The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 288
... Nash point appeal to us in the explicit - bargaining game - we should probably pick the Nash point . Without asking precisely why , let us go on to another variant of the game . This variant is tacit too ; but it differs in that we get ...
... Nash point appeal to us in the explicit - bargaining game - we should probably pick the Nash point . Without asking precisely why , let us go on to another variant of the game . This variant is tacit too ; but it differs in that we get ...
Page 289
... Nash point ) ; or some especially suggestive form that seems to point towards a particular point ; or unless there is an impurity ( such as a dot on the boundary , from a printer's error , or a single point whose coordinates are whole ...
... Nash point ) ; or some especially suggestive form that seems to point towards a particular point ; or unless there is an impurity ( such as a dot on the boundary , from a printer's error , or a single point whose coordinates are whole ...
Page 292
... point of departure : " The second condition prohibits confusion in the case of non- unique jointly admissible ... Nash in 1951. For a comparison of several related solution concepts see Chap . 5 of Luce and Raiffa , and J. F. Nash ...
... point of departure : " The second condition prohibits confusion in the case of non- unique jointly admissible ... Nash in 1951. For a comparison of several related solution concepts see Chap . 5 of Luce and Raiffa , and J. F. Nash ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game