The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 7
... deterrence is . This is not said to depreciate the efforts of people who have struggled with the deterrence concept over the last dozen years . On strategic matters of which deterrence is an example , those ho have tried to devise ...
... deterrence is . This is not said to depreciate the efforts of people who have struggled with the deterrence concept over the last dozen years . On strategic matters of which deterrence is an example , those ho have tried to devise ...
Page 10
... deterrence . * The idea of deterrence figures so prominently in some areas of conflict other than international affairs that one might have sup- posed the existence of a well - cultivated theory already available to be exploited for ...
... deterrence . * The idea of deterrence figures so prominently in some areas of conflict other than international affairs that one might have sup- posed the existence of a well - cultivated theory already available to be exploited for ...
Page 11
... deterrence stand out vividly in child discipline : the importance of rationality and self - disci- pline on the part of the person to be deterred , of his ability to comprehend the threat if he hears it and to hear it through the din ...
... deterrence stand out vividly in child discipline : the importance of rationality and self - disci- pline on the part of the person to be deterred , of his ability to comprehend the threat if he hears it and to hear it through the din ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game