The Strategy of Conflict |
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... Bernard F. Haley , and Charles J. Hitch . Numerous associates , particularly at The RAND Corporation , have lent me ideas and stimulated my own ; I refer especially to Bernard Brodie , Daniel Ellsberg , Malcolm W. Hoag , Herman Kahn ...
... Bernard F. Haley , and Charles J. Hitch . Numerous associates , particularly at The RAND Corporation , have lent me ideas and stimulated my own ; I refer especially to Bernard Brodie , Daniel Ellsberg , Malcolm W. Hoag , Herman Kahn ...
Page 9
... Bernard Brodie in the first chapters of his Strategy in the Missile Age ( Princeton , 1959 ) . Pertinent also is Colonel Joseph I. Greene's foreword to the Modern Library edition of Clausewitz , On War ( New York , 1943 ) : " During ...
... Bernard Brodie in the first chapters of his Strategy in the Missile Age ( Princeton , 1959 ) . Pertinent also is Colonel Joseph I. Greene's foreword to the Modern Library edition of Clausewitz , On War ( New York , 1943 ) : " During ...
Page 20
Thomas C. Schelling. cerns the relative virtues of clean and dirty bombs . Bernard Brodie has pointed out that when one considers the special re- quirements of deterrence , in contrast to the requirements of a war that one expects to ...
Thomas C. Schelling. cerns the relative virtues of clean and dirty bombs . Bernard Brodie has pointed out that when one considers the special re- quirements of deterrence , in contrast to the requirements of a war that one expects to ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game