The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 34
... commitment to $ 2.07 % ; why not $ 2.024 ? The numerical scale is too continuous to provide good resting places , except at nice round numbers like $ 2.00 . But a commitment to the principle of " profit sharing , " " cost - of - living ...
... commitment to $ 2.07 % ; why not $ 2.024 ? The numerical scale is too continuous to provide good resting places , except at nice round numbers like $ 2.00 . But a commitment to the principle of " profit sharing , " " cost - of - living ...
Page 39
... commitment may be a pro- gressive one , the commitments acquiring their firmness by a se- quence of actions . Communication is often neither entirely impossible nor entirely reliable ; while certain evidence of one's commitment can be ...
... commitment may be a pro- gressive one , the commitments acquiring their firmness by a se- quence of actions . Communication is often neither entirely impossible nor entirely reliable ; while certain evidence of one's commitment can be ...
Page 124
... commitment fixes one's course of action , the threat fixes a course of reaction , of response to the other player . The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first move carries an advantage ; the threat is a ...
... commitment fixes one's course of action , the threat fixes a course of reaction , of response to the other player . The commitment is a means of gaining first move in a game in which first move carries an advantage ; the threat is a ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game