The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 265
... Quemoy , we probably ought to be much less concerned about the outcome on Quemoy than about the character of the nuclear exchange , the precedents that it establishes , the role we manage to assume for ourselves , and the role the enemy ...
... Quemoy , we probably ought to be much less concerned about the outcome on Quemoy than about the character of the nuclear exchange , the precedents that it establishes , the role we manage to assume for ourselves , and the role the enemy ...
Page 266
... Quemoy , and that we should use them in a manner that achieves our Que- moy objectives . But , in considering whether the Chinese or Rus- sians would use them in return , we should perhaps not worry mainly about what they think their ...
... Quemoy , and that we should use them in a manner that achieves our Que- moy objectives . But , in considering whether the Chinese or Rus- sians would use them in return , we should perhaps not worry mainly about what they think their ...
Page 308
... Quemoy , 192 , 265f . See also Formosa Quota systems , 91 Kid- Racketeer , 12 , 137n . See also Black- mail ; Burglar ; Extortion ; napper ; Police Radner , Roy , 86n Raiffa , Howard , vi , 87 , 95n , 96n , 123 , 125 , 181п , 210 , 214 ...
... Quemoy , 192 , 265f . See also Formosa Quota systems , 91 Kid- Racketeer , 12 , 137n . See also Black- mail ; Burglar ; Extortion ; napper ; Police Radner , Roy , 86n Raiffa , Howard , vi , 87 , 95n , 96n , 123 , 125 , 181п , 210 , 214 ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game