The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 271
... bargaining game . And each player knows this . The most informative way to characterize the game , then , is not that the players must reach overt agreement by the time the final bell rings or forego the rewards altogether . It is that ...
... bargaining game . And each player knows this . The most informative way to characterize the game , then , is not that the players must reach overt agreement by the time the final bell rings or forego the rewards altogether . It is that ...
Page 280
... bargaining- game situation ( with perfect information about utilities ) , a par- ticular outcome such that a ... bargaining game is virtually identical with the intellectual process of arriving at a coordinated choice in the tacit game ...
... bargaining- game situation ( with perfect information about utilities ) , a par- ticular outcome such that a ... bargaining game is virtually identical with the intellectual process of arriving at a coordinated choice in the tacit game ...
Page 288
... game that has just been played and told that we are now to be perfect partners , winning and losing together . Conscious of the fact that our present game is modeled on a bargaining game we are to pick , without communicating ...
... game that has just been played and told that we are now to be perfect partners , winning and losing together . Conscious of the fact that our present game is modeled on a bargaining game we are to pick , without communicating ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game