The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 39
... evidence of one's commitment can be communicated directly , other evidence must travel by newspaper or hearsay , or be demonstrated by actions . In these cases the unhappy possibility of both acts occurring , as a result of simultaneous ...
... evidence of one's commitment can be communicated directly , other evidence must travel by newspaper or hearsay , or be demonstrated by actions . In these cases the unhappy possibility of both acts occurring , as a result of simultaneous ...
Page 72
... evidence for the latter view . The evidence is simply that if they had to divide the $ 100 without communicating , they could concert on 50-50 . Instead of relying on intuition , then , we can point to the fact that in a slightly ...
... evidence for the latter view . The evidence is simply that if they had to divide the $ 100 without communicating , they could concert on 50-50 . Instead of relying on intuition , then , we can point to the fact that in a slightly ...
Page 250
... evidence . One reduces the proba- bility of missing such evidence by enlarging and intensifying the system ; and one supposes that the evasion is made difficult by the need to keep activities hidden over a long period . But in a crisis ...
... evidence . One reduces the proba- bility of missing such evidence by enlarging and intensifying the system ; and one supposes that the evasion is made difficult by the need to keep activities hidden over a long period . But in a crisis ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game