The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 95
... cell where their choices intersect . If to each choice of one player there corresponds a single choice for the other that " wins " for both of them , we can arrange columns so that all the winning cells lie along the diagonal . In those ...
... cell where their choices intersect . If to each choice of one player there corresponds a single choice for the other that " wins " for both of them , we can arrange columns so that all the winning cells lie along the diagonal . In those ...
Page 154
... cell in the upper row , which is the upper left cell , i , I . And Row knows that , if he commits himself to row i , he gets the payoff in that upper - left cell , which is 2. ( B ) If , instead , Row commits himself to row ii ...
... cell in the upper row , which is the upper left cell , i , I . And Row knows that , if he commits himself to row i , he gets the payoff in that upper - left cell , which is 2. ( B ) If , instead , Row commits himself to row ii ...
Page 185
... cell differs from zero , say o.5 or 0.5 , the for- mula for optimum value of # differs somewhat . ) If Row's payoff in the lower left cell were 1 , no commitment with a greater than 50 per cent chance of ii would serve . And if that ...
... cell differs from zero , say o.5 or 0.5 , the for- mula for optimum value of # differs somewhat . ) If Row's payoff in the lower left cell were 1 , no commitment with a greater than 50 per cent chance of ii would serve . And if that ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game