## The Strategy of Conflict |

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Page 48

2 but if East can effectively threaten the mutually undesirable ag, he leaves North

only a

for East to commit his

2 but if East can effectively threaten the mutually undesirable ag, he leaves North

only a

**choice**of ag or AB and North chooses the latter. Note that it is not sufficientfor East to commit his

**choice**in advance, as it was in Figure I ; he must commit ...Page 185

Thomas C. Schelling. do this one must retain the right to move second, exploiting

only the right to commit oneself ahead of time; if one had actually to move first, by

a definite

Thomas C. Schelling. do this one must retain the right to move second, exploiting

only the right to commit oneself ahead of time; if one had actually to move first, by

a definite

**choice**, the possibility of a randomized commitment would be lost.Page 217

Suppose R is given a free

and C can attack only after R has had an opportunity to make his

on it, and only if R has not attacked. We now build further on this game, by letting

...

Suppose R is given a free

**choice**, to attack or not, while C is constrained to wait;and C can attack only after R has had an opportunity to make his

**choice**and acton it, and only if R has not attacked. We now build further on this game, by letting

...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game