The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 158
... final paragraph of Chapter 2 , and referred to as an abstract example of the principle that , in bargaining , weakness may be strength . ) There is probably no single principle of game theory that epitomizes so strikingly the mixed ...
... final paragraph of Chapter 2 , and referred to as an abstract example of the principle that , in bargaining , weakness may be strength . ) There is probably no single principle of game theory that epitomizes so strikingly the mixed ...
Page 270
... final offer . That is , there is some last moment before the bell rings , beyond which it is too late to change one's existing offer . Under the rules of the game and the rationality postulate both players know this . And by the rule of ...
... final offer . That is , there is some last moment before the bell rings , beyond which it is too late to change one's existing offer . Under the rules of the game and the rationality postulate both players know this . And by the rule of ...
Page 271
... final bell rings or forego the rewards altogether . It is that they must reach overt agreement by a particular ( and well - identified ) penultimate moment - when the " warning bell " rings- or else play the tacit variant of the same ...
... final bell rings or forego the rewards altogether . It is that they must reach overt agreement by a particular ( and well - identified ) penultimate moment - when the " warning bell " rings- or else play the tacit variant of the same ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game