The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 48
... choice of aß or AB and North chooses the latter . Note that it is not sufficient for East to commit his choice in advance , as it was in Figure 1 ; he must commit himself to a conditional choice , B or ẞ depending on whether North ...
... choice of aß or AB and North chooses the latter . Note that it is not sufficient for East to commit his choice in advance , as it was in Figure 1 ; he must commit himself to a conditional choice , B or ẞ depending on whether North ...
Page 185
... choice but not per- mitting him to make his choice depend on Column's . A firm com- mitment to ii induces a choice of column I but is wasted because the lower left cell to which Row is now committed - contains no reward . Row's problem ...
... choice but not per- mitting him to make his choice depend on Column's . A firm com- mitment to ii induces a choice of column I but is wasted because the lower left cell to which Row is now committed - contains no reward . Row's problem ...
Page 217
... choice , to attack or not , while C is constrained to wait ; and C can attack only after R has had an opportunity to make his choice and act on it , and only if R has not attacked . We now build further on this game , by letting C have ...
... choice , to attack or not , while C is constrained to wait ; and C can attack only after R has had an opportunity to make his choice and act on it , and only if R has not attacked . We now build further on this game , by letting C have ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game