second causes, joint defendants with the Advocate-pany no parties in the suit, maintained with great zeal General in the third cause, and sole plaintiffs in the and ability that the testator's lands if they did escheat, fourth or cross cause.

escheated not to the Crown but to the East India ComWhether the Advocate General really appeared Mr. John Palmer being known to have died and to pany. have been buried in Calcutta a few days before, and it for the King under the existing decree of the court, it is being stated at the bar and by the officers of the court, very difficult to say. I do not mean to say whether by law that Deverine was believed to have gone to France out the Advocate-General has or has not the right and duty to appear for the King in a suit of this nature: or of the jurisdiction of the court, which is assumed to have been so on the 23d February, 1832, by the de- whether this is a question of difficulty or not; I think cretal order of that date, and that neither of them had the court, by the decree of 23d February, 1832, has decreed that he does not, i. e. I presume that he cannot, appeared in these causes for many years. confess being very much surprised at the course of proceeding though how it was possible so to decree in a cause the proposed. I enquired of the Advocate-General whether basis and foundation of which is nothing else than an he admitted that Palmer was dead, to which he answered information filed by the Advocate-General, for and on that he did admit it. He nevertheless was prepared, as behalf of His Majesty King George the Third, at and it seemed, to proceed on his information, and the learn by the relation of John Martin Wilkins which has been ed counsel for such of the surviving parties as appeared, going on ever since 29th June, 1816, in which there intimated no desire to stop the progress of a suit in which have been many decretal orders which stand on the record unrescinded: and which, notwithstanding what the two only defendants were, one of them dead and was so decreed in February, 1832, was not stopped the other out of the reach of the process of the court, by the court for want of parties, but under that decree, having no attorney, so far as I can learn, representing in pursuance of orders made by it, has been going on him on the record. I declared my opinion that one of ever since, and is now proceeding as if all were quite the two executors being out of the jurisdiction, and not appearing by his solicitor, and the Advocate-General regular, it is certainly very difficult to understand. But appearing not to deny this, and expressly admitting that it is equally difficult to put upon the terms of this decretal order the other executor, the other defendant is now dead, the other construction. any suit could not proceed; that it had abated by the death The decree distinguishes between the land in and out of the sole executor within the jurisdiction, and could not of Calcutta, within the provinces subject to the preproceed until it was revived. Upon which my learned sidency of Fort William. As to the first, it says, that brother, the Chief Justice said, that there was no objec- the testator, being an alien, they could not pass by his tion made for want of parties, and that the cause must will. As to the second, that there were not the proper proceed; and my other learned brother, Mr. Justice parties nor sufficient evidence to enable the court to Malkin said, that he concurred, that sitting here he did not know that Palmer was dead.

determine whether they could pass by the will. As to the evidence, it is difficult to see what other evidence was wanting, it being ascertained that according as the The cause accordingly proceeded, and the counsel were court has decreed, that the testator was an alien, and heard, the Advocate-General and Mr. Cochrane on the that the lands were situated, in what is called the same side; but for whom they did or could appear in Mofussil. As to want of parties the decree explains its the shape in which these causes stood, it was very diffi- meaning. At least I think it contains sufficient to shew cult to say. The Advocate-General, informant, expressly what was meant in the next sentence, giving as a reason on behalf of the King, the Mayor and community of for what it is about to do" inasmuch as the AttorneyLyons. Christopher Martin, an executor, who had prov- General of our Lord the King is not resident within the ed the will in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury, also jurisdiction of this court, and there is no party to these a legatee, and other legatees under the will, all residing suits who has made any claim to any of the said lands, in France and the two executors, Palmer and Deverine, &c. on the part and behalf of the Crown," and then it were the sole persons who were or ever had been parties orders that a receiver be appointed, &c. I do not say to these causes. The corporation of the East India Com- that this is very explicit, for it seems to imply that some pany were not, and never had been parties; and the Ad- other party to these suits not being the Attorney-General, vocate General could not appear for them, unless they had might have made a claim on the part of the Crown, been admitted to appear gratis for their interest, or been which I think can only have been meant of the Advomade parties, of which there is no trace in the proceeding. cate-General. But then if the Advocate-General has To my surprise the Advocate-General did not claim the merely neglected his duty, what has the non-residence lands of the testator on behalf of the Crown. I asked if of the Attorney-General within the jurisdiction to do the Advocate-General appeared on behalf of the Crown, with the matter? There is nothing in the 63d. Geo. 3, as informant; how it happened that he did not appear c. 855 giving the Advocate-General such powers as he to claim these lands on behalf of the Crown? and if he possesses where the rights of the Crown are concerned, did not or could not appear on behalf of the Crown, which makes them in any way dependant upon the how the information could remain on the record? To Attorney-General. What the Court might be bound these questions I obtained no answer. The Advocate- to do in discharge of its constant duty to the Crown upon General proceeded to state that there was no Alien Law in India.

