The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 11
... important , of the threatened party's conviction that the threat will be carried out . Clearer perhaps in child discipline than in criminal deterrence is the im- portant possibility that the threatened punishment will hurt the ...
... important , of the threatened party's conviction that the threat will be carried out . Clearer perhaps in child discipline than in criminal deterrence is the im- portant possibility that the threatened punishment will hurt the ...
Page 231
Thomas C. Schelling. dox in its dramatic reminder that , important as it may be to keep secrets from an enemy and in ... importance of not keeping that particular secret has an analogue in our alleged political inability to attack first ...
Thomas C. Schelling. dox in its dramatic reminder that , important as it may be to keep secrets from an enemy and in ... importance of not keeping that particular secret has an analogue in our alleged political inability to attack first ...
Page 258
... important distinction in the process of limiting war or destroying its limits . Similarly , there is little difference between the terrain a hundred miles north of the Soviet - Iranian border and the ter- rain a hundred miles south , or ...
... important distinction in the process of limiting war or destroying its limits . Similarly , there is little difference between the terrain a hundred miles north of the Soviet - Iranian border and the ter- rain a hundred miles south , or ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game