The Strategy of Conflict |
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Page 29
... incentive structure of his own that differs from his principal's . This device is involved in automobile insurance ; the private citizen , in settling out of court , cannot threaten suit as effectively as the insurance company since the ...
... incentive structure of his own that differs from his principal's . This device is involved in automobile insurance ; the private citizen , in settling out of court , cannot threaten suit as effectively as the insurance company since the ...
Page 36
... incentives so as to demonstrate that he would , ex post , have an incentive to carry it out . " We are back again at the commitment . How can one commit himself in advance to an act that he would in fact prefer not to carry out in the ...
... incentives so as to demonstrate that he would , ex post , have an incentive to carry it out . " We are back again at the commitment . How can one commit himself in advance to an act that he would in fact prefer not to carry out in the ...
Page 124
... incentive for doing as one warns he will . As a matter of fact , if a threat is of such nature ( as it often is ) that the act of commitment is not contained in the act of communicating it — if the commitment precedes the conveyance of ...
... incentive for doing as one warns he will . As a matter of fact , if a threat is of such nature ( as it often is ) that the act of commitment is not contained in the act of communicating it — if the commitment precedes the conveyance of ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
2 An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision | 83 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game