The Advocate-General here interrupted Mr. Justice Grant." My Lord, I could not have said there is no Alien Law in India. I have always contended the

Alien Law does extend to India."

Mr. Justice Grant.-Mr. Advocate General I may have mistaken your words. But it is so in my notes, and they are usually pretty accurate. Of course, I took you only to mean with reference to the matter in hand. But the note I made was this:-" No Alien Law in India. If there is, then not the Crown, but the East India Company ought to take advantage of it. Whole exercise of sovereignty is delegated. Escheats form a part." I may possibly have mistaken your expressions, but it is certain that the Advocate-General then being the advocate for the Crown, and the East India Com

Ff

any such case of breach of his duty to the Crown committed by the Advocate-General, I give no opinion. It were very unbecoming in me to suppose such a case, and as long as the office is in the hands that now hold it, I am very sure, it is impossible that it can intentionally happen; but if the case were to happen, if the Advocate-General has the right and duty under the statute to appear for the Crown, the objection would not be for want of parties; but that the Crown, a party, was betrayed by its officer.

The decree, however, says that these are not the proper parties, and it seems to intimate that if the AttorneyGeneral were in Calcutta the defect might be cured. I must, therefore, take the decree of February, 1832, as purporting that the Advocate General either does not or cannot represent the interests of the Crown upon this occasion. I do not say, whether this finding of the

of any evidence being gone into upon the subject after such admission. Nor can I conceive a case in which any thing more could be necessary than the information of the council or solicitors, unless some extraordinary mystery hung over an event usually notorious to all the surviving parties, and the neighbourhood where the deceased parties have resided. If the suit has abated, the court has no longer jurisdiction in that suit, till it is revived by supplying the defect from want of parties, and it is pars judicis to see that he has jurisdiction. But now we are in a different situation. We have it upon the records of our court that Palmer is dead and administration granted of his effects.

