The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 278
... John Harsanyi . He says , " The bar- gaining problem has an obvious determinate solution in at least one special case : viz . , in situations that are completely symmetric with respect to the two bargaining parties . In this case it is ...
... John Harsanyi . He says , " The bar- gaining problem has an obvious determinate solution in at least one special case : viz . , in situations that are completely symmetric with respect to the two bargaining parties . In this case it is ...
Page 306
... Harsanyi , John , 113 , 267n , 268 , 272n , 278 , 279 , 280 , 284n , 287n Heise , G. A. , 86n vi Hints , 85 , 163f , 165n , 295 Hitch , Charles J. , Hitchcock , Alfred , 133n Hitchhiker , 183 Hitler , 17 Hoag , Malcolm W. , vi Hogan ...
... Harsanyi , John , 113 , 267n , 268 , 272n , 278 , 279 , 280 , 284n , 287n Heise , G. A. , 86n vi Hints , 85 , 163f , 165n , 295 Hitch , Charles J. , Hitchcock , Alfred , 133n Hitchhiker , 183 Hitler , 17 Hoag , Malcolm W. , vi Hogan ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game