The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 129
... Row . ) But , if commit- ment means the attachment of a finite penalty to the choice of row ii and we show this in the ... Row's re- sponse to II will be ii , in spite of the commitment . In this case the commitment is simply a loss that ...
... Row . ) But , if commit- ment means the attachment of a finite penalty to the choice of row ii and we show this in the ... Row's re- sponse to II will be ii , in spite of the commitment . In this case the commitment is simply a loss that ...
Page 154
... row 1 , and column 1 if he commits himself to row 2. " For Row , a strategy consists of a decision on 0 , 1 , or 2 ... Row's best out- come is to commit himself to row ii . This is the evident " solu- tion " ; it has a payoff of [ 52 ] ...
... row 1 , and column 1 if he commits himself to row 2. " For Row , a strategy consists of a decision on 0 , 1 , or 2 ... Row's best out- come is to commit himself to row ii . This is the evident " solu- tion " ; it has a payoff of [ 52 ] ...
Page 185
... Row is now committed - contains no reward . Row's problem is that he needs row ii to induce Col- umn into I , but he needs row i to profit from I. A compromise can be achieved by a randomized commitment - a commitment to a randomized ...
... Row is now committed - contains no reward . Row's problem is that he needs row ii to induce Col- umn into I , but he needs row i to profit from I. A compromise can be achieved by a randomized commitment - a commitment to a randomized ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game