The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 25
... bilateral monopoly problem is as follows . One member of the pair shifts his marginal cost curve so that joint profits are now zero at the output at which joint profits originally would have been maxi- mized . He does this through an ...
... bilateral monopoly problem is as follows . One member of the pair shifts his marginal cost curve so that joint profits are now zero at the output at which joint profits originally would have been maxi- mized . He does this through an ...
Page 29
... bilateral monopoly solution suggested earlier , there is a transfer of interest to a third party with a resulting visible shift in one's own incentive structure . fashion publicity is required . Both the initial offer and AN ESSAY ON ...
... bilateral monopoly solution suggested earlier , there is a transfer of interest to a third party with a resulting visible shift in one's own incentive structure . fashion publicity is required . Both the initial offer and AN ESSAY ON ...
Page 35
... bilateral monopoly between firms , the ends of the bargaining range are points of zero profits for one or the other party ; and to settle for one's minimum position is no better than no settlement at all . But , apart from certain ...
... bilateral monopoly between firms , the ends of the bargaining range are points of zero profits for one or the other party ; and to settle for one's minimum position is no better than no settlement at all . But , apart from certain ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game