The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 100
... clue in the event that it appears to discriminate against him . They must find their clues where they can . ( If the map they are using hap- pens , for example , to contain an embarrassing richness of clues , making it difficult to ...
... clue in the event that it appears to discriminate against him . They must find their clues where they can . ( If the map they are using hap- pens , for example , to contain an embarrassing richness of clues , making it difficult to ...
Page 298
... clue to pursue , we may as well agree to use this rule to reach a meeting of minds . " - - to In this case the players are not choosing their second strategies because 5 is preferable to o . They have no serious expectation of getting 5 ...
... clue to pursue , we may as well agree to use this rule to reach a meeting of minds . " - - to In this case the players are not choosing their second strategies because 5 is preferable to o . They have no serious expectation of getting 5 ...
Page 299
... clue to common choice . Why not take the clue contained in the other cells , which seems to point toward ( ii , II ) ? 7 we ask him how much he'd pay for the privilege of playing the different vari- ants in place of the one with 5. ) If ...
... clue to common choice . Why not take the clue contained in the other cells , which seems to point toward ( ii , II ) ? 7 we ask him how much he'd pay for the privilege of playing the different vari- ants in place of the one with 5. ) If ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game