The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 73
... communication to full communication all show some dependence on the need to coordinate expectations . Hence all show some degree of dependence of the participants themselves on their common inability to keep their eyes off cer- tain ...
... communication to full communication all show some dependence on the need to coordinate expectations . Hence all show some degree of dependence of the participants themselves on their common inability to keep their eyes off cer- tain ...
Page 146
Thomas C. Schelling. COMMUNICATION AND ITS DESTRUCTION Many interesting game tactics and game situations depend on the structure of communication , particularly asymmetries in com- munication and unilateral options to initiate communication ...
Thomas C. Schelling. COMMUNICATION AND ITS DESTRUCTION Many interesting game tactics and game situations depend on the structure of communication , particularly asymmetries in com- munication and unilateral options to initiate communication ...
Page 147
... communicate a commitment requires more than communication of words . One has to communicate evidence that the commitment exists ; this may mean that one can communicate a threat only if he can make the other person see something with ...
... communicate a commitment requires more than communication of words . One has to communicate evidence that the commitment exists ; this may mean that one can communicate a threat only if he can make the other person see something with ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game