The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 190
... Russians ) take precautions commensurate with a crisis ; knowing this , the Russians may have to take the risk into account . Finally , the threat is not discredited even if the Russians accom- plish their purpose without triggering war ...
... Russians ) take precautions commensurate with a crisis ; knowing this , the Russians may have to take the risk into account . Finally , the threat is not discredited even if the Russians accom- plish their purpose without triggering war ...
Page 197
... Russians to get out of Hungary or it will work terrible damage on the USSR . The Russians ignore the threat , since there is no persuasive way for the threatening country to make itself have to do anything so suicidal . Alternatively ...
... Russians to get out of Hungary or it will work terrible damage on the USSR . The Russians ignore the threat , since there is no persuasive way for the threatening country to make itself have to do anything so suicidal . Alternatively ...
Page 252
... Russian belief that we might be goaded into deliberate attack . The Russians might not believe this if their retaliatory forces were substantially invulnerable to a first strike by ours . It can be argued that except under the most ...
... Russian belief that we might be goaded into deliberate attack . The Russians might not believe this if their retaliatory forces were substantially invulnerable to a first strike by ours . It can be argued that except under the most ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game