## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 19

Many of these

, rationality, knowledge, control, or freedom of choice. They are all, in principle,

valid in certain circumstances; but seeing through their strangeness and ...

Many of these

**examples**involve some denial of the value of skill, resourcefulness, rationality, knowledge, control, or freedom of choice. They are all, in principle,

valid in certain circumstances; but seeing through their strangeness and ...

Page 67

In bargains that involve numerical magnitudes, for

strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity. A trivial illustration is the tendency

for the outcomes to be expressed in “round numbers”; the salesman who works ...

In bargains that involve numerical magnitudes, for

**example**, there seems to be astrong magnetism in mathematical simplicity. A trivial illustration is the tendency

for the outcomes to be expressed in “round numbers”; the salesman who works ...

Page 169

A “scenario” might, for

might give the outcomes of previous plays of the same game by other players; it

might give a background story that would tend to identify some particular division

of ...

A “scenario” might, for

**example**, identify one of the players as “aggressor”; itmight give the outcomes of previous plays of the same game by other players; it

might give a background story that would tend to identify some particular division

of ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game