The Strategy of Conflict |
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... balance of terror and the ancient institution of hostages . The analysis is neither difficult nor so dependent on mathe- matics or analytical apparatus as to be inaccessible to any serious reader . A few chapters call for a rudimentary ...
... balance of terror and the ancient institution of hostages . The analysis is neither difficult nor so dependent on mathe- matics or analytical apparatus as to be inaccessible to any serious reader . A few chapters call for a rudimentary ...
Page 137
... balance of terror " that is so often adverted to isif , in fact , it exists and is stable equivalent to a total exchange of all conceivable hostages . ( The analogy requires that the balance be stable , i.e. , that neither side be able ...
... balance of terror " that is so often adverted to isif , in fact , it exists and is stable equivalent to a total exchange of all conceivable hostages . ( The analogy requires that the balance be stable , i.e. , that neither side be able ...
Page 252
Thomas C. Schelling. ity of the balance of terror ; and the stakes of course are very high . So although we cannot be sure that a deliberate policy of collaborating to make each side's retaliatory forces invul- nerable would make any ...
Thomas C. Schelling. ity of the balance of terror ; and the stakes of course are very high . So although we cannot be sure that a deliberate policy of collaborating to make each side's retaliatory forces invul- nerable would make any ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game