The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 18
... advantage to be rational , particularly if the fact of being rational or irrational cannot be concealed . It is not invari- ably an advantage , in the face of a threat , to have a communica- tion system in good order , to have complete ...
... advantage to be rational , particularly if the fact of being rational or irrational cannot be concealed . It is not invari- ably an advantage , in the face of a threat , to have a communica- tion system in good order , to have complete ...
Page 160
... advantage of its claim if the tactic failed . ) 30 " STRATEGIC MOVES " If the essence of a game of strategy is the dependence of each person's proper choice of action on what he expects the other to do , it may be useful to define a ...
... advantage of its claim if the tactic failed . ) 30 " STRATEGIC MOVES " If the essence of a game of strategy is the dependence of each person's proper choice of action on what he expects the other to do , it may be useful to define a ...
Page 231
... advantages in thinking of the surprise- attack problem as one suitable for negotiation . The innovation in the surprise ... advantage of striking first can be elimi- nated or severely reduced , the incentive to strike at all will be re ...
... advantages in thinking of the surprise- attack problem as one suitable for negotiation . The innovation in the surprise ... advantage of striking first can be elimi- nated or severely reduced , the incentive to strike at all will be re ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game