court is right or wrong, but I find it, as I understand the testators, Mr. Osborne and Mr. Grant appeared. this decree so decreed-and this is a decree upon fur- For the two executors, the most essentially necessary ther direction. I do not know how this can be revers-parties of any, no one at all appeared, and for the reason ed if it be wrong except upon a re-hearing, and until which I have mentioned that one of them was out of this be done, I take it that nothing which is against the the jurisdiction, and had not appeared in these causes, foundation of that decree can be done. I find it decreed for many years, and that the other was dead. But it is that the interests of the Crown are most materially con- now admitted that Mr. Deverine, who had been living cerned in the causes before the Court. I am aware that out of the jurisdiction, is dead also. [The Registrar said, decretal order of February, 1832, it is very difficult to I believe my Lord he died about the year 1830.] Adreconcile with the decretal order of 2d November 1816, ministration has been applied for, and we have granted which was pronounced expressly in the cause, Strettle it to the nearest of kin of Mr. Palmer the other exeAdvocate General, for and on behalf of His Majesty cutor. I was of opinion that the adinission at the bar of King George the Third, at the relation of John Martin the counsel for the plaintiff of the death of a necessary Wickens v. Palmer and Deverine, before either of the defendant was sufficient to compel the court to hold that bills in the two other original causes was filed,-and the cause had abated. And I have never heard or read that of 16th August, 1819, which consolidates this cause with the other two, and expressly recognizes the account taking in it between the Advocate-General as such informant on behalf of the King and the executors, and makes the parties to the other suits, parties to this account, they consenting. These decrees are express judicial recognitions of the right and duty of the Advocate-General appointed by the East India Company to appear in this cause, and for and on behalf of the King. And whether the judgments be in this respect right or wrong, they stand upon the record unaltered and unreversed. Then comes upon the 23rd February, 1832, a decretal order which, notwithstanding this, finds that the said Advocate-General cannot and does not appear in Here then we are in this position. The Advocatethis cause, for and on behalf of the King. I cannot re- General whose predecessor filed the first bill in these concile these decrees which most certainly standing on consolidated causes in the year 1816 on the part of the the same record in the same cause are utterly repugnant, crown as informant; and who now desires to appear in and cannot stand together. But I do not know any virtue of his office and of the statute in that character; way by which any of them may be reversed or altered the King being a necessary party both as parens patria except upon a rehearing. There is no way that I am and as having a patrimonial interest in right of his acquainted with of altering the record except recently crown, has been decreed by the court not to represent for errors of the officer in engrossing or in miscasting, the crown by virtue of his office of Advocate-General but upon rehearing, or if the decree is enrolled, upon in these causes. And that there is nobody here who bill of review. And how am I to know when the court does or can appear on the part of the King. The has decreed one thing, and so recorded its decree in Advocate-General, therefore, is out of court. We have 1816 and 1819, and has decreed the direct reverse and so no informant plaintiff in the first cause, and according recorded its decree in 1832, which is the decree that ought to this never had. The first cause, therefore, never hal to be rescinded and expunged from the record, and unless any legitimate existence. It has been decreed to have upon rehearing the cause? And one main ground for a bill been a supposititious birth. But however this may be, of review is error apparent upon the record. Although, it certainly has according to this decree no legitimate therefore, I think this decree of 1823 in this particular existence now. In the second cause there were only could not be regularly or validly pronounced as being repugnant to former decrees in the cause standing unreversed, I do not think there is any way in which this can be declared upon motion or petition, or ex proprio motu of the Judges, or otherwise than upon rehearing, or bill of review or appeal. But therein stands a decree that there are not the proper parties to the causes, that there is not before the court the proper officer to represent and protect the interests of the crown, and that these are largely concerned. What then ought to follow that the causes do stand over. It may have been right enough with one executor out of the jurisdiction and the other adjudged insolvent, to appoint a receiver, and to have the money paid into court for the safety of the property, there to wait till the proper parties should it is proposed, we should decree, i. e. in the first without be before the court, and till upon a rehearing the decrees any plaintiff, or any defendant, and in the other two finding that they should be reversed, if they ought without any defendant. This is not a question of regu to be reversed. But I think it much to be lamented that larity or irregularity, or of particular persons whether the court did not stop here, but should have proceeded by the rules of the court they are or are not necessary to refer it to the Master to make enquiries which, as I parties. Upon such questions if I had the misfortune to think, could not but be nugatory,--and to frame a report, differ from the majority of the court, I should feel mywhich in my opinion must be waste paper upon the very self bound by the decision of the court, and it would be shewing of its own decree, and to make decrees upon sundry matters not referred to the Master, which formy duty if the cause went on to give my best attention the same reason, as it appears to me, could not be otherwise than utterly irregular and without any possible legal benefit to any one.

For the Mayor and community of Lyons I have said that Mr. Prinsep appeared. For Christopher Martin and the other legatees, and some of the next of kin of

two defendants, the two executors, and they are both dead, and the cause has not been revived against their representatives. That cause, therefore, has totally abated, and no proceedings can be had in that. In the third cause the Advocate-General has been decreed to have no personæ standi in judicio, and the two executors are dead, so that there are no defendants in that cause. The fourth cause is a cross cause brought by the said two executors the only plaintiffs, who as I have said are both dead, besides which there has been no replication ever filed in that cause, so that this cause has never been in a state in which any order could be made.

The three first form the consolidated causes in which

and assistance to the decision of it. But in this case, not because it has not some of all the necessary parties where it appears to me, that the court has no jurisdiction, before it, about which there may sometimes be a difference of opinion, but that in one cause there are me parties according to what has been decreed. And in the two others there are plaintiffs but no defendants; and that

[ 227 ]

therefore there is in truth no cause at all before the rectly by himself who are, therefore, bound to see in all
court, for there can be no cause nor judicial proceeding cases that come before them, that the rights of the pre-
without two parties, plaintiff and defendant and a judge; rogative whether patrimonial or other, that may come into
and where there are not two parties there can be no judge; question in judgment are duly advocated by those to
King. And he is very ignorant of the laws and consti-
being in this case of this opinion, it follows that I ought whom this duty has been or may be assigned by the
tution of England who thinks that the least part of
not to take any further part in this proceeding.
the ancient and legal prerogative of the crown can be
invaded with safety to the liberty of the subject.

