The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 5
... conflict . Concepts like deterrence , limited war , and disarmament , as well as negotiation , are concerned with the common interest and mutual dependence that can exist between participants in a conflict . Thus , strategy in the sense ...
... conflict . Concepts like deterrence , limited war , and disarmament , as well as negotiation , are concerned with the common interest and mutual dependence that can exist between participants in a conflict . Thus , strategy in the sense ...
Page 89
... conflict and mutual dependence . It is interesting that we have no very good word for the relation be- tween the players : in the common - interest game we can refer to them as " partners " and in the pure - conflict game as " opponents ...
... conflict and mutual dependence . It is interesting that we have no very good word for the relation be- tween the players : in the common - interest game we can refer to them as " partners " and in the pure - conflict game as " opponents ...
Page
... conflict situations against which it is tested are " essentially bargaining situations . " The strategy may be explicit or tacit , the conflict may arise between adversaries or partners , and the area of pertinence extends from game ...
... conflict situations against which it is tested are " essentially bargaining situations . " The strategy may be explicit or tacit , the conflict may arise between adversaries or partners , and the area of pertinence extends from game ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game