## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 95

8 and they receive the rewards denoted by the numbers contained in the

where their choices intersect. ... a single choice for the other that “wins” for both of

them, we can arrange columns so that all the winning

8 and they receive the rewards denoted by the numbers contained in the

**cell**where their choices intersect. ... a single choice for the other that “wins” for both of

them, we can arrange columns so that all the winning

**cells**lie along the diagonal.Page 154

(A) If Row is committed to row i, with a penalty of 5 for breaking his commitment,

Column can see that row i will be chosen, no matter which column he chooses;

Column chooses his preferred

.

(A) If Row is committed to row i, with a penalty of 5 for breaking his commitment,

Column can see that row i will be chosen, no matter which column he chooses;

Column chooses his preferred

**cell**in the upper row, which is the upper left**cell**, i,I.

Page 185

A firm commitment to ii induces a choice of column I but is wasted because the

lower left

problem is that he needs row ii to induce Column into I, but he needs row i to

profit ...

A firm commitment to ii induces a choice of column I but is wasted because the

lower left

**cell**— to which Row is now committed — contains no reward. Row'sproblem is that he needs row ii to induce Column into I, but he needs row i to

profit ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game