The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 195
... enemy territory ? As in limited war , there again may be two parts to the " cost " imposed on an enemy . One is a direct cost : casualties , destruction , humiliation , or whatever it may be . The other is the created risk of all - out ...
... enemy territory ? As in limited war , there again may be two parts to the " cost " imposed on an enemy . One is a direct cost : casualties , destruction , humiliation , or whatever it may be . The other is the created risk of all - out ...
Page 235
... enemy to triple the size of his attack may substantially increase the enemy's dif- ficulty of sneaking past our warning system , and appreciably change his likelihood of successfully precluding retaliation . The same kind of calculation ...
... enemy to triple the size of his attack may substantially increase the enemy's dif- ficulty of sneaking past our warning system , and appreciably change his likelihood of successfully precluding retaliation . The same kind of calculation ...
Page 265
... enemy treatment of them , partly to avoid misinterpreting enemy intentions if he treats them dif- ferently after nuclears are brought into play . ) A third conclusion is that on the occasion of their first use we should perhaps be at ...
... enemy treatment of them , partly to avoid misinterpreting enemy intentions if he treats them dif- ferently after nuclears are brought into play . ) A third conclusion is that on the occasion of their first use we should perhaps be at ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game