I have expressed no opinion upon the question whether
the Advocate General does or does not here, under the
statute, represent the King to the same extent and in the
same manner as the Attorney General in England. I
is not necessary to decide that in these causes till the
question shall be moved upon a re-hearing, when the
suit is revived, if the parties, when there shall be parties
to it, are so advised; but I think it proper that I should
state one thing upon which I have no doubt, namely,
that supposing the Advocate-General of the East India
Company to have that representation to its fullest extent,
he cannot at the same time represent or be counsel for
both the King and the Company, where they have
No counsel can appear
If hi-
conflicting interests.
flicting parties. He must make his election.
duty to the Company is paramount to that to the King
then he must elect accordingly, and the cause must
stand over till some one shall be duly appointed who
may appear for the King. If on the contrary, he appears
for the King with the leave of the Company, and the
Company have an essential interest in the suit, it must
stand over till the Company shall be made a party and
appoint some one else as their counsel.

for con

I think it right also to say that the decretal order of 23d February, 1832, is one in which I cannot concur; that I think it a decretal order to which it was and is impossible to give effect consistently in my opinion with the best established and best known rules of a Court of Equity? that there is hardly any part of it, in which I can master is exceptionable, though even with this it would agree except that which says that the report of the late be difficult, it having been confirmed, as I see stated, by consent, to deal, unless by the like consent; and that if the objection arising from there being at present no parties to the suit, but such as are all on one side, there being nobody to defend the estate itself, or against whom a decree can be made, nor that will assert the rights of the crown, nor that has any right to assert the rights of the Company, in whose favour no decree could be made in the shape the cause had acquired before it abated: that if these objections were removed, I could not concur in any order tending to give effect to this decretal order, but in my opinion before another step can be taken consistently with Equity, the causes being first rendered complete by the introduction of the necessary parties, must be opened up by general petition of re-hearing, and being carefully examined from the beginning upon the established rules of Courts of Equity freed from the errors and defects, which I am sorry to say, have infected and disgraced them from the decretal order of 2d December, 1822, downwards. Being of opinion that the court cannot lawfully or equitably take any proceedings in these causes in their present state, it is unnecessary that I should observe upon the particulars of the decretal order of February, 1832, or of the Master's Report. Indeed it would be inconsistent with my opinion,-that there is no cause at present before me to do so.

I have only to request of the Registrar, if he marks my presence at the causes being called on, that he will note that I am no party to the order which is about to be made.

Whether after appearing here upon the record as informant on the part of the Crown, supposing the Advocate-General to be authorized so to do, he can withdraw himself from that character in order to appear for the Company where their interests conflict, is another question. But I am very clear that in this case the escheat, if it falls at all, must fall to the King, unless there are peculiar circumstances arising out of the grant made to the Company of the Government of India, which vest it in the Company instead of the Crown. He cannot appear on the part and behalf of the crown to argue against the interests of the crown in favour of those of the Company under this grant., In this case the corporation having the local and delegated Government, and pretending to rights limiting or superseding the prerogative, by virtue of a grant from the King in Parliament or otherwise; and by virtue of such rights It seems to me strange to cite authorities to justify my pretending to an interest in the estate of the testator, the administration of which was under adjudication in these declaration of the law in matters which I consider so causes before they abated, ought to have been a party and to have appeared by their own counsel totally dis-plain and well established as the following propositions:— tinct from the counsel for the crown, to contest with the crown its claims against the crown; but it never can be contended that its Advocate-General or any other person on its behalf can take upon himself to decide whether we shall claim a right which is in dispute for the King; or whether he shall not rather claim it for the Company. But where the King and the Company have both interests to be heard in any suit, and their interests as in the present case are conflicting, they must both be made parties and contest their rights in the King's Court, as the King and other corporation would contest them in any other suit. For there is nothing more certain than that the corporation of the East India 3d. That no decretal order can be reversed except Company under its delegated powers, whether of Government or now of Legislation, cannot through any of its of For this I refer to 15 ficers, or by any means whatever, assume to itselfany part, upon re-hearing bill of review, or appeal, and that nothe most minute, of the prerogative of the crown, beyond thing can be done which is against the foundations of Ves. 75 1 Ves. Jun. 93 and the Prac. Reg. 357 Wy. what has been specially granted to it, or in any way li- such decree until it is reversed. mit or infringe upon that prerogative which resides ina-edition. I refer to the original book which is a book lienably. Though capable of being temporarily communicated in the person of the King, in trust for the servation of the rights and liberties of his people, the adjudicating upon which prerogative in all cases, and the giving effect to it according to law, he hath wholly and exclusively devolved upon judges commissioned di

For

1st. That the executor is a necessary party to a suit which concerns the administration of his testator's estate, and that no such suit can proceed without him. this I refer to 1. Eq., ca. ab. 73 and the modern case of Lowe v. Parley, 2. Mad. 101 and cases cited in both.

