## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 129

But, if commitment means the attachment of a finite penalty to the choice of

and we show this in the matrix by subtracting from each of

clear to Column that

But, if commitment means the attachment of a finite penalty to the choice of

**row**iiand we show this in the matrix by subtracting from each of

**Row's**... Otherwise it isclear to Column that

**Row's**response to II will be ii, in spite of the commitment.Page 154

For

denoting how he will react to each of Column's possible ... For example, 1; I-i, II-i

would mean, “Commit to

For

**Row**, a strategy consists of a decision on o, I, or 2, plus a pair of symbolsdenoting how he will react to each of Column's possible ... For example, 1; I-i, II-i

would mean, “Commit to

**row**i, then choose**row**i no matter what Column does.Page 185

1) can be used to illustrate this situation if we change the rules of the game to

permit

ii to induce Column into I, but he needs

...

1) can be used to illustrate this situation if we change the rules of the game to

permit

**Row**an unconditional commitment ...**Row's**problem is that he needs**row**ii to induce Column into I, but he needs

**row**i to profit from I. A compromise can be...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game