## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 60

I. A and B are to

heads,” A gets $3 and B gets $2; if both

they

I. A and B are to

**choose**“heads” or “tails” without communicating. If both**choose**“heads,” A gets $3 and B gets $2; if both

**choose**“tails,” A gets $2 and B gets $3. Ifthey

**choose**differently, neither gets anything. You are A (or B); which do you ...Page 126

But the issue is both simpler and more precise than that. Consider the left-hand

matrix in Fig. 9, where Column is assumed to have “first move.” Without threats,

Column has an easy “win.” He chooses strategy I, forcing Row to

between ...

But the issue is both simpler and more precise than that. Consider the left-hand

matrix in Fig. 9, where Column is assumed to have “first move.” Without threats,

Column has an easy “win.” He chooses strategy I, forcing Row to

**choose**between ...

Page 178

THE RISK OF FAILURE The risk of failure, however, does give an incentive to

made is some horrendous act, one may be tempted to scale it down by attaching

it to a ...

THE RISK OF FAILURE The risk of failure, however, does give an incentive to

**choose**moderate rather than excessive threats. If the only threat that can bemade is some horrendous act, one may be tempted to scale it down by attaching

it to a ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game