2d. That where a suit was abated, the consent of parties can enable the court to perform any further act, whether by process, order, or decree, except to pay money out of court or do some merely collateral thing until the suit is revived. For this I refer to Wharam v. Broughton, 1 Ves. Senr. 181 and Beard v. E. Powes 2 Ves. Senr. 399.

of authority. But pre

4th. That although where a decree signed and enrolled is capable of being executed by the ordinary pro cess of the court, whatever its inquity may be, the court till it is reversed is bound to assist it with its process, Ff2

On the 2d November, 1816, the information came on for hearing on the pleadings, and the Court decreed that the charitable bequests to the town of Calcutta into the 24th clause of the will, should be carried into execution; that two lacs of rupees, which was within the amount of assets admitted by Palmer to be in his hands, should be paid into Court, and applied to that purpose, that the master should prepare a scheme for the charity, and take an account of the personal estate of the testator from the hands of the executors, and of the debts and legacies, and advertize for creditors and legatees, and that a commission should issue, empowering the commissioners to receive the claims of creditors and legatees in England and France.

On the 4th March, 1819, the executors put in an answer to the bill of Christopher Martin, and the others, co-complainants, whereby they denied that complainants were heirs at law of Claude Martin : admitted that Claude was born at Lyons, and was domiciled at Lucknow at the time of his death, and stated him to have left landed property at Chandernagore, a French settlement, as well as at other places, charged Louis Martin with the receipt of the sums mentioned in the bills: and alse that Joseph, another executor, residing out of the juris

On the 20th August, 1818, a bill was filed by Mon-diction, had obtained possession of assets. sieur Godinot, Mayor of the city of Lyons in France, in behalf of the community of the city of Lyons, against the same executors, Palmer and Deverine, setting out the will, and stating nearly the same facts as had been set out in the information, and praying for the payment of the sums appropriated to charitable bequests in the city of Lyons by the 25th clause of the will, with arrears of

On the 3d June, 1829, a return was filed to a commission which was issued under the decree of the 2d November, 1816, stating that the commissioners had published advertisements, that no creditors had come in, that the city of Lyons had made their claim, but admitted the payment into the Court of Chancery in England of pounds sterling 25,833-6-8, and that Christo

pher Martin, Charles Xavier Marta Martin, and Cathe-paid to Mr. Abbott, the attorney for the city of Lyons, rine Charlotte Martin had put in claims on behalf of themselves, and the other next of kin to the residue; and it was further stated that the next of kin of the testator at the time of his death were Louis Martin, the testator's brother of the blood, Charles Xavier Maria Martin and Catherine Charlotte Martin, the children of Pierre Martin, another brother of the half-blood, who died in the life time of the testator, Fleane Martin, the wife of Christopher Durand Francois Martin, and Magdelene Martin, the three sisters of the half-blood

In August, 1819, the causes, in one of which Godinot was complainant, and in the other, Christopher Martin and others, were set down on bill and answer, and it was ordered that those two causes and the information filed by the Advocate-General, should be consolidated, and it was referred to the master to take an account of the rents and profits of the real estate of the testator Iving out of Calcutta, which had come to the hands of the executors, which was in the possession of the testator at the time of his death, and that all parties to the several causes should be parties to the account then going on in the master's office, and should be bound by it, and that 20.000 rupees should be paid to the attorney for the city of Lyons to be applied in the liberation of prisoners under the 25th clause of the will, and that the master should make one report in the consolidated causes by the

next term.

