of a governor without the restraint of a council, there are in the opinion of the Board the strongest constitutional objections.

An officer exercising power during the pleasure of the Governor General in Council would act under the feeling of immediate responsibility subsequent upon his measures. A Governor in Council has imposed upon him the necessity of deliberation before he acts,