## The Strategy of Conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 30

Both the

surrounds either point, or if the outcome is inherently not observable, the device

is unavailable. If one party has a “public” and the other has not, the latter may try

...

Both the

**initial**offer and the final outcome would have to be known; and if secrecysurrounds either point, or if the outcome is inherently not observable, the device

is unavailable. If one party has a “public” and the other has not, the latter may try

...

Page 31

If duopolists, for example, divide markets in a way that maximizes their combined

profits, some

the profits requires that one firm be able to compensate the other. If the fact of ...

If duopolists, for example, divide markets in a way that maximizes their combined

profits, some

**initial**accrual of profits is thereby determined; any other division ofthe profits requires that one firm be able to compensate the other. If the fact of ...

Page 35

If the truth is more demonstrable than a false position, a conservative

position is indicated, as it is if any withdrawal from an

would discredit any subsequent attempt to convey the truth. Actually, though a

person ...

If the truth is more demonstrable than a false position, a conservative

**initial**position is indicated, as it is if any withdrawal from an

**initial**“advanced” positionwould discredit any subsequent attempt to convey the truth. Actually, though a

person ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

2 An Essay on Bargaining 2 I | 21 |

Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior bilateral monopoly cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggests suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game