On the 5th November, 1822, the master made his report, whereby he reported that there was then in the hands of the executor Palmer, in Company's paper and cash, 21,55,963 Rs, of which 3,489 Rs were rents and profits of real estates out of Calcutta, and 3,60,415 of the real estate situate in Calcutta, including the price of a house sold, which was situate near Chandpaul ghat, that the usual advertisements had been made for crediture and legatees but none had come in.

together with a principal sum sufficient for the annual payment of four thousand rupees, and that the Master enquire and report what rates of interest have been produced by the government securities held by the executors, and that such be the rate of interest where interest by that decree was ordered to be allowed, and that the Master report what will be a proper sum to set apart for securing the payment of the pensions directed by the will, and that the Accountant-General do pay the same, and what will be a proper sum to appropriate to keep up the establishment, house, buildings, premises at Lucknow, , and to pay the salaries of the persons directed to be employed there and to keep up the tomb of the testator and two other persons named in the will, and that such sums be set apart from the estate, and that the Master enquire, whether the colleges directed to be connected with the establishment at Lucknow can be established and in what manner, and that interest is due on the sum of 100,000 appropriated to the college from 30th September, 1801, till it be paid, together with the arrears of the annual sum of 4,000 rupees, and that the Master ascertain what sum will be necessary for securing the payment of the said annual sum of 4,000 rupees for the release at Lucknow of prisoners for debt, and that the same be set apart, and that the Master do enquire and report what sums have been paid to, and received by, Louis Martin, one of the executors of Claude Martin, or the representatives of Louis, and to enquire and report who are the five poorest relatives, and that the Accountant-Generai set apart the sum of sicca rupees 20,000, with interest from 30th Sept. 1801, for the payment of them, and that the Master ascertain whether the will of Claude Martin was executed in the presence of three creditable witnesses, according to the statute of frauds, so as to pass the real estate in Calcutta ; and the Court decreed that the house at Chandpaul Ghaut, which had been sold, and which had been mortgaged to the testator, was of the nature of personal estate, and that the rents and profits and purchase money thereof are part of the assets; but that the real estate remaining unsold in Calcutta is freehold estate, and that the heirat-law, according to the law of England, is entitled thereto, and to the rents and profits, if the will was not executed so as to pass it, and the Master was directed to report who was the heir-at-law by the law of England, by the Mahomedan law, and who are the next of kin by the law of England, and who by the Mahomedan law, and what was the domicile of Claude Martin at the time of his death, and how by the laws and usages there the inheritance and succession to the real and personal estates; and the Master was directed to ascertain and report whether there was any and what residue after providing for all the directions of the will, and that all the costs past and to come be paid out of the funds in the hands of the Accountant-General.

On the 2nd of December, 1822, the cause coming on to be heard, the court decreed that the executors had fully accounted, that Palmer should pay the Accountant-General of the court the money found by the report of the Master to be in his hands, and that upon his doing so the two executors should be absolutely discharged and exonerated from the trusts and executorship of the will, and from all acts, deeds, receipts and payments concerning the same, and that the Accountant-General should be appointed receiver of the real estate, and that the Master should enquire respecting the bond against which Palmer On the 7th July, 1823, a commission which had issued claimed to be indemnified, and the Court decreed that in August, 1820, was returned with the examination of interest was due on the sum already paid into Court for witnesses in France on the claims of the city of Lyons, carrying into effect the charitable bequests to the town and also of Christopher Martin and his co-complainants, of Calcutta, from the 30th September, 1801, to 6th De- together with the answers of Christopher Martin and cember, 1816, and the master was directed to enquire his co-defendants to the cross bill filed by the executors. whether the estate was adequate to pay the additional These returns shewed the French law relating to public bequest to Calcutta, 150,000 Rs, and if so the town of charities, the constitution of the city of Lyons, and who Calcutta was declared to be entitled to the same with were the next of kin of the testator, Claude Martin, and interest from the time when the assets became sufficient Christopher Martin and the other defendants in the cross to have paid the same, that the charitable bequests to suit, admitted in their answers that Louis Martin, as exethe city of Lyons should be established and carried into cutor of Claude Martin, had possessed himself of 45,707 execution, and that interest was due on the sum of pounds sterling English, out of which he had paid the 200,000, appropriated to that purpose from 30th Septem- specific legacies due to the family and relations in France, ber, 1801, to the 10th July, 1816, when that sum was re- pursuant to decrees obtained in the courts there; they mitted to Europe, and that interest was due on the sum could give no account of what had been done with the reof 50,000 rupees from the 30th September, 1801, until mainder.

the same should be paid, and that the arrears of the On the 26th October, 1826, the Master reported a annual sum of four thousand rupees should also be scheme for the Calcutta charity, which on the 7th March, paid to the city of Lyons, and that these sums should be 1827, was sent back